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 Note on terminology 
 The vocabulary used to describe ethnic, racial and migration identi-
ties is inevitably fl awed and contested. In this book we have chosen 
to use some terms and not others: 
 Migrant – We use this term to denote those who have moved, either 
temporarily or permanently, from one country to another. In some 
research studies, the category ‘migrant’ refers to those who have citi-
zenship in another country from the one in which they reside. We do 
not refer to descendants of migrants as migrants unless they them-
selves have also moved between countries, nor as second- or third-
generation migrants. 
 Asylum seeker – Someone who has left their country of citizenship and 
applied for asylum (refugee status) in another country but whose 
application has not yet been decided. 
 Refugee – The 1951 Refugee Convention defi nes a refugee as ‘any 
person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his/her nationality 
and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself/
herself of the protection of that country’. 
 Illegal/irregular –  Rather than referring to an individual as an ‘illegal’ 
migrant we use the terms ‘irregular’ and ‘undocumented’ for those 
without a visa or citizenship as this is usually more accurate, given 
the frequent changes in law and its interpretation, and individuals’ 
changing circumstances in relation to this. The exception to this use 
of language is when we refer to the survey work undertaken with Ipsos 
MORI. In some of the questions for that survey, the term ‘illegal/
irregular migrant’ was used, as it was seen as more likely to be rec-
ognised in everyday conversation. 
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 Minoritised – In general we do not use the term ‘minority ethnic’ or 
‘ethnic minority’, except when this is the term used in texts we are 
discussing or by others we have been in conversation with (for the 
survey we commissioned, for example, Ipsos MORI use the language 
of ‘white’ or ‘black and minority ethnic (BME)’). We use ‘racialised 
minorities’ and ‘racially minoritised’ to draw attention to the active 
processes of racialisation that are involved in terminology. 
 EU citizen – In most countries of the European Union (EU), citizens 
of fellow member countries of the EU are referred to as EU citizens, 
and migrants from countries outside the EU are referred to as ‘third-
country nationals’. In the UK, common political and public debate 
has tended to refer to citizens of other EU countries as migrants, 
despite sharing many similar rights of settlement, work and welfare 
with UK citizens while the UK remains a member state of the EU. 
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 Introduction 
 To say good-bye is to submit to the will of heaven. 
 John Berger and Jean Mohr  ( 2010/1975 : 36) 
 ‘It ’ s extreme, scary’, said a woman from Senegal. She was looking at 
an image of a van carrying a government billboard with the words ‘In 
the UK illegally? GO HOME OR FACE ARREST’. 
 Hannah had asked this group of asylum seekers and refugees in 
Bradford what came to mind when they saw the photograph of the 
van and its huge billboards (see Figure  1 ). For the next person to 
speak, it was the broken promises between a husband and wife. 
Imagine this, Sara 1 said: in their country he had made her many 
promises, now she ’ s alone here, she doesn ’ t know anything. She does 
not know about the rules. In this new world her husband is everything. 
Imagine that her husband beats her and kicks her out. She tries to ask 
her family for help but they will not let her come back: ‘Where will 
she live? Where will she go?’ 
 Lucee, a refugee from Sierra Leone, worried that the van would 
create ‘racial tension’. All foreigners could be stigmatised. In the area 
where she lived, ‘there had been a few racist things going on … these 
are people who obviously don ’ t care whether I ’ ve got my stay or not 
… every time they ’ ve seen me they ’ ve always told me to go back to 
my country. So imagine if they saw this they ’ d probably call them [the 
Home Offi ce], pick me up [laughs], do you know?’ 
 The van had got Abas thinking about why he had fl ed Afghanistan 
to come to England, rather than seeking refuge elsewhere. In his 
mind ’ s eye, England was a place where he might be able to continue 
his education or even get a good job; there was the BBC, and the best 
newspapers! 
 1 All the interviews were anonymised to protect the privacy of the research 
participants, so the names used in this book are pseudonyms. 
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 That a single image of a government immigration policing cam-
paign can bring up such thoughts and feelings begins to suggest 
something of the emotional, existential and political textures of con-
temporary immigration control – the ‘submitting to the will of heaven’ 
– of which the crossing of national borders and citizenship rights 
is just one part. For those like Lucee, the Go Home campaign is 
frightening because it might infl ame the hostility and racism that she 
has already faced in her local community. Sara ’ s stream of conscious-
ness is deeply gendered; the fi gures of an aggressive and volatile 
husband and a host country are almost interchangeable (see also 
 Gunaratnam and Patel,  2015 ). The questions Sara asked in imagining 
a homeless and abused wife – ‘Where will she live? Where will she 
go?’ – when transposed into the contemporary political vocabulary of 
the nation state can be read as: Who belongs? Who can move and how 
easily? Who can stay? For how long? And on what terms? 
 It was questions like this that troubled us when we came together 
as activist researchers to counter the 2013 Home Offi ce immigration 
publicity campaign ‘Operation Vaken’, of which the vans discussed 
in the Bradford focus group were a part. Five months later, and in 
partnership with civil society organisations in six different areas 
in England, Scotland and Wales, our funded project, ‘Mapping 
Immigration Controversy’ (MIC) began. We used multiple methods 
(ethnographic observation, focus groups, qualitative interviews and a 
 Figure 1:  Go Home van 
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survey) to research Vaken-related policy and media narratives and 
associated initiatives. We were especially keen to investigate Vaken ’ s 
aftermath in local communities. 
 The moment of the Go Home van seemed to us to be a turning 
point in the climate of immigration debates – a ratcheting up of anti-
migrant feeling to the point where it was possible for a government-
sponsored advertisement to use the same hate speech and rhetoric as 
far-right racists. Sadly, as we fi nish writing this book in the immediate 
aftermath of the UK ’ s June 2016 referendum on membership of the 
European Union, it seems as if the process has gone full circle. In the 
days immediately following the narrow vote to ‘Leave’ the EU, after 
a campaign largely focused on the ‘problem’ of immigration control, 
there have been many reports of physical and verbal abuse of migrants 
and racially minoritised people, linked directly to the Leave vote and 
to the violating language of the Go Home van. Shazia Awan, a Muslim 
businesswoman from Caerphilly in Wales and a Remain campaigner 
in the referendum, was told on Twitter the day after the referendum 
result ‘Great news … you can pack your bags, you ’ re going home … 
BYE THEN’ ( Staufenberg,  2016 ). Signs saying ‘Leave the EU, No 
more Polish vermin’ were left outside homes and schools in Hunting-
don, Cambridgeshire ( BBC News,  2016 ). Countless other reports of 
people – mostly nationals of other EU countries, and British Muslims 
– being threatened and told they must ‘go home now’ began to cir-
culate in press and social media reports ( Agerholm,  2016 ;  Lyons, 
 2016 ;  York,  2016 ). 
 Before the referendum votes were cast, in the midst of the cam-
paign, the Labour Member of Parliament and pro-refugee campaigner 
Jo Cox was murdered in a horrifyingly brutal attack. Witnesses 
reported that Cox ’ s assailant had shouted ‘this is for Britain’ and ‘keep 
Britain independent’ ( Boffey and Slawson,  2016 ). Far from being 
random statements, these were slogans used by Britain First, a far-
right fascist group, which claims to share most of the goals of the 
right-wing United Kingdom Independence Party ( Britain First,  n.d. ). 
There are parallels here with how fear of UKIP ’ s popularity was seen 
by many commentators as the inspiration for the Operation Vaken 
vans in 2013 (e.g.  Merrick,  2013 ;  Syal,  2013 ). As several of our 
research participants feared (see especially Chapters  4 and  5 ), use of 
increasingly hostile anti-migrant rhetoric in government and main-
stream political debate seems to both authorise and fuel such hate-
fi lled outpourings, verbal and physical. 
 When we began the research for this book we did not know the 
signifi cance of Operation Vaken, of course. But we were disturbed by 
the vitriol of government rhetoric and an intensifying public mood of 
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besiegement ( Hage,  2016 ). These worries were shared by the com-
munity organisations with whom we developed and did the research. 
This way of doing research, collaboratively and with local community 
partners, developing ‘working knowledges together’ and ‘partially 
shared imaginaries’ ( Suchman,  2012 : 52), has helped us to include a 
variety of perspectives and stories of immigration enforcement, and 
to explore how ‘the object of study is ultimately mobile and multiply 
situated’ ( Marcus,  1995 :102). It has also challenged us to think more 
critically about the politics of immigration research and knowledge 
production. How are we contributing to the manner in which immi-
gration is imagined and lived? What part does research play in the 
circulation and meanings of categories such as the ‘immigrant’, 
‘asylum seeker, ‘refugee’ and ‘British citizen’? How might we produce 
an anti-racist and feminist ‘situated knowledge’ ( Haraway,  1988 ) in a 
way that does not reinscribe our research participants into dominant, 
dehumanising discourses (see  Bhavnani,  1993 )? 
 In this chapter we will:
 1  contextualise the immigration regimes and debates within which 
our study took place 
 2  describe and discuss the Go Home van and related government 
communications in relation to broader immigration regimes and 
practices 
 3  summarise briefl y our key fi ndings from the research, which will 
be developed and elaborated on throughout the book 
 4  outline the approach that we took in the project as activist 
researchers 
 5  provide an overview of what is in the book. 
 The problem of immigration 
 Look at all these borders, foaming at the mouth with bodies broken 
and desperate. 
 ( Warsan Shire,  2011 : 25) 
 Discussions of immigration and immigration control, securitisation 
and illegality have become more voluble throughout the research and 
writing for this book. According to the United Nations Population 
Fund, in 2015, 244 million people, or 3.3 per cent of the world ’ s 
population, lived outside their country of origin, with increasing 
numbers of people being forcibly displaced as a result of confl ict, 
violence and human rights violations ( UNPF,  2016 ). As we worked 
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on this manuscript in April 2016, harrowing scenes of what has 
become known as the Mediterranean ‘refugee’ or ‘migrant crisis’ 
played out in the media almost daily, as more people fl eeing war, 
violence and poverty in Africa and the Middle East tried to fi nd safety 
in Europe. Sometimes, these lives have faded from our screens and 
pages as another spectacle has caught journalistic and public atten-
tion, but these dangerous journeys and the trauma and deaths, ‘bodies 
broken and desperate’, that they entail continue. So far (June 2016), 
there have been 215,380 ‘arrivals’ to the EU by sea in 2016; 2,868 
people were reported as dead or missing on their journey to the EU 
in the fi rst half of 2016 ( UNHCR,  2016a ). Others lost at sea go 
unreported. Of the nearly fi ve million Syrians registered by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, just over 50 per cent were women 
( UNHCR,  2016b ). This new era of migration, which includes more 
women and children, is characterised for the most vulnerable by 
‘necropolitics’. This term was coined by the African philosopher 
 Achille Mbembe  ( 2003 ) to describe ‘death worlds’, where ‘vast popu-
lations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the 
status of living dead’ (p. 40). 
 The growth of harsh new border regimes or what activist  Harsha 
Walia  ( 2013 ) calls ‘border imperialism’ has been a midwife to the 
birthing of these death worlds in Europe, not only in the Mediterra-
nean but in planes, lorries and detention camps and centres across 
the continent. There are three simultaneous, imbricated developments 
in contemporary border regimes: the deterritorialisation of state sov-
ereignty; a fortifi cation of land-based borders; and the domestication 
of borders ( Rigo,  2005 ;  Walters,  2006 ;  Vaughan-Williams,  2010 ). 
 The fi rst is characterised by an outsourcing of border control, 
especially by those in northern Europe to more southerly nations, as 
increasing numbers of migrants have been heading to Europe ’ s south-
ern shores as part of a longer journey to destinations such as Germany, 
Sweden, France and Britain. Increasingly, richer countries – potential 
places of sanctuary – require asylum applications to be made from 
outside their territory ( Hyndman and Mountz,  2008 ). This require-
ment extends border and migrant management into third countries, 
as the EU has done at different times with Turkey and Morocco 
( Wolff,  2008 ). 
 Alongside this deterritorialisation, the fortifi cation of state borders 
can be seen in more aggressive forms of border surveillance and 
policing, including the building of razor-wire fences, new makeshift 
detention camps, and the re-establishing of border posts. The latter 
erodes the Schengen system of open internal borders that has been 
key to European integration for over two decades. 
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 In a seemingly contradictory but actually complementary move, 
borders have also come ‘home’, entering into domestic spaces, as citi-
zens are increasingly required to check the visa status of those they 
live with, work with, and serve. The UK Immigration Act 2014 
brought in rules requiring private landlords to satisfy themselves that 
a tenant ’ s immigration status is in order, or risk penalties. Since the 
Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996, employers have been obliged 
to check that employees meet immigration rules, or face large fi nes; 
and the Immigration Act 2016 means that banks will have to check 
the immigration status of people opening accounts. 
 Each of these developments requires increased surveillance, docu-
mentation and justifi cation for the most basic of everyday transac-
tions. They also make ordinary people – who are unqualifi ed to 
understand often complex legal immigration documents – liable for 
the maintenance of border control  inside a territory. Domesticated 
bordering increases suspicion and fear of the (potentially irregular) 
migrant and carries these into everyday personal interactions: if an 
irregular migrant can trick a landlord or bank clerk or human resources 
offi cer turned border guard, these proxy border guards could them-
selves be punished. 
 These changes in law and practice are heavily entwined with 
public feeling and discourse, as our research into performative 
politics demonstrates throughout the book. As we write, the last 
twelve months alone have seen huge shifts in what is being said in 
public and in local debates about migration. Throughout 2015, the 
press regularly carried sensationalist stories and images of people 
arriving in, or crossing, Europe to seek refuge. As the Lebanese-
Australian anthropologist Ghassan Hage has observed, ‘Hardly any 
newspaper – whether antagonistic to asylum seekers, such as the 
Australian  Daily Telegraph (September 9, 2015), or sympathetic 
to their plight, such as the  Los Angeles Times (August 6, 2015) – 
failed, at least occasionally, to refer to refugees in terms of “fl ows,” 
“fl ood,” and “waves”’ (2016: 39). The then British Prime Minister, 
David Cameron, talked of ‘a swarm of people coming across the 
Mediterranean, seeking a better life, wanting to come to Britain’ 
( BBC,  2015 ). Others went further: ‘these migrants are like cock-
roaches … they are built to survive a nuclear bomb’ wrote a  Sun 
journalist ( Hopkins,  2015 ). The potency of such visceral signifi -
ers is that they work to reshape both the object of disgust (the 
migrant, or those suspected of being migrants) and the person 
who feels disgust. The circulation and accruing of emotions in 
this way is what the feminist cultural theorist  Sara Ahmed  ( 2004 ), 
drawing on the ideas of Karl Marx, calls an ‘affective economy’. For 
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Ahmed, emotions are understood as a form of capital. They are full 
of value. 
 But emotions, for all of their power, can change. A palpable, if 
perhaps temporary shift, in public and political orientations towards 
refugees in Britain, took place on Wednesday 2 September 2015. After 
weeks and months of media coverage of arrivals of people by boat 
into Europe, a single image seemed to change the register of debate: 
the photograph of the dead body of three-year-old Syrian Alan Kurdi, 
washed up on the shores of a Turkish beach. Alan had drowned with 
his brother, Galip, who was fi ve, and their mother Rehanna, when 
their boat sank as they tried to reach the Greek island of Kos from 
Bodrum in Turkey. They had previously applied (unsuccessfully) for 
asylum in Canada. The image of Alan elicited huge international 
public and political concern, perhaps because, as the writer  Avan Judd 
Stallard  ( 2016 : n.p.) believes, Alan looked so much like a typically 
middle-class Western boy with ‘his shirt bright red, his long shorts 
deep blue, his skin perfect vanilla. With arms by his side and palms 
facing the sky, it looked as if he had fallen and could not get up.’ 
Whatever it was about the image that moved people, more and more 
individuals across Europe began to offer support to displaced people 
in large and small ways: signing online petitions, sending money, visit-
ing refugee camps, joining protests and offering shelter in their own 
homes ( Jones,  2015 ). 
 In the UK, this shift in public sympathies led to the government 
promising that it would take more refugees (having previously refused 
to participate in any international plan). It was announced that the 
UK would take twenty thousand Syrian refugees – coming through 
the UN resettlement programme – over fi ve years. Rather than relo-
cating people who were already in Europe, Britain would be resettling 
those from refugee camps in the region. In effect a territorial border 
and the ‘problem’ of refugees was moved from Europe to Syria, and 
a moral border was drawn around Syrians as legitimate (see  Holmes 
and Castañeda,  2016 ) and deserving refugees (see also Chapter  5 ). 
The number (twenty thousand) was seen to be large, but once spread 
across fi ve years, and across regions of the UK, meant that few fami-
lies would arrive in any one area. 2 Thus the move enabled national 
 2 A survey published in early July 2016 found that a third of UK councils 
have refused to take in Syrian refugees because they lack the fi nancial 
resources to support them. See  www.ibtimes.co.uk/one-third-councils-
refuse-house-syrian-refugees-due-high-accommodation-costs-1569340 
[last accessed 8 July 2016]. 
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government to assuage growing public pressure for the UK to do 
something to help refugees, while effectively limiting its (conditional) 
hospitality. 
 The identifi cation of Syrian refugees specifi cally as deserving of 
help (and the downgrading of the lives of others seeking refuge from 
elsewhere) changed again on 13 November, as media reported that a 
Syrian passport had been found near the body of one of the suspected 
terrorist attackers in Paris. In the attack 130 people had been mur-
dered (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ‘ISIL’ later claimed 
responsibility for the violence). Three days afterwards, the then Home 
Secretary, Theresa May, gave a speech associating immigrants with 
terrorists, superimposing an announcement of ‘targeted security 
checks’ on to a promise of more stringent control at both national and 
European borders. The point here is that the ways in which immigra-
tion and immigration enforcement emerge as a problem are continu-
ally evolving. This includes not only how categories of ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
are open to revision but also how these categories can be mediated 
by moments of, and movements between, indifference, welcome, 
compassion and conviviality (see  Brah,  2012/1999 ;  Jones and Jackson, 
 2014 ). 
 In the months following the Paris attacks, Britain ’ s political debate 
increasingly focused on campaigns about whether to ‘leave’ or ‘remain’ 
in the European Union, with both sides focused on immigration. The 
Leave campaigners emphasised a promise to ‘control immigration’ 
and the Remain campaign appeared to offer something similar, 
though slightly less stridently. Over months, confusion abounded over 
what exactly was meant by immigration control. Would EU citizens 
in the UK have their residency rights removed? Would Britons have 
their residency rights, and freedom of movement, in other EU coun-
tries revoked in return? What would it mean, if anything, for non-EU 
citizens wanting to live in Britain? No specifi c details were given, 
except that immigration would be more ‘in control’ following the 
referendum, whatever the result. And it was promised that conse-
quently, there would be an easing of the problems of limited jobs, 
housing and disinvestment in the NHS. These promises came from 
government ministers campaigning on both sides, and senior politi-
cians and public fi gures. 
 In this atmosphere, on Thursday 16 June, exactly one week before 
the referendum vote, the then UKIP Leader and prominent Vote 
Leave campaigner Nigel Farage launched a poster with the words 
‘Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all. We must break free of the 
EU and take back control of our borders’. The words appeared 
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above an image of a crowded queue of Syrian refugees at the Slo-
venian border. Immediate parallels were drawn with similar images 
used in German Nazi propaganda ( Lister,  2016 ). A few hours after 
the poster was unveiled, the Labour MP and pro-migrant Remain 
campaigner Jo Cox was murdered outside her constituency offi ce by 
a man whom witnesses said they heard shouting far-right nationalist 
slogans. 
 Farage dismissed any connection between the temperature of the 
debate on migration and the assassination of Jo Cox, stating: ‘The 
Remain camp are using these awful circumstances to try to say that 
the motives of one deranged, dangerous individual are similar to half 
the country, or perhaps more, who believe we should leave the EU’ 
(quoted in  Smith,  2016 : n.p.). This was the same man who, a month 
earlier, had said: ‘It ’ s legitimate to say that if people feel they ’ ve lost 
control completely, and we have lost control of our borders com-
pletely as members of the EU, and if people feel voting doesn ’ t change 
anything, then violence is the next step’ (quoted in  Simons,  2016 : 
n.p.). 
 Farage ’ s latter prediction seems to be materialising. His Leave 
campaign won the referendum, but, as we completed this book in the 
days following that result, the vote seemed to have changed both 
everything and nothing. Everything, as there was apparently no plan 
about how to proceed, no political leadership within the government 
(following the Prime Minister ’ s resignation and before Theresa May ’ s 
appointment as his replacement), or opposition (as Labour MPs 
attempted to remove their leader). There are dramatic economic fl uc-
tuations and uncertainty, with the renewed possibility of Scottish 
independence since Scotland voted strongly to remain in the EU, and 
increasing political fracturing between the almost equally divided 
voters across the country. 
 And nothing, because, in the days following the result, all key Leave 
campaigners insisted that they had never promised to reduce immi-
gration, or to invest money they claimed would be saved from EU 
contributions into the NHS. In the days immediately after the refer-
endum it emerged that there was no plan of how to begin negotiations 
or renegotiate the UK ’ s relationship to the EU, or what this might 
mean in practice. And yet again everything, as violence towards EU 
migrants and racially minoritised people appears to have been rein-
vigorated. ‘Go home’ racist catcalls and graffi ti have been reported in 
unusual numbers, and, as it becomes clear that ‘migrants’ (or those 
assumed to be) are not going anywhere, the anger and xenophobia 
that have been stoked are expected to become more intense. There is 
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a certain painful relentlessness to waking up every morning to more 
reports of racist abuse and violence. Our pained disbelief and 
depressed sighs carry the ‘worrying exhale of an ache’, as the poet 
 Claudia Rankine  ( 2014 : 60) has written of the impact of living with 
the ongoingness of racism. 
 ‘It ’ s all about immigration’ 
 I have been unprotected. I have been naked and exposed. I have 
been clothed and armoured. I know what I carry in my suitcase. I 
carry my history. I carry my family. Over my saris, I wear my sisters. 
 (Shailja  Patel,  2010 : 41) 
 What has been clear at this time is how toxic and capacious the signi-
fi ers ‘migrant’ and ‘migration’ have become. People moving across 
state borders to settle in a new place do so for many reasons, with 
various citizenship and visa statuses (or their lack), with different 
economic and social resources, and different ethnicities and religions. 
The ‘problem’ of migration is at some points characterised simply by 
those who break the rules – as with the Go Home van and the ques-
tion ‘In the UK illegally?’ This identifi cation can slip into the associa-
tion of asylum seekers as ‘rule breakers’, even though under the 
Geneva Convention it cannot be illegal to seek asylum (until that 
claim is accepted or rejected). There is also the slippage between 
seeing certain groups of migrants such as migrant workers, or ‘eco-
nomic migrants’ as a problem, though often in the same breath there ’ s 
an appeal to visa systems that might prioritise ‘skilled workers’ or 
concerns are voiced about how immigration control can damage 
British industries, such as the seasonal work of fruit picking. As we 
saw in the shifts in mood toward Syrian refugees and a later entangle-
ment with fears of terrorism, we now also see anti-immigration rheto-
ric blurring with Islamophobia: ‘It ’ s all about immigration. Right, it ’ s 
not about trade or Europe or anything like that, it ’ s all about immi-
gration. It ’ s to stop the Muslims from coming into this country. 
Simple as that’. So said a ‘man in the street’ interviewed by a Channel 
4 journalist the day the EU referendum result was announced 
( Jenkins,  2016 ). 
 As we write in this politically volatile context, we ask: what does it 
mean to live in this time of an obsession with borders and where 
‘taking back control’ holds such a political and psychological appeal? 
How do different groups of people – migrants and refugees, policy-
makers, British citizens and pro-migrant activists – understand and 
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narrate the ‘problem’ of immigration and its control? How might we 
make a problem out of the problem of immigration? 
 Operation Vaken 
 It is with these questions in mind that we tell the story of our Mapping 
Immigration Controversy project. The study, funded by the Eco-
nomic and Social Research Council, investigated Operation Vaken 
that took place between 22 July and 22 August 2013. The short-lived, 
two-week Home Offi ce campaign in England, Scotland and Wales 
included the Go Home vans discussed earlier. There was also a sepa-
rate pilot scheme where ‘Ask about going home’ posters were put up 
in detention centres in Glasgow and Hounslow (see Chapter  4 for 
more detail). 
 Vaken is most often associated with the two Go Home vans that 
were driven through six of the most ethnically diverse London bor-
oughs (Hounslow, Barking and Dagenham, Ealing, Barnet, Brent and 
Redbridge). The full message carried by the vans (see Figure  1 ) read: 
‘In the UK illegally? GO HOME OR FACE ARREST. Text HOME 
to 78070 for free advice, and help with travel documents. We can help 
you return home voluntarily without fear of arrest or detention.’ Along 
with these words was a close-up of a border guard ’ s uniform and 
handcuffs, a telephone number to call, and the claim: ‘106 ARRESTS 
LAST WEEK IN YOUR AREA’. At the time of the piloting of Vaken, 
the Home Offi ce issued press releases and Twitter updates, reporting 
on arrests of ‘immigration offenders’. The offi cial Home Offi ce 
Twitter account shared images of immigration raids, showing people 
being put into the back of secure vans. The tweets read, ‘There will 
be no hiding place for illegal immigrants with the new #immigration-
bill’. Another hashtag was #immigrationoffender. 
 Not surprisingly it was the visual drama of the vans that attracted 
much press coverage and commentary from politicians, civil society 
organisations and the public. As well as eliciting anger, the vans 
became objects of ‘play’, a source of satire and ridicule in the ‘rever-
beration’ ( Kuntsman,  2012 ) of feelings between online and offl ine 
worlds. The Liberal Democrat Cabinet Minister Vince Cable, speak-
ing on the BBC, said that the campaign was ‘stupid and offensive’, 
adding, ‘It is designed, apparently, to sort of create a sense of fear [in 
the] British population that we have a vast problem with illegal immi-
gration’ ( Huff Post Politics, UK,  2013 , n.p.). Images of the vans 
circulated quickly on social media, along with the hashtag #racistvan, 
directly connecting the language used with the history of the words 
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‘go home’ as racist abuse used in the streets and by far-right political 
groups such as the National Front in the 1970s. 
 In response to criticisms of Vaken, the then Minister for Immigra-
tion, Mark Harper, wrote an article in the tabloid newspaper the  Daily 
Mail on 29 July 2013, saying that he had been ‘astonished’ by the 
reactions of the ‘Left and pro-immigration industry’ that had 
denounced Vaken as racist. ‘Let me clear this up once and for all’, 
Harper wrote, ‘it is not racist to ask people who are here illegally to 
leave Britain. It is merely telling them to comply with the law. Our 
campaign targets illegal immigrants without any discrimination at all 
between them. By no stretch of the rational imagination can it be 
described as “racist” ’ ( Harper,  2013a : n.p.). This rhetorical move to 
separate out racism from immigration control was not new. As the 
cultural theorist  Paul Gilroy  ( 2012 ) has observed, it was during New 
Labour ’ s administrations, between 1997 and 2010, that ‘the bogus 
proposition that race and immigration could be easily untangled in 
Britain ’ s political culture held sway’ (p. 380). This proposition holds 
that to be anti-migrant or anti-immigration is not the same as being 
racist. It was a rhetoric that did not go unchallenged. 
 On 2 August 2013, Doreen Lawrence (an anti-racist campaigner 
and Labour peer) added her voice to surfacing claims that Vaken ’ s 
immigration enforcement checks at railway and Tube stations were 
based on racial profi ling, targeting racially minoritised commuters. 
‘I ’ m sure there ’ s illegal immigrants from all countries, but why would 
you focus that on people of colour, and I think racial profi ling is 
coming into it’, she said ( Malik and Batty,  2013 ). Civil society organi-
sations were also taking action to highlight Vaken ’ s racist tropes and 
the kindling of racism and suspicion within local communities. Three 
days before Harper ’ s article on 26 July, the Refugee and Migrant 
Forum of Essex and London (RAMFEL) (one of our community 
partners in the research for this book) held ‘an emergency tension-
monitoring’ meeting with Home Offi ce offi cials. On 31 July, RAMFEL 
announced that it had written to the Department to inform it of legal 
action to declare Vaken unlawful. In RAMFEL ’ s words:
 Two service users from RAMFEL, supported by Deighton Pierce 
Glynn launched a legal challenge against the Home Offi ce based 
on the fact that there had been no consultation done with anyone 
(community organisations, and local councils and borough police) 
and that the Home Offi ce had failied [ sic ] to pay due regard to 
equality and cohesion issues. Further legal action was precluded by 
the fact that the Operation Vaken was a pilot.  
 ( RAMFEL, n.d. ) 
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 In a written statement to Parliament in October 2013, Mark Harper 
gave this retrospective rationale for Vaken:
 It is better for both the UK taxpayer and offenders themselves if 
offenders leave the country voluntarily rather than in an enforced 
manner. Immigration Compliance and Enforcement teams are 
therefore working to identify how they can promote the visibility of 
enforcement operations to drive compliance and encourage more 
immigration offenders to leave the UK voluntarily.  
 ( Harper,  2013b : n.p.) 
 In short then, Vaken was presented as being for the benefi t not only 
of immigration offenders but also of the UK taxpayer. The campaign 
was subsequently condemned by the Advertising Standards Author-
ity for using inaccurate information (the ‘106 arrests in your area’ 
claim was inaccurate; see  ASA,  2013 ). On 21 October, the Home 
Secretary announced that Vaken would be scrapped. Yet this drive to 
communications campaigns by national government, ostensibly tar-
geted at immigration offenders but with an audience of the law-
abiding and taxpaying public in mind, continued. This extended to 
similar measures over the following years, including an increased 
visibility of marked Home Offi ce Enforcement vans on raids around 
the UK; signs in hospital waiting rooms declaring ‘The NHS is not 
free for everyone’ to highlight limited access to ‘universal’ healthcare 
for some migrants (see Figure  2 ); press releases on immigration 
enforcement activities; and ride-alongs for local and national journal-
ists on immigration raids. 
 In fact, the spectacle-making of British immigration enforcement 
was not something that began in 2013. There was a clear turning point 
in the UK government approach to migration policy in around 2006, 
under a Labour government. A policy consensus in Whitehall and 
Westminster reached the conclusion that, while immigration had been 
a long-standing concern in public opinion polls (see  Blinder,  2015 ), 
any previous attempts to defi ne migration as good for the UK, par-
ticularly in economic and cultural terms, appeared to have no effect 
in increasing positive pro-immigration views and feelings. Instead, 
hostility to new immigration seems to have been taken as a given, and 
government resources invested in demonstrating a visibly tough 
approach to controlling borders and movement. In 2006, under the 
then Home Secretary John Reid, the visibility of UK Border Control 
at ports was increased, with new uniforms and signage, and politicians 
and journalists accompanying enforcement offi cers on photogenic 
immigration raids. 
14 Go home?
 These changes in immigration enforcement are related to the 
increasing militarisation of policing and control in the UK that has 
taken place over decades. The changes happened incrementally and 
through the targeting of particular demonised groups, such as striking 
miners or rioting black youth, bringing tactics previously deployed in 
Northern Ireland to the British mainland. 
 Through the 1970s and 1980s to the present day, the physical 
appearance and weaponry employed shifted from a police force that 
did not differentiate between the appearance and uniform of the 
‘bobby on the beat’ and offi cers deployed in urban disturbances, to 
become actively intimidating. After the Brixton disturbances in the 
summer of 1981, and while Lord Scarman was still compiling his 
report into the events, the results of a review of ‘protective clothing 
and equipment’ announced that in future the police would have 
special riot gear: overalls, ‘NATO’ helmets, special shields (short and 
long), special riot batons (much longer and thicker than usual), ‘pro-
tective’ screens for transits, and CS gas and plastic bullets ( Bunyan, 
 1985 : 301). The language throughout was militaristic, speaking of 
gaining and holding ground, seeking ‘strategic’ advantage and induc-
ing fear ( Bunyan,  1985 : 302). 
 The 2006 introduction of newly branded staff and vehicles to 
undertake immigration enforcement, including the extension of 
immigration raids with the accompanying militarised uniforms and 
dogs, could be regarded as another development of this militarised 
approach to public order. Just as the introduction of military-derived 
equipment for police offi cers was deployed to induce fear among 
particular targeted groups, shows of force in the name of immigration 
enforcement might also be regarded as a tactical performance of 
power. 
 During the period of escalating militarisation of policing through 
the 1970s and 1980s, this uneven performance of violent intent was 
communicated as a confi rmation that there were indeed enemies 
within. In this framework the performance of power has two distinct 
audiences – those who are the immediate target of coercive power 
and those who must be persuaded that the state is exerting its powers 
against dangerous ‘others’. 
 As we will go on to explain (see Chapter  2 ), we understand Vaken 
as part of this developing ‘performative politics’ ( Rai,  2015 ) of immi-
gration control, in which emotions are recruited and played upon. 
 Margaret Wetherell ’ s  ( 2012 ) notion of ‘affective practice’ as including 
situated discourses, practices and bodily states, has helped us to think 
through and apply the ideas of the political theorist  Shirin Rai  ( 2015 ) 
on political performance to our empirical research (discussed further 
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in Chapter  2 ). Rai describes political performance as ‘Those perfor-
mances that seek to communicate to an audience meaning-making 
related to state institutions, policies and discourses’ ( 2015 : 1179). 
However, the extent to which such communication is successful in 
achieving its intended effects is always locally contingent and unstable 
(see also  Austin,  1975/1962 ). 
 The hate speech of a politician or a journalist, for instance, can 
overlap with what is said in a café or in a focus group interview, but 
the power and consequences of each of these speech acts are not the 
same. Because our project included various levels of research that 
moved between texts and policy discourses, such as the post-hoc 
rationale for Vaken given by Mark Harper, to talk-in-interaction in 
social media, to observation and one-to-one interviews and focus 
groups in different localities, we have been able to decipher some 
of the continuities as well as what Wetherell calls the ‘different com-
positional logic’ ( 2012 : 159) of the affective practices surrounding 
Vaken. As we show in Chapter  4 , the localities in which elements of 
government communications campaigns were deployed, and the ways 
opposition to them was mobilised, shaped how the campaign was 
variously felt and responded to in different contexts. 
 What we found 
 Throughout the book, we discuss the fi ndings of our research in 
detail. Our data and analysis are intertwined, and we draw on existing 
knowledge and theory in the social sciences to make sense of what 
we have found. Here, though, we summarise very briefl y what our 
research uncovered. 
 1  We found  no evidence that government communica-
tions about immigration and enforcement are based 
on research about ‘what works’ in managing immigra-
tion. The only research evidence policy-makers mentioned 
to us was privately commissioned research on managing 
public opinion about immigration, particularly among 
those worried that immigration is ‘out of control’. Yet our 
research suggests the tactics used on this basis can increase 
fear and anxiety. 
 2  Government campaigns on immigration provoked 
or increased anger and fear , among irregular migrants, 
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regular migrants and non-migrants, including those 
opposed to immigration. The latter told us they thought 
that the government campaigns were ineffective ‘theatre’. 
 3  For people who were the subjects of immigration cam-
paigns (or felt under threat from them), talking about the 
publicity campaigns often led them to think about their 
own experiences of immigration enforcement and trig-
gered feelings of fear and anxiety.  Our own research 
focused on communications campaigns, but partici-
pants also made direct links to, for example, images 
of enforcement raids and their own experiences of 
immigration enforcement in their homes. 
 4  Hard-hitting government publicity on immigration 
seemed to provoke new waves of pro-migrant activ-
ism. Anger and outrage was translated into online and 
street-based activism, including by people who had not 
been engaged in activism before. 
 5  Some, but not all, activism has been migrant-led, and  we 
identifi ed inequalities in who felt able to take part 
in political debate because of real or perceived 
threats to their residency status as a result. 
 6  Traditional anti-racism campaigns are fi nding it 
hard to keep up with changes in the focus of hos-
tility and discrimination , for example with how to 
engage with the status of international students and asylum 
seekers. 
 7  Our local case studies demonstrated  local variations in 
how government campaigns were experienced, and 
the activism that was produced in response . In some 
places migrants and activists could build on existing infra-
structures for political organising. In other places such 
resources did not exist or had dwindled, or energies were 
focused on service provision for vulnerable people in an 
increasingly diffi cult funding environment. 
 8  There is not always solidarity between people being 
targeted by anti-immigration campaigns . We found 
several instances of hostility between different groups of 
migrants, often based on an idea that their own group was 
‘deserving’ of residency and status in the UK, while others 
were ‘undeserving’. 
 9  The different legal statuses that migrants can have is 
confusing. For many people in the wider public, the dis-
tinctions between ‘illegal’ and ‘legal’, and between asylum 
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seeker, refugee, student, worker, resident, and sometimes 
between migrants and ethnic minority British-born people 
is diffi cult to understand.  Many people reported har-
assment for being ‘illegal immigrants’ when they 
had settled status, or were British citizens . 
 10  We heard that many people had come to the UK 
because of ideals often promoted as ‘British values’ 
– such as democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and 
mutual respect and tolerance for those with different faiths 
and beliefs.  Their experience since arrival called into 
doubt the existence of these values . 
 Researching immigration 
 As well as telling the story of government immigration communica-
tion campaigns, we want to contribute to thinking and discussions 
about the role of critical migration research and the relationships 
between activism and research (see also  Casas-Cortes et al.,  2014 ; 
 Walia,  2013 ). There is a ‘civic task’ at stake in how we make use of 
our sociological imaginations in such endeavours, the sociologist 
Alberto Toscano argues, which ‘is not to create pacifying knowledge, 
but to sharpen and concretise what would otherwise be a vague and 
powerless anxiety, while at the same time providing a realistic estimate 
of the powers necessary to alter, however minimally, the course of 
history’ ( 2012 : 68). The term ‘militant investigation’ ( Casas-Cortes et 
al.,  2014 ) has been used more recently to refer to new ways of think-
ing about and doing migration research, although research propelled 
by a ‘civic task’ has a long history in early British research on migra-
tion and race, such as the studies  Race, Community and Confl ict by 
 John Rex and Robert Moore  ( 1967 ),  Elizabeth Burney ’ s  Housing on 
Trial  ( 1967 ),  Racial Discrimination in England ( Daniel,  1968 ) and 
 Because They ’ re Black ( Humphry and John,  1971 ). 
 For us, it was crucially important that we connected and extended 
the civic task of sociology to the structures and practices of actually 
doing the research. The MIC team included early career academics 
and more established scholars. We are predominantly women, and 
women of various ethnicities and migration histories. An aspiration 
of our research, from the very beginning, is outlined in a warning 
from  Stuart Hall and his ‘Policing the Crisis’  ( 1978 ) co-authors: we 
tried not to fall into ‘a trap of “liberal opinion” – to split analysis from 
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action’ ( Hall et al.,  1978 : ix). As we have already mentioned, our 
research began in July 2013 with unfunded street surveys to capture, 
as quickly as we could, reactions to Vaken (details of the methods we 
used are in the Appendix). At the time, our primary aim was to record 
and provide some evidence of the impact of Vaken, and more ambi-
tiously to intervene in and encourage public discussions of immigra-
tion enforcement. 
 However, on the same day that we began to foment the idea of 
immediate action research to counter Vaken, we were separately 
alerted to a call for proposals by the Urgent Research Grant scheme 
of the Economic and Social Research Council. It seemed to be worth 
a try to do something bigger and more systematic. In putting our 
funding proposal together, we consolidated our connections with local 
civil society organisations that were interested in doing some of the 
research with us in their local areas. Their time was costed into the 
proposal (see  Living Research Six ). The organisations helped us to 
shape our overall research questions and research design, to identify 
activists and community workers to interview in each area, recruited 
participants for our focus groups and invited us to local events and 
meetings where immigration enforcement was being discussed. They 
also helped us to set up feedback sessions, where we took the interim 
fi ndings of our research back to open meetings in each community, 
and learned more from their responses, which in turn were fed into 
our emerging analysis. 
 In brief, the research methods that we used in the study 
consisted of:
 •  13 focus groups with 67 people (including new migrants, long-
settled migrants, ethnic minority and white British citizens) 
 •  24 one-to-one interviews with local activists 
 •  interviews with eight national policy-makers about the intentions 
and thinking behind immigration enforcement campaigns 
 •  a survey commissioned from Ipsos MORI to investigate awareness 
of and attitudes to immigration enforcement. Questions were 
placed on the Ipsos MORI Omnibus (Capibus) amongst a nation-
ally representative quota sample of 2,424 adults (aged 15 and 
over). Interviews were conducted face-to-face in respondents’ 
homes between 15 August and 9 September 2014, using Com-
puter Assisted Personal Interviewing software. All data are weighted 
to the known national profi le of adults aged 15 + in Great Britain. 
 •  participation in and documentation of online debates on Twitter 
about key elements of Vaken and related campaigns, and reactions 
to them 
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 •  presenting and discussing interim fi ndings with the communities 
and organisations with whom we had done the initial research, and 
including their responses in the fi ndings 
 •  fi eldnotes of interviews and ethnographic observation that we used 
to help us develop more multisensory and refl exive insights. 
 The approach we took in the project comes closest to the ethos of 
‘live sociology’, which is the term coined by sociologist  Les Back 
 ( 2007; 2012 ) for a sociology that is civic, dialogic and multisensory 
(see also  Back and Puwar,  2012 ). Live sociology for  Back is ‘histori-
cally situated, refl ective, contestable, uncomfortable, partisan and 
fraught’ ( 2007 : 22), with an ‘intellectual architecture’ attentive to the 
‘scope and scale of global social processes’ ( 2012 : 20). One way in 
which we tried to be receptive to matters of ‘scope and scale’ in the 
statecraft of immigration communications was to use a combination 
of qualitative and quantitative methods. By working across methods 
and sites of research, including the digital, we were able to connect 
the more nuanced and intimate responses that we elicited through our 
face-to-face interviews and observations to larger, more distanced and 
distributed affective patterns. Our survey not only focused attention 
on immigration enforcement, we were also able to contextualise some 
of our questions with regard to racism (see Chapter  2 ). A vital aspect 
of our ‘live sociology’ is that it has been collaborative throughout (see 
 Living Research Six ). This included producing research in partner-
ship with those outside the academy, communicating our thoughts 
and engagement with immigration politics as they unfolded in real 
time through blog posts and Twitter. And, not least, the imagining, 
writing, editing and redrafting of this book have been a collective 
effort. 
 About this book 
 Throughout the book, we draw upon ideas and theories from cultural 
studies, economics, politics, media and communications and sociol-
ogy to develop an account of contemporary British immigration 
enforcement politics. There are six substantive chapters, which begin 
by contextualising Vaken with regard to the performative politics of 
immigration control (Chapter  2 ) and post-liberal governmentality 
(Chapter  3 ). Chapters  4 and  5 provide a more close-up analysis of 
our empirical research, situating the research within space and place 
(Chapter  4 ) and critically examining narratives of the ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving’ migrant, and ways these characterisations have been 
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resisted (Chapter  5 ). Chapter  6 , our concluding chapter, brings 
together the key themes from our research and raises questions about 
the developing politics of immigration control at the critical and fast-
changing moment in which we complete this book. 
 The chapters are separated by short interludes that we have titled 
‘Living Research’. These are refl ective pieces, breathing and thinking 
spaces that offer our thoughts and experiences of doing the research. 
They cover why we did the research (Living Research One); the 
methodological challenges of researching emotionally charged topics 
(Two); the politics of migration research and the media (Three); 
ethics (Four); how social media and social research allowed us to 
channel and also connect our anger at Vaken with others (Five); and 
how the collaborative aspects of the research worked (and didn ’ t 
work) in practice (Six). The Living Research sections are intended to 
incite thinking and dialogue about these issues of the politics and 
practice, as well as the fi ndings, of research. For this reason we also 
include some questions for the reader to refl ect on, whether in a group 
or independently. 
 Our understanding of Vaken draws on the framework of perfor-
mance politics proposed by the political scientist  Shirin Rai  ( 2015 ). 
In Chapter  2 we describe and use Rai ’ s work to make sense of the 
deployment of theatricalised violence by the British state in which 
performances of state power are directed at many audiences and serve 
to segment the population. Drawing on our research we suggest 
that, despite attempts to address a diversity of audiences, commu-
nications and performances of immigration policing appear to be 
met with indifference or anxiety. They can also be reinterpreted 
through a popular cynicism that is infl uenced by a broader culture of 
anti-politics. Chapter  2 explores the impact of such scepticism on the 
politics of migration, and asks whether there are possibilities for a 
politics based on mutuality. 
 In Chapter  3 we consider how the politicisation of British immigra-
tion policy tests the limits of ‘liberal governmentality’ ( Rose and 
Miller,  1992 ). Typically, this form of government is understood in 
terms of splitting questions of ‘politics’ from those of ‘expertise’, 
employing statistics, professions, economics, audits and so on, to 
insulate certain issues as matters of ‘fact’ or ‘effi ciency’. ‘Blackboxing’ 
political questions through the use of statistics (and utilitarian assump-
tions), we suggest, is a way of preventing them from turning into 
controversies which invite public deliberation. Immigration is an 
exception that evades this bracketing. More emotional, story-based 
impressions of immigration, often cultivated by the media, appear 
hard to dislodge through statistical data. Under these circumstances, 
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policy-makers have engaged in different types of knowledge acquisi-
tion and production, focusing on the affective, emotional and sym-
bolic dimensions of immigration. This involves unwieldy combinations 
of pre-liberal sovereign performances (parading state violence) with 
postliberal attempts to manipulate affect (nudging and social market-
ing). Here, by engaging with policy-makers’ accounts of the negotia-
tions they make in this context, we explore the strains that immigration 
control places on liberal governmentality, with its desire to separate 
technical decisions from politics, and the challenge posed by postlib-
eral approaches which emphasise morality and distinctions between 
deserving and undeserving subjects. 
 Having contextualised the Go Home van and other government 
anti-immigration communications as part of a performative politics 
that challenges liberal governmentality, we move on to situate these 
developments by considering the part played by spaces and places 
– from the street to the digital realm – in the implementation and 
reception of, and resistance to, anti-immigration campaigns (Chapter 
 4 ). For us, such interventions are closely tied to the increasingly 
domestic nature of immigration control and as they are enacted in 
particular spaces, with different local histories of migration and activ-
ism, they have had unintended consequences. These include increased 
fear, feelings of not belonging and acts of resistance. For instance, we 
discuss how opposition to Go Home posters in Glasgow fed into 
debates about Scottish Independence and how the Go Home vans’ 
appearance in West London played into divisive discourses of respect-
ability among more established migrants and British citizens. We 
argue that it is vital to consider specifi c sites of immigration interven-
tion and resistance (e.g. the hospital waiting room, Twitter) and how 
local and urban contexts shape and are shaped by reaction and resist-
ance when examining the impact of anti-immigration campaigns. 
 The distinctions between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ migrants 
(and citizens), that are made by local people, including those from 
racially minoritised communities and recent immigrants, are the 
subject of Chapter  5 . Our research has found a certain complicity 
with anti-immigrant messages and, as diverse local communities 
compete over limited resources, the exacerbation of latent tensions. 
In making sense of these fi ndings, we use  Bridget Anderson ’ s explora-
tion of ‘communities of value’  ( 2013 ),  Imogen Tyler ’ s theorisation of 
social abjection ( 2013 ) and  Beverley Skeggs ’ examination of the poli-
tics of respectability in relation to gender and class ( 1997; 2014 ). In 
an intersectional analysis we look at the fracturing of the connections 
between ‘race’ and immigration and discuss the role of socially con-
servative codes of respectability in internalising disgust towards 
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particular social groups – sex workers, the destitute and people using 
alcohol and drugs (some of who are assumed to have irregular immi-
gration status). 
 Our own 
 The proliferation of domestic immigration enforcement, the seem-
ingly more mundane and shadowy ‘other’ of international border 
control and necropolitics, has uneven and unexpected effects. Immi-
gration is itself an internally differentiated experience of inclusion and 
exclusion ( Erel,  2010 ) and of changing identifi cations ( La Barbera, 
 2013 ). 
 We know that the damage infl icted by enforcement campaigns can 
be slow-paced and dispersed across lives. It is diffi cult to quantify and 
capture. Operation Vaken was terrifying for some people. For others, 
it signalled the authorising and normalisation of the public expression 
of hostility towards immigration and migrants. ‘It is now acceptable 
to come out and say I am anti-immigration’ one person told us in a 
focus group interview. 
 If government communications on immigration lend a certain 
respectability to anti-migrant feelings and racism, we should not 
forget that it can also galvanise opposition and dissent, both serious 
and playful. The government ’ s own evaluation of the Operation Vaken 
makes for interesting reading ( Home Offi ce,  2013 ). Of the 1,561 text 
messages received by the Home Offi ce, 1,034 were hoax messages, 
taking up 17 hours of staff time. At the time of writing, the YouTube 
fi lm of one of our research partners, Southall Black Sisters, disrupting 
a Vaken immigration raid has been viewed over 39,000 times, 3 sug-
gesting an impact much wider than the original spontaneous event 
(discussed further in Living Research One and Five and Chapter  4 ). 
 There are plenty more examples of dissent from the politics of 
suspicion and hatred, signifying what the political scholar  Vicki Squire 
 ( 2011 ) thinks of as ‘mobile solidarities’ – collective engagements and 
small acts of hospitality that cut across social hierarchies and divisions. 
We also take heart from the work of the feminist and postcolonial 
theorist  Avtar Brah , whose doctoral research ( 1979 ) in three schools 
in Southall in the 1970s, sought to better understand the interrelations 
between race, ethnicity and class in this fast-changing West London 
community. Brah ’ s research picked up on similar themes to ours in 
 3  www.youtube.com/watch?v = pQ0_TFBVots [last accessed 27 June 2016]. 
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the interplay between xenophobia and racism, the feelings of resent-
ment, fear and antipathy to the arrival of migrants from India and the 
Caribbean. At the same time  Brah  ( 2012/1999 : 20–1) identifi ed com-
plicated and ambivalent affi nities across lines of class, gender and 
ethnicity, expressed most beautifully in the South Asian creole lan-
guage of Urdu. Urdu recognises dynamic movements between the 
positions of ‘ajnabi’ (‘a stranger; a newcomer whom one does not yet 
know but who holds the promise of friendship, love, intimacy’), ‘ghair’ 
(where difference ‘walks the tightrope between insider/outsider’) and 
‘apna’ (‘one of our own’). 
 As borders continue to mobilise and insinuate themselves across 
and within our everyday lives, our hope is that so will resistance and 
a more unconditional hospitality to migrants, who might yet cross the 
most signifi cant frontier, moving across the boundary of the ajnabi 
into the space of the apne (plural) – our own. 
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 Living Research One: Why are we 
doing this? Public sociology and 
public life 
 This short section is a conversation between an activist involved in 
the project 1 and a member of the research team. Each refl ects can-
didly on the value of the MIC project to civil society and on social 
research (and socially engaged research) in general as a ‘public 
good’.
 Sukhwant: Personally, I was motivated to get involved in the Mapping 
Immigration Controversy project because of a sense of frustration 
with the way that immigration was being discussed by politicians and 
the media. There seemed to be a cross-party consensus on the need 
to restrict immigration. There was almost no public or media atten-
tion to the specifi c experiences of people subject to immigration 
controls. My personal engagement also carried an investment and 
commitment to anti-racism, a belief that as academics we have a role 
in highlighting discriminatory and dehumanising practices and poli-
cies and in challenging these. And conducting the AARX 2 surveys 
was a way to collate information about the experiences of local 
people and to engage them in a conversation about their views, 
which aren ’ t always obvious – as we discovered at the last general 
 1  Southall Black Sisters (SBS) is a not-for-profi t organisation, established 
in 1979 to meet the needs of Black (Asian and African-Caribbean) 
women. It aims to highlight and challenge all forms of gender-related 
violence against women; and to empower women to gain more control 
over their lives, live without fear of violence and assert their human 
rights to justice, equality and freedom. SBS were our research partners, 
helping us with the fi eldwork in Ealing and Hounslow. 
 2  Action Against Racism and Xenophobia is a group of academics and 
activists who came together to conduct ‘fl ash research’ into the impacts 
of the Go Home vans, as a precursor to the Mapping Immigration Con-
troversy research project. 
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election [2015], we tend to surround ourselves with others that hold 
similar views. What prompted Southall Black Sisters to want to par-
ticipate in the AARX survey and then to become one of the com-
munity partners in the Mapping Immigration Controversy bid? And 
why did you think it would be valuable to involve the SBS support 
group in the focus group sessions? 
 Southall Black Sisters : The research was timely. For us, it was part of 
a process that had already started at SBS. The London borough of 
Ealing was one of the areas where the Go Home vans were piloted. 
Alongside that, women using the [Southall Black Sisters] centre 
were telling us about the stops and checks taking place at the local 
train station. We were hearing from them that there had been an 
increase in the number of immigration raids within the local area. 
So we were already discussing this with users of the centre. The 
research enabled the women to see their own experiences as con-
nected to others around the country. Also, we saw our involvement 
in the research as part of our wider community work; it became a 
particularly good example of this. Immigration is a toxic issue and 
we know from the two public meetings that we then organised jointly 
with you and the MIC team that the local community is divided on 
this issue. After all, this is a deprived area and it is easy for people 
to blame each other. The research was one way of doing sustained 
community work, of fl agging those divisions and challenging them. 
In a sense it was a form of community cohesion work 3 – whatever we 
might think of the government ’ s cohesion agenda, when we are 
questioning and challenging divisions within local communities we 
are doing cohesion work. These events had a unifying effect, they 
enabled the coming together of people within local areas. 
 Sukhwant : You referred there to the users of your centre, can we talk 
a bit about their engagement with the fi eldwork? I found it really 
enlightening, right through from the surveys to the focus groups to 
the public meetings. People had so much to say on this issue. And 
they supplied valuable insights into the incidence of immigration 
raids and stops and checks, including new information about people 
being stopped at particular bus stops and outside usual offi ce hours, 
the sorts of times where ethnic minorities will be working the early 
morning, late evening or night shifts. Things we may have suspected 
but didn ’ t know were happening. And I felt the data collated here 
 3  ‘Community cohesion’ became important in UK local and national 
government from 2001, as an attempt to redefi ne ‘multiculturalism’ 
(see  Jones,  2013 ). 
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[at the SBS centre], through the focus groups, gave rise to some of 
the key themes within the MIC fi ndings, especially the point that the 
Home Offi ce and media campaigns were exacerbating divisions 
within local communities and local people are distinguishing 
between immigrants that they consider to be deserving and unde-
serving of support. 
 Southall Black Sisters : Yes! If you remember, one of the focus group 
sessions was fairly coherent and women had the opportunity to share 
their personal experiences, fears and concerns and to support each 
other. And the focus group session gave them a voice, it allowed them 
to say for themselves the massive impact immigration rules were 
having on their daily lives. Up until then, there had not been many 
spaces to highlight these impacts or to record their daily lived experi-
ences. But the second focus group session refl ected local tensions 
and hostilities – there were lots of references to ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
points about the worthiness of some immigrants and not others. That 
second session took place in the context of heightened UKIP mobi-
lisation against Eastern Europeans and some of that anti-Eastern 
European sentiment was expressed by participants in that session. 
For us, getting involved in the MIC research was part of a process, a 
continuation of work we were already doing with service users. And 
after the focus group sessions we continued some of those debates 
– as a follow-up to the points made at the second focus group, we 
organised a debate on the elections and political parties and we did 
a lot of work on building understanding and empathy towards all 
migrants, to encourage users of the centre to understand that anti-
immigrant sentiment is not just impacting on them but on other 
communities as well. 
 Sukhwant : I do have a question in my mind though; even I as a 
researcher wonder how much impact we have actually had, beyond 
awareness raising and discussion among the research participants. 
The European elections [2014] and the subsequent national elec-
tion results [2015] seem to have wholeheartedly supported the anti-
immigrant hostility of that period. And here in the UK, the 
government did bring in the Immigration Act 2014, irrespective of 
opposition and projects like ours giving voice to their divisive and 
undemocratic nature. And, although the two public meetings in 
Southall were really well attended and we had an excellent discus-
sion, I had the sense that we were talking to the ‘already converted’. 
There were just two voices that contrasted with what speakers on the 
panel were saying – the man at the fi rst meeting that wanted to make 
a strong distinction between recent migrants allegedly claiming 
welfare benefi ts and the work ethic of his parents’ generation. Then 
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there was the man at the second meeting, where we discussed the 
MIC project fi ndings, who said he could not understand why a focus 
on ‘illegal’ immigrants would impact on established ethnic minority 
communities. But these were minority views at the public meetings. 
Did you see any value in these events and what is your sense of the 
impact that we had? 
 Southall Black Sisters : But it gave us space to make the connections. 
For example, to hear from the JCWI [Joint Council for the Welfare 
of Immigrants] speaker about the work going on in Birmingham 
around landlord checks. We heard about the rise and fi ght across 
the country as well as the compliance. You make connections and 
build support, solidarity among dissenting voices. We heard about 
the disparate ways that people are protesting. In fact our contact 
with Rita Chadha 4 came through all this. None of us were aware of 
Rita ’ s fantastic work and she is such an important voice. Also, we 
can ’ t look at ‘impact’ as something that will completely overhaul all 
these things. The anti-immigrant push is like a juggernaut! It has 
been layer upon layer of anti-immigration measures. Some of the 
measures in the current Crime Bill are like the pass laws of apartheid 
South Africa – if this goes through, it will allow the police to stop 
people not just on suspicion that you might not legally be in this 
country but to ask for your documents and if you can ’ t produce 
them within the stipulated time then be able to arrest you. They 
don ’ t even have to have reasonable suspicion, just suspicion. 
 Sukhwant : So even more likely to involve racial profi ling. 
 Southall Black Sisters : Yes. And you don ’ t even have to give a good 
reason. The combination of this and the new measures under the 
Immigration Act have created levels of fear among people because 
landlords etc. are being encouraged to report people. So in that 
climate, where minorities are treading on eggshells, all of this work 
is so, so important because it ’ s about trying to create alternative 
networks. The anti-immigrant push is a tidal wave, it ’ s a juggernaut! 
 4  Throughout the MIC research project Rita Chadha was Chief Executive 
of RAMFEL (Refugee And Migrant Forum of Essex and London). 
RAMFEL was a community partner for the research in Barking and 
Dagenham. Prior to the research project, Rita was a prominent voice 
opposing the Go Home van in local and national media and active in 
the AARX survey (see note  2 ), and RAMFEL supported one of their 
clients to make a successful legal challenge to the Go Home van initia-
tive (see  Taylor, Gidda and Syal,  2013 ). 
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And all we can do is create spaces for discussion and networks that 
challenge those views. One other very real impact is that the next 
time when one of the women in the focus group sees an Eastern 
European she won ’ t be so hardened in her views. 
 Sukhwant : Did it do that? Did it change the views of the women 
within the groups? 
 Southall Black Sisters : Yes, yes. We were doing the Everyday Borders 
project 5 at the same time and that helped as well. That period, the 
series of discussions, was a good opening for us to discuss what all 
of us, local people can do. And it was important for creating alterna-
tive networks of support. Networks are vital, not only for individual 
women to overcome some of their fears and sense of isolation, but 
also for us as an organisation to link with other groups working 
around the country. 
 Sukhwant : Is that why SBS are involved in a number of social research 
projects? 
 Southall Black Sisters : Yes but there is a reason that this particular 
project has been unique – we are not encouraging, carte blanche, 
all academics to come and knock on our door [laughs]. This project 
was unique because women had already had a spontaneous protest 
outside the Himalaya Palace and then organised a demonstration 
outside the reception centre in Hounslow. These actions helped to 
galvanise individual feelings into a collective sentiment. It focused 
attention on a pressing issue. It generated a public debate. And that 
is the context in which the research comes along. It ’ s not like the 
research has manufactured something. It ’ s not like the research, or 
SBS workers for that matter, are manufacturing it. We were all sup-
porting women that wanted to do something about it. And the 
research offered to map what was happening around the country. 
And it also gave us spaces for self-refl ection. Activism teaches research 
what the issues are but academics may help us understand the pro-
cesses and to develop our analysis of all this. That self-refl ection is 
always a necessary part of activism. Research gives you a chance to 
step back and think about what has gone on, to connect your input 
with what other people are doing around the country. But it doesn ’ t 
work when researchers just swan in, in an instrumental way. We have 
 5  Research conducted at the University of East London between 2013 
and 2016 as part of the EU Borderscapes project; see  Yuval-Davis, 
Wemyss and Cassidy,  2016 . 
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that experience all the time, where academics just want us to organ-
ise the focus groups and ask the women to discuss a particular issue, 
without context or process, then it becomes manufactured. And 
there is also the question of payment. 
 Sukhwant : You ’ ve raised two issues there. So the research needs to 
be part of a process. And two, the fi nancial aspects – are you saying 
that payment is an important part of this discussion? 
 Southall Black Sisters : One, staff time and staff resources that are 
taken up when we engage with research and that needs to be recog-
nised. Secondly, it ’ s the women ’ s time and researchers need to rec-
ognise that they don ’ t have any money, especially those subject to 
immigration controls. Researchers tend to think they can just come 
along and do this session and take the data and go away and write 
up. But the women need to be reimbursed, as they were on this 
project. The fact that they are giving up their time and they are 
travelling in especially, all this needs to be taken into account. But 
the other thing that happened, and this is an important offshoot 
that has made this research project unique, is that the same women 
then decided to get involved in UEL [University of East London] ’ s 
Everyday Borders project and that process that they started on the 
MIC project continued. That was really empowering, it helped their 
confi dence and a couple eventually went on to speak at public events 
about their experiences. 
 Sukhwant : That is great to hear! The focus groups were so powerful, 
really comprehensive discussions. I can see how your activism and 
the data have contributed to the project but have you learned or 
gained anything from us? 
 Southall Black Sisters : We can say for sure that being part of this 
helped us to refl ect on what was happening. We spoke at a couple 
of the events and two of us also co-authored the  New Left Project blogs 
with you and Yasmin. 6 And we valued the joint production of these 
intellectual outputs – that is real partnership, not parachuting in 
collating data and exiting again. And I ’ ll tell you what that helped 
us to do, it helped us to develop our own thinking – key points that 
we aired for the fi rst time at the Westminster Breakfast Briefi ng. 7 It 
 6  Dhaliwal and Patel,  2015 ;  Gunaratnam and Patel,  2015 . 
 7  An event held by the MIC project to share our interim research fi nd-
ings with policy-makers and activists in March 2015, at which Pragna 
Pratel from SBS gave a response to the fi ndings and the ongoing 
research. 
Why are we doing this? 35
helped us articulate the view that this drive on immigration, this 
‘hostile environment’ (and all the duties being foisted on statutory 
agencies and local people), this drive contradicts the protection 
principle and public policy/practice guidelines that remind public 
sector workers that they have a duty to protect women and children 
from violence and abuse. We had been thinking and discussing these 
points but the spaces around the project helped us to consolidate 
some of that thinking. And in fact the research project bolstered the 
position of SBS as well. Campaigning on immigration, in Southall 
particularly, has historically been led by BME [Black and Minority 
Ethnic] men while there have been few voices from the women ’ s 
voluntary sector questioning and challenging immigration rules. For 
us, getting involved in that space was important and the research 
project gave us legitimacy in this respect – we were involved in the 
work, so no one could say ‘well who are you, how do you know what 
is going on?’ And the events embedded our group in community 
structures and processes. And it ’ s really important that people can 
see a women ’ s group playing a part in the networks and spaces that 
have arisen as a consequence of the range of activities that are chal-
lenging the intensifi cation of anti-immigrant policies and views. This 
is as important for migrant rights networks to see this as it is for 
other women ’ s groups to see. And for each section to connect the 
issues across race and gender and class. Women ’ s groups like Sand-
hya ’ s group – Sisters 4 Safety – in Manchester have felt isolated and 
academia can play a role in countering that isolation by linking them 
into what else is happening around the country. 
 Has reading this conversation made you think any differently 
about how academic researchers might work with community 
and activist groups? If so, in what ways? 
 When planning a research collaboration between academic 
researchers and community or activist groups, what issues 
might you consider with regard to:
 1  Benefi ts of the relationship (to the community or activist 
group, to the participants, to the researcher) 
 2  Costs of the relationship (to the community or activist 
group, to the participants, to the researcher) 
 3  Ethics 
 4  Relationships 
 5  Clarity of roles 
 6  What happens after the fi eldwork fi nishes? 
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 Permeable borders, performative 
politics and public mistrust 
 Rita: I was just taking the train from Victoria to Clapham Junction. 
And Clapham Junction when I get off from the train, I saw so many 
UKBA [UK Border Agency] people they were there, I saw them 
with large dogs, blocking the entire area. I had a visa and have it 
now also. But I got really scared because I could see the place 
blocked. I cannot describe how terrifi ed I was, wondering why there 
is a man there with dogs and searching, what are they searching, 
was it drugs, or what? I got so panicked and scared that I went and 
sat in the wrong train … When I got on the train I started crying. 
I was thinking how long will I live with this fear? I ’ m not allowed 
to work … I started to think to myself, if I can ’ t move around at all, 
that people are blocking the way like this, and I ’ m so scared then 
perhaps suicide is better. 
 (Ealing and Hounslow Focus Group, 
conducted by Sukhwant) 
 Our [Go Home poster] campaign targets illegal immigrants without 
any discrimination at all between them. By no stretch of the rational 
imagination can it be described as ‘racist’. Furthermore, the cam-
paign is not meant to, and does not, discourage legal immigrants 
who have earned the right to live or settle in Britain. To claim that 
the poster campaign is unfair to legal migrants is silly. 
 (Mark Harper, Immigration Minister, 
writing in the  Daily Mail , 2013) 
 Alan: Yes, they ’ re trying to give the impression that they ’ re doing 
something about it … ‘We are doing our job, we are catching these 
illegals, we are putting them in the van and we ’ re taking them to 
the jail’ and half an hour later they ’ re going to let them go again, 
they ’ re not saying that bit, are they? 
 (Dagenham Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
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 The three statements above provide very different perspectives on the 
performative politics of immigration control, demonstrating some of 
the contradictory reactions to the increasing visibility of the ‘tough-
ness’ of UK immigration enforcement. In the fi rst narrative, a woman 
describes the visceral fear that gripped her on seeing a large, public 
show of force by border offi cials at a domestic railway station in South 
London. Rita had a valid visa and therefore in theory had no reason 
to fear being stopped. But she was ‘terrifi ed’, ‘panicked’, ‘scared’ and 
‘nervous’, to the extent that she got on the wrong train, and began to 
think that death might be better than such constant fear when simply 
trying to move around the city. She saw her way, and perhaps her life, 
as ‘blocked’, almost impossible. 
 This account is in contrast to the second extract, in which the then 
Minister for Immigration, Mark Harper MP, makes a defence of the 
Go Home vans in a column in the  Daily Mail newspaper (see also 
 Introduction ). He argues that it is not ‘rational’ to view the poster as 
threatening to anyone other than people who are in contravention of 
immigration law. By extension it seems that Harper would class the 
experience of terror described by Rita as ‘silly’ too. Why should Rita 
feel ‘blocked’ if she is carrying a valid visa and being ‘rational’? 
 In the fi nal extract, the speaker identifi ed himself in our focus 
group as supporting the far-right British National Party (BNP), a 
party which has long supported ‘voluntary resettlement’ for (legal) 
‘immigrants  and their descendants’ ( BNP,  2010 ; our emphasis). Much 
journalistic commentary and analysis of the Go Home vans suggested 
that their purpose was to appeal as much to this audience – the voter 
sceptical about immigration and turning to far-right parties – as to 
those ‘in the UK illegally’ (see  BBC,  2013 ;  Merrick,  2013 ;  Wigmore, 
 2013 ). This was a view supported by some of our interviews with 
policy insiders about the reasons for the rise in demonstrations of 
toughness in government communications about immigration (see 
Chapter  3 ). Talking not just about the Go Home vans but also about 
the images of arrests by immigration enforcement offi cers circulated 
by the Home Offi ce on Twitter and elsewhere, Alan both supports the 
idea that such performances reach out to these audiences, and ques-
tions their effi cacy in doing so. The message is at once recognised and 
dismissed as insuffi cient and as a public relations game. It seems, 
indeed, that by following the logic circulating in Westminster, whereby 
government has given up on trying to discuss the facts of immigration 
in favour of emotional appeals to reassurance and fear (see Chapter 
 3 ), the Home Offi ce has met with further scepticism. 
 In what follows, we explore these different experiences and view-
points, focusing on the ways in which the theatricalised performances 
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of the state emerged in the particular moment of border control 
materialised by Operation Vaken. Through our research we have been 
able to delve into the effects of the state performance and mobilisation 
of the border through the accounts of both those who have suffered 
the most coercive aspects of bordering and those who are most vocal 
in their distrust of political elites. In both groups, the performative 
aspect of Home Offi ce immigration campaigns is identifi ed as a 
moment of crisis and crumbling credibility. What should be constitu-
tive becomes indicative of an underlying lack; and for both of these 
audiences this serves to confi rm the vulnerability and contradictions 
of government activity in this area. In our discussion of these com-
plicated dynamics, we will consider the responses of different audi-
ences to highly staged instances of Home Offi ce performance, 
suggesting that, in the process, what is revealed is the scepticism of 
these varied audiences towards the performativity of immigration 
enforcement and its politics. 
 In making sense of these different entanglements in the perfor-
mance of immigration enforcement, in this chapter we:
 1  engage with debates about performative politics to consider the 
apparently contradictory performances mounted in the name of 
border control 
 2  discuss the deployment of theatricalised violence by the state 
 3  argue that performances of state power should be understood as 
directed at several audiences and also as techniques that segment 
the population 
 4  consider how some attempts to address a diversity of audiences 
can be met with scepticism, anxiety or indifference 
 5  note how, despite amplifi ed expressions of anti-migrant sentiment 
across public life, the anti-migrant performances of government 
are viewed with suspicion and re-interpreted through a popular 
scepticism infl uenced by a broader culture of ‘anti-politics’. 1 
 Performing coercion 
 The key question that concerned us during Operation Vaken was a 
deceptively simple one: how do governments seek to demonstrate that 
 1  By ‘anti-politics’ we are referring to both feelings of disaffection and 
disillusionment and to the movement of political activities and interven-
tions outside of established political institutions and spaces. 
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they are controlling immigration? Importantly, although the Go 
Home vans might be regarded as the most crass and obvious form of 
political performance, throughout the course of the project we came 
to understand the many other and varied forms political performance 
can take. For example, while we were doing our research the Home 
Offi ce initiated a series of interventions, all designed to confi rm the 
government ’ s commitment to tough border controls. The majority of 
these constituted what we might understand as speech acts. 2 These 
were public proclamations of intent. At the same time, there was a 
period during the project when the more overt coercion of immigra-
tion raids and people being ‘lifted’ in public places seemed to escalate. 
In trying to better understand the impact of the varied initiatives 
undertaken to create a ‘hostile environment’, we sought out responses 
to this range of quite different actions. We have now come to under-
stand both the communication campaigns and the physical assertion 
of the border through checks, raids, detentions and deportations as 
modes of state performance. 
 Central to our interests has been the manner in which popular 
understandings of sovereignty place the issue of the border as a 
central test and marker of sovereign power. Nicholas Vaughan-
Williams, a scholar in politics and international relations, explains the 
centrality of border marking to theoretical accounts of the exercise of 
state sovereignty:
 the concept of the border of the state can be said to frame the limits 
of sovereign power as something supposedly contained within fi xed 
territorially demarcated parameters.  
 ( Vaughan-Williams,  2009 : 730) 
 Alongside these assumptions about the role of the border in demon-
strating sovereign power and for complex reasons that may be par-
ticular to the UK, the question of immigration control has become 
 2  The philosopher  J.L. Austin  ( 1975/1962 ), known for his pioneering 
work on ‘Speech Act Theory’, makes a distinction between the ‘illocution-
ary’ speech act that does what it sets out to do in the moment and the 
‘perlocutionary’ component of ‘utterances’ that has impacts beyond the 
moment of interaction. However, as the feminist philosopher  Judith 
Butler  ( 1997 ) has pointed out, in reality this distinction is hard to main-
tain. Whatever the intention, any speech act might spin out to become 
perlocutionary. What is said may come to circulate more widely and in a 
longer timeframe, and in this process, other responses and interpretations 
can proliferate. 
Permeable borders 41
one of the central talismanic markers of the alleged failure of main-
stream politics. In the moment of increasingly vocalised anti-politics 
in the UK, the issue of immigration has taken on a symbolic status 
that goes far beyond the detail of any policy intervention or outcome. 
While we will go on to reveal the extent to which ‘the UK’ is a diverse 
space in relation to the reception of government-led immigration 
campaigns (see Chapter  4 ), the presentation of the issue of immigra-
tion in mainstream political and media discourse erases many of these 
differences. For the most part then, immigration is presented as: a test 
of sovereignty and/or as evidence that sovereignty has been eroded; 
an example of the diverging interests of a (possibly metropolitan) 3 
political class and the rest of the population; an indication of the 
overall loss of control of central government; a demonstration of the 
questionable use of data in offi cial pronouncements. The chapters in 
this volume will go on to refl ect on the repercussions of these varying 
views among different audiences, including the manner in which such 
discourses position different actors as inside or outside political space. 
 In relation to the exclusions that arise from border marking, 
Vaughan-Williams has revisited the philosophy of  Giorgio Agamben 
 ( 1998, 1999, 2005 ) to think again about the spaces of indistinction 
and what Agamben calls the ‘banned’ person. In doing this, Vaughan-
Williams reopens debates about the location and character of sover-
eign power and, importantly for our interests here, the ambiguous 
and ambivalent inclusion extended to those who are disallowed by the 
exercise of power. As we will go on to explain, these discussions of 
the banned and disallowed person have been important in helping us 
to acknowledge and interpret the unexpected and contradictory 
impacts of immigration enforcement campaigns for the (more usually) 
ignored subject of border enforcement (namely irregular migrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers). 
 Our aim then is to offer a critical reading of the performance of 
recent border enforcement campaigns in order to understand the 
impact of such campaigns on political spaces and popular under-
standings of the business of government. To do this, we will link our 
analysis of state campaigns to a larger debate about the conduct of 
political life and suggest that the assertion of power may not always 
 3  The term ‘metropolitan elite’ has been used by the media and politicians 
across the political spectrum not only to denote the class privilege of 
liberal Londoners but also as a way of suggesting that the views of this 
elite group are out of touch with the feelings and experiences of ‘ordinary 
people’ (see Chapter  6 ). 
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play out in linear or predictable ways among the wider population. In 
particular, we have been alert to the debates about anti-politics or 
postpolitics (see  Burnham,  2002 ;  Hay,  2007 ;  Schedler,  1997 ) signify-
ing a disaffection, negativity or a disengagement from political institu-
tions and processes, such as elections (see  Saunders,  2014 ). Yet these 
ideas have been rarely linked to discussions of immigration and state 
immigration campaigns. 
 Our exploration of state performances in the name of immigration 
control found that the fear of popular scepticism both informed gov-
ernment tactics and circulated in the reception of the various cam-
paign initiatives. This constant whisper of scepticism in the face of 
all and any government initiatives relating to immigration control 
brings up questions of political performance and the impact of such 
performances. 
 What do we mean by political performance? 
 Shirin Rai offers a useful framework through which to analyse politi-
cal performances and the ways in which they are received and inter-
preted by different audiences. For Rai, political performances are:
 those performances that seek to communicate to an audience 
meaning-making related to state institutions, policies and discourses. 
This meaning-making is read in very specifi c socio-political con-
texts; it can be either consolidative or challenging of the dominant 
narratives of politics.  
 (Rai, 2015: 1179–80) 
 Rai ’ s interest is in the active and planned business of political life. Her 
own work has examined parliamentary ritual and how this positions 
women. When she writes of political performance, it is with a focus 
on statecraft and the actions of political representatives. It is a concep-
tion that places most of us as audience, not actor, but in a manner 
that gives due weight to the interpretative power of audiences:
 Its legitimacy rests on a convincing performance; it has to be repre-
sentative of a particular political stand; it must engage the audience 
that is its particular target; it should satisfy the formal rules, rituals 
and conventions of the institutions through which the meaning is 
being projected; and be received as logical and coherent. Because 
much of this performance can be challenged by disruption of the 
performance itself through counter-performance, mis-recognition 
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or mis-reading of and by the audience, political performance is 
inherently unstable and vulnerable to being seen as illegitimate.  
 ( Rai,  2015 : 1180) 
 The central realisation here is the inherent instability of political per-
formance. Much of what we found suggested that various audiences 
viewed government performances as weak or misplaced and, as a 
result of this reading, were confi rmed in their view of the incompe-
tence or irrelevance of government more generally. The inherent 
instability of political performance is of key importance when consid-
ering recent immigration campaigns because this reminds us that 
what the powerful say and do may not determine how all actors 
understand what is happening in public space. With this in mind, we 
have used Rai ’ s work to inform our readings of this set of state per-
formances. Rai suggests a framework for understanding the produc-
tion of political performances by identifying two axes of activity:
 On one axis we can map the markers of representation: the body, 
the space/place, words/script/speech and performative labour. 
Together, these four markers encapsulate political performance. On 
the second axis we can map the effects of performance: authenticity, 
mode of representation, liminality and resistance (of and to) politi-
cal representation.  
 ( Rai,  2015 : 1181) 
 Applying this schema to Home Offi ce immigration campaigns in the 
period of our project has allowed us to pull out the aspects of these 
campaigns that typify these particular strands of performance. There-
fore, we might consider that bodies are adapted, rebranded or con-
tained through the varied activities of updating uniforms and 
instituting immigration raids (see also  Bunyan,  1985 : 295). The per-
formance of immigration control utilises space and place both by 
reiterating the border at the border and through new signage in public 
locations such as hospital waiting rooms (see Figure  2 ). Equally the 
circulation of immigration enforcement teams, branded vans and 
public raids all extend the space of political performance to the street 
and this also is a tactical remaking of political space ( Yuval-Davis, 
Wemyss and Cassidy,  2016 ). As we have already identifi ed, much of 
the campaigning activity under scrutiny consists of speech acts, 
including tweets, slogans and branding. As these performances are 
not tied to any particular representative, the performative labour can 
be harder to identify. However, the positioning of journalists as an 
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internal audience to the most coercive elements of border control 
through invitations to witness its performance, along with the overall 
effort of communication and will to embody authority, all point to 
the locations of performative labour in these endeavours. We have 
understood the campaigns that we analysed as representing this range 
of tactical performances. 
 Alongside focus groups, interviews and observations in our own 
six research locations, to help us understand how the wider popula-
tion reacted to these campaigns, we commissioned a survey from 
Ipsos MORI on attitudes to Home Offi ce immigration campaigns 
(see the  Appendix for more details). The opening section of the 
survey mapped public awareness of a number of overlapping initia-
tives, chosen to represent the focus on  communicating  the active 
 Figure 2:  Signs in NHS on limited rights to healthcare for some 
migrants 
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pursuit of immigration control. The survey asked people whether they 
were aware of the following:
 1  advertising vans around London in 2013 stating ‘In the UK 
illegally? GO HOME OR FACE ARREST’ 
 2  tweets from the Home Offi ce showing images of people 
being detained by immigration offi cers and the hashtag 
#immigrationoffender 
 3  journalists accompanying immigration offi cers on raids of 
wedding ceremonies, homes or workplaces 
 4  signs in NHS premises stating ‘NHS hospital treatment is not 
free for everyone’ [see Figure  2 ] 
 5  UK Border branded signs about immigration regulations at pass-
port control areas introduced in 2006 
 6  uniforms for passport control offi cers introduced in 2006/7 
 7  Immigration Enforcement branded vans on UK streets 
 8  other communications (please specify) 
 9  none of these 
 10  don ’ t know. 
 We wanted to map the extent of public knowledge of the Home Offi ce 
campaigns and also to get a sense of how it felt to be positioned as 
an audience to these campaigns. In effect, we conducted a very basic 
form of audience research and, in so doing, we sought to shift the 
discussion away from attitudes to a thing called ‘immigration’, 
and towards an assessment of how government campaigns about 
immigration made sense or incited sensation for different audiences. 
Table  1 summarises some key outcomes of the survey we commis-
sioned from Ipsos MORI. 
 After the heightened publicity accompanying the Go Home vans, 
it is perhaps surprising that such small proportions of the sample were 
aware of the Vaken initiatives. The media coverage of the Go Home 
vans was intensive for a short period of time, yet by the time of our 
survey more than a year later only a little more than a quarter (26 
per cent) of those surveyed recalled this campaign. Other initiatives 
also had little impact on popular recall; only new signage at passport 
control elicited a higher level of recognition (31 per cent). In relation 
to the introduction of vans (either the ad-van or those used by enforce-
ment offi cers), tweets or accompanying journalists, those who said 
that they were aware of various initiatives were almost as likely – or 
more likely – to be concerned about the impact of unnecessary sus-
picion as they were to be reassured by evidence of government action. 
The areas where a signifi cantly greater proportion expressed a sense 
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of reassurance – NHS signs, border signs and uniforms for border 
staff – relate more concretely to the marking of a static border albeit 
extended into the space of healthcare. As Rai (2015) has indicated, 
the sense of space and place signifi cantly shapes the possibilities and 
impact of political performance. In our case, the spaces in which the 
‘performance’ is enacted appears to shape the extent to which the 
general audience considers it legitimate. 
 The Ipsos MORI survey also gave respondents opportunities to 
provide textual, qualitative responses in addition to the multiple-
choice questions. Although this option was taken only by a minority 
of those familiar with the government campaigns, the responses show 
the uncertain impact of the performance (see Table  2 ). In order to 
summarise this range of material, we have organised comments in 
relation to each campaign strand under the headings of: 
 •  considered ineffective 
 •  opposition/disgust 
 •  agreement with approach 
 •  stupid or equivalent 
 •  a failed or misplaced performance 
 •  other responses. 
 Table 2:  ‘Other’ written responses to the question ‘Which, if any, of 
the following best refl ects how you feel about this communication/
action?’ (responses are verbatim as typed by survey respondents) 
 Advertising vans around London in 2013 stating ‘In the UK 
illegally? Go Home or Face Arrest’ 
 Considered 
ineffective 
‘i feel strongly that the previous labour govt  + 
coalition have performed badly in controlling 
immigration’
 ‘government doing nothing’
 ‘i think the vans are a waste of money on a 
personal note. we need to curb immigration to 
uk & i now vote for UKIP as a protest vote’
 ‘The Home Offi ce are not doing enough to 
combat immigration ie funding reduced to tackle 
this major issue’
 ‘they have to control immigration so i am for the 
work of offi cers but against the vans as they 
create problems for us british citizens with our 
neighbours’
 ‘the vans are a waste of public money’
 ‘CANNOT SEE VANS BEING THE ANSWER.’
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 Opposition/disgust ‘A worrying shift to the right wing in this country’
 ‘Disgusted by it’
 I think it ’ s horribly racist.’
 ‘Angry’
 ‘1930 ’ s Berlin?’
 ‘Absolutely fucking outraged that public funds 
were spent on such a crass and insensitive waste 
of effort’
 ‘Intimidating!’
 ‘i think the vans initiative in london is appalling’
 Agreement with 
approach 
‘the illegals are here on false pretences & should be 
deported immediately.’
 ‘where there is a strong suspicion’
 Stupid or 
equivalent 
‘Ridiculus’
 ‘ed embarrass’
 ‘It was stupid’
 A failed or 
misplaced 
performance 
‘counter productive’
 ‘bad publicity!’
 ‘inappropriate action’
 Other responses ‘ON TV’
 ‘i am fully aware of the immigration problem’
 Tweets from the Home Offi ce showing images of people being 
detained by immigration offi cers and the hashtag 
#immigrationoffender 
 Considered 
ineffective  
 NONE 
 Opposition/disgust  ‘disgusted’
 Agreement with 
approach 
‘fi ne’
 Stupid or 
equivalent 
 NONE 
 A failed or 
misplaced 
performance 
 NONE 
 Other responses  NONE 
 Signs in NHS premises stating ‘NHS hospital treatment is not 
free for everyone’ 
 Considered 
ineffective  
‘they need to act more not just put up signs’
 Opposition/disgust  ‘Disgusted’
 ‘should not be there’
 ‘legal immagrints should get free nhs’ 
 Agreement with 
approach 
‘foreigners abusing our nhs’ 
 ‘Fine’
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 Stupid or 
equivalent 
 NONE 
 A failed or 
misplaced 
performance 
‘its not necessarily immigration.its not being legal 
or illegal.’
 Other responses ‘only concerned about postcadev treatment’
 UK Border branded signs about immigration regulations at 
passport control areas introduced in 2006 
 Considered 
ineffective  
‘not enough is being done’
 ‘should be stricter’
 ‘I feel thst these signs would make little difference 
- I doubt anybody intending to enter the country 
illegally is going to be discouraged by signs.’
 ‘theres not enough resources’
 Opposition/disgust   NONE 
 Agreement with 
approach 
‘Fine’
 ‘concerned some may be treated with uneccesary 
suspicion as well as too many immigrants 
entering.’
 Stupid or 
equivalent 
 NONE 
 A failed or 
misplaced 
performance 
 NONE 
 Other responses  NONE 
 Journalists accompanying immigration offi cers on raids of 
wedding ceremonies, homes or workplaces 
 Considered 
ineffective  
‘Steps taken not enough’
 Opposition/disgust  ‘Outraged’
 ‘Disgusted’
 Agreement with 
approach 
‘Fine with it’
 ‘too much immigration’
 Stupid or 
equivalent 
 NONE 
 A failed or 
misplaced 
performance 
‘dont feel the need for it to be publisised’
 ‘it is an inappropiate way of carrying out 
government bussiness’
 Other responses ‘Null’
 Uniforms for passport control offi cers introduced in 2006/7 
 Considered 
ineffective  
‘theres not enough resources’
 Opposition/disgust   NONE 
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 Agreement with 
approach 
‘Fine’
 ‘it makes the process formal and tidy.nothing to do 
with illegal immigrants.it makes them look 
professional.its same in other countries.’
 Stupid or 
equivalent 
 NONE 
 A failed or 
misplaced 
performance 
‘thought they were badly fi tting - not good 
impression’
 Other responses ‘More widespread than PEOPLE realise’
 Immigration Enforcement branded vans on UK streets 
 Considered 
ineffective  
‘government is not taking enough action’
 ‘money would be better spent tracking down 
illegals’
 ‘dont feel gov ’ t is taking enough action’
 ‘waste of money’
 ‘it creates the wrong impression of the weakness of 
the immigration service’
 Opposition/disgust  ‘xenophobic, alarmist,unprofessional, unethical.’
 ‘feel digraceful’
 ‘Disgusted’
 ‘they are a disgrce’
 ‘UNFAIR/ILLEGAL’
 ‘CONCERNED ABOUT THEM FUELLING 
RACISM’
 ‘FEEL SAD ABOUT THE SITUATION 
SURROUNDING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATES’
 ‘Offensive’
 ‘Racist’ 
 Agreement with 
approach 
‘like it’
 ‘If it ’ s done in a good way then that ’ s a good thing’
 Stupid or 
equivalent 
‘it ’ s a joke’
 A failed or 
misplaced 
performance 
‘govt are doing their best’
 ‘badly phrased’
 ‘legal immigrants may be victimised’
 Other responses ‘bigger problem than government thinks’
 The question of the effects of the performance of immigration 
enforcement has been central for us. From the very beginnings of the 
project we have tried both to describe the particularity of these inter-
ventions at a time of heightened politicisation of immigration control 
and to register and trace the impact of such actions on migrants and 
on others. In the process, our analyses have revealed the extent to 
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which campaign messages circulate differently according to audience 
and location. With this in mind, the questions that are raised by Rai 
in relation to the effects of performance should be regarded as varying 
across audiences. The second axis that Rai identifi es consists of:
 •  Authenticity – Is this for real? Vocal scepticism reveals distrust of 
performance and effectivity of state actions overall (e.g. ‘Abso-
lutely fucking outraged that public funds were spent on such a 
crass and insensitive waste of effort’). 
 •  Mode of representation – for vans, this mode has been regarded 
as improper and/or ineffective. For signage, there seems to be a 
greater acceptance of both script and place (e.g. ‘they need to act 
more not just put up signs’). 
 •  Liminality – possibility of rupture, here arising from dangerous 
admission that performance is required (e.g. ‘it creates the wrong 
impression of the weakness of the immigration service’). 
 •  Resistance of/to political representation – including humour, ridi-
cule, outright disbelief (e.g. ‘it ’ s a joke’). 
 All four of these aspects of reception were mentioned in the sceptical 
readings of state campaigns in our survey. In particular scepticism 
was sometimes expressed as ridicule and the performances were also 
taken as a reminder that authority is uncertain and sometimes inef-
fective (see also  Living Research Five ). Taken together the two axes 
allow us to consider political performance both as a set of performa-
tive  techniques and as a set of  responses or audiences. 
 It is important to remember that the immigration campaigns that 
we studied did not inhabit the usual spaces of political life and did 
not constitute the ritualistic performances of bodies such as those 
seen in Parliament. Instead, they were designed to enact and mark 
the border in everyday locations. At the same time, the very act 
of reasserting such sovereign authority also served to reveal the fra-
gility and precariousness of state power. As Rai points out, political 
performances are always inherently unstable and open to alternative 
interpretations. The very act of seeking to make power visible can be 
regarded as a sign of weakness (because ‘real power’ has no need of 
such theatrical assertions) or as a demystifi cation of the workings of 
power (revealing the secrets that create the illusion of authority). 
 Immigration campaigns that took place during our research were 
undertaken against a backdrop of public scepticism and the increas-
ingly amplifi ed view that government had no control over immigra-
tion. We learned from discussions with those tasked with the formation 
of policy and government campaigns that public opinion was 
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considered to be beyond infl uence by any data that could be presented 
to demonstrate ‘effective border control’ (discussed further in Chapter 
 3 ). In this context, the performative assertions that the border is being 
guarded can be seen as an attempt to persuade the public that some-
thing is being done about immigration enforcement. The move to 
these particular modes of political performance is a response to the 
ineffectiveness of more usual practices of presenting evidence. Our 
task becomes, then, to understand the workings of government mes-
sages that are not presentations of evidence and to explore how such 
messages are received and interpreted by different audiences. 
 Popular scepticism 
 In our research, the most explicitly voiced scepticism came from those 
who identifi ed themselves as wishing to see more and stronger con-
trols on immigration. In Barking and Dagenham (a borough in the 
east of London), focus group discussion revolved around the negative 
impact of recent immigration in local neighbourhoods, yet these 
groups also expressed high levels of distrust in government initiatives 
to communicate actions taken as part of immigration control. 
 In Dagenham, one man revealed that he had stood for election 
as a BNP candidate – an action that had led to considerable public 
barracking. For this group, mainstream politics (national  and  local, 
as they were keen to point out) was out of touch with people like 
themselves and unable to address the issue of immigration in any 
meaningful way. In the context of these views, government commu-
nications on migration control, and the Go Home vans in particular, 
were interpreted as another distraction from the underlying impotence 
or indifference of government in relation to the issue of immigration 
control. 
 To understand the manner in which this form of scepticism is 
voiced, it is helpful to listen closely to the conversation. The fi rst 
cause of scepticism arises from the purported audience for the ‘Go 
Home’ message. In assessing the impact, this group do not include 
themselves as part of the intended audience and point instead to the 
likely resistance from the implied audience.
 Yasmin: So with things like the van, what sort of impact do you 
think it actually has? 
 Joe: None, because they don ’ t take no notice anyway, they just wait 
until they get caught, you know that, don ’ t you? What, you think 
Permeable borders 53
someone ’ s going to hand theirself in, look, I ’ m a criminal, I just 
robbed a bank. 
 Carol: Not when it ’ s paved with gold, no, they ain ’ t going to hand 
themselves in. 
 (Dagenham Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
 However, this unambiguous assertion of the ineffectiveness of the 
initiative contrasts with a point made earlier in the conversation. In 
an earlier remark, it had been suggested both that the offer made on 
the vans was welcome to those who wish to see fewer immigrants in 
Britain and that the offer of advice and support was magnanimous 
and should be regarded as such (echoed in the views of a policy-
maker quoted in the next chapter).
 Yasmin: So you ’ re sort of saying different things. So on the one 
hand you ’ re saying it ’ s good because it ’ s advising and on the other 
hand you ’ re saying it ’ s going to have no impact at all? 
 Joe: No, it ’ s not going to have no impact, it ’ s good for the people 
that live here. 
 Alan: Yeah. 
 Joe: It ’ ll make them happy. 
 (Dagenham Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
 These statements suggest that ‘the people who live here’ (i.e. non-
migrants) will be made happy by the circulation of the vans and the 
publicity given to government immigration advice. Local residents 
become the intended audience and the performance takes on a dif-
ferent intention, to evoke the emotion of happiness. The feminist 
cultural theorist Sara Ahmed has outlined a way of understanding 
such shifting investments in ‘happiness’:
 An attachment to happiness as a lost object involves not simply a 
form of mourning but also an anxiety that the wrong people can be 
happy, and even a desire for happiness to be returned to the right 
people.  
 ( Ahmed,  2010 : 13) 
 For a moment it seems that those in our focus group participate in 
these feelings of properly returned happiness, viewing the vans as a 
momentary confi rmation that they have been listened to. Yet this lull 
passes quickly and the conversation moves back to the question of 
why the vans were withdrawn.
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 Alan: But the fact is, though, it made an impact, didn ’ t it, because 
who said that it was racist, all the foreigners, all the foreigners 
revolted and said we ’ re not having that. 
 Carol: Yeah, all the English said it ’ s racist. 
 Alan: And that ’ s the impact that it made, it brought the foreigners 
out to say we ’ re not having that, that is racist against us and 
therefore the government went for them again and said you ’ ve 
got to take it off. 
 (Dagenham Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
 In this fi nal analysis of the vans, the idea that the intended audience 
is elsewhere returns. There is an obvious confusion about who initi-
ated the campaign and who holds authority – ‘the government … said 
you ’ ve got to take it off ’ as a result of supporting foreigners and the 
complaint of racism. There is also some variance between the two 
speakers – is it foreigners or the English who said it was racist? 
However, the overall sense of defl ation is palpable. After the momen-
tary happiness of being heard, the reminder that the impact has been 
to reaffi rm the illegality of overt racism places this group outside the 
circuit of communication again. 
 The scepticism continued in the response to tweeted images of 
immigration raids. Here the same group explain why they place little 
trust in such images:
 Joe: they ’ ve obviously raided somewhere and found a couple of 
illegals and they ’ ve taken them into custody, but what brings to 
mind again is what I said before, they won ’ t keep them in custody, 
they ’ ll give them bail to appear in court or to report to the police 
station every Tuesday or whatever and they won ’ t be seen again. 
 (Dagenham Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
 As discussed in the opening of the chapter, this process of Home 
Offi ce reporting was considered disingenuous by this group. This was 
an issue that arose again later in the same discussion.
 Alan: I ’ ve seen this on the television, on the police programmes 
where they ’ ve raided certain shops and things like that and 
they ’ ve arrested four or fi ve and within a couple of days they ’ ve 
all been released to report back to the station, every week. 
 There was a strong sense in the group that the theatricality of such 
performances was designed to distract public attention from govern-
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 Alan: They ’ re trying to give the idea to the general public that 
they ’ re doing something about it, but they ’ re doing absolutely 
nothing. 
 Carol: Nothing, yeah. 
 Alan: Because they ’ re going to release them people. 
 Joe: That van ain ’ t big enough, though, is it? 
 (Dagenham Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
 Here the agreement within the group that such images are just for 
show reveals, paradoxically, that the government is not doing anything 
(‘absolutely nothing’). The group agree that these campaigns are 
unconvincing to them, but that they may work for other, more trusting 
(gullible), audiences. 
 In Barking, discussion of the vans and tweets took a slightly different 
turn, returning to the question of what government hoped to achieve 
through such initiatives. The discussion opened with scepticism:
 Annie: It ’ s not going to work, because if you ’ re illegal you ’ re illegal 
and you ’ re hiding, because you don ’ t come out in society, you 
stay hidden, so yeah, it ’ s true, it is true, but it ’ s not going to work, 
I don ’ t think. I don ’ t object to the actual picture. 
 (Barking Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
 There is another circling around the question of the identity of the 
intended audience in this extract. Of note is how Annie clarifi es that 
she is not offended (‘I don ’ t object’), so that she is not aligned with 
those complaining of racism. Instead, her concern is directed to the 
effectivity of this approach (‘it ’ s not going to work’). Annie assumes 
that she (and people like her) are not the primary intended audience; 
that role belongs to the ‘illegal’. Yet the intended interlocutor is absent 
and Annie does not believe that the targeted group will engage in this 
pretended dialogue (‘you stay hidden’). As the ‘secondary’ audience, 
watching the offi cial address to this absent other, Annie feels that 
her doubt about the intention and effi cacy of government actions is 
confi rmed.
 Yasmin: And so if it ’ s not going to work, why do you think they 
did it? 
 Annie: Because they wanted it to work, they want it to work, because 
we ’ ve just explained to you, we ’ re overloaded with illegal immi-
grants, not anybody in the government or anyone I spoke to can 
tell us how many illegal immigrants are here, how many have gone 
back, so that is just, well, it ’ s playing lip service and yet this is 
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what annoys me, you ’ ll get our Home Offi ce people going into 
say a Chinese shop, a Chinese takeaway shop and they ’ re looking 
for people that have overstayed their welcome, overstayed their 
visas. They send one little Chinese man back home, because they 
caught him. What about 28,000 Romanian criminals in this 
country, they ’ re here, they haven ’ t sent them back, they haven ’ t. 
 Chris: Or any of the terrorists. 
 Annie: One little Chinese man and I feel really sorry for them 
people, because what they ’ re doing, they ’ re earning a living in 
their little takeaways and they get sent back. 
 Chris: Well, they pick the easy target all the time, don ’ t they? 
 Annie: Yeah. 
 Chris: Because then they can brag about what they ’ ve done. 
 Annie: Yeah, well, that to me, that is ridiculous, what you need is 
the wider, do the wider thing, leave them poor little devils who 
are not really doing any harm to us. 
 Chris: I think this was probably done as something to make people 
think oh look how brilliant we are and what we ’ re actually doing, 
but it ’ s a load of rubbish, really. 
 (Barking Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
 Once again the conversation positions speakers as a knowing audience 
who are not susceptible to the somewhat foolish performances of 
government. More than this, the interchange reveals a more nuanced 
narrative around immigration, one where ineffectual government 
picks the ‘easy target’ but does not know how many people are here 
illegally and chooses to ignore ‘the terrorists’ and ‘28,000 Romanian 
criminals’ (see Chapter  5 ). In this instance, and despite the underlying 
discomfort with the impact of immigration, this group viewed the Go 
Home van campaign as disingenuous and not in good faith. As a 
demonstration of this, the discussion circles back to local knowledges 
in a lovely, almost Pinteresque exchange:
 Yasmin: But did you see it [the Go Home van] at all because it went 
through Barking and Dagenham, didn ’ t it? 
 Chris: Well, apparently it did. 
 Annie: What this? 
 Yasmin: Yes. 
 Chris: But you can ’ t go through the high street, because it ’ s pedes-
trian, so I don ’ t know where it would have gone. 
 (Barking Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
 The framework through which the potential effi cacy of government 
campaigns is judged returns to these most basic constraints of local 
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architecture. The ‘targeting’ of localities reveals the distance from what 
is local here. The spaces where such displays might have made sense 
as theatre, if nothing else, are pedestrianised, ‘so I don ’ t know where 
it would have gone’. The claim of coming to localities, a key aspect 
of the theatricality of this particular initiative, is called into question. 
Where would it have gone and, it is implied, who would have seen it? 
 Without an audience, there is no political performance at all. 
 The suggestion of violence 
 Insaaf: This picture already made me sick because I ’ ve been in the 
same situation that they have been in and I know what it makes, 
it makes you feel. 
 (Coventry Focus Group, conducted by Kirsten) 
 This was the immediate response to the tweeted image of an immigra-
tion raid from one focus group participant who had been caught up 
in the cycle of raid–detention–release. Whereas some participants 
experienced Home Offi ce campaigns as a belated but bungled recog-
nition of their locality, others immediately placed the campaigns in a 
wider circulation of mediatised communications. For those who have 
had direct experience of raids and of detention, the trigger image of 
the deportation called up an array of fears and humiliations. To this 
constituency it was all too apparent that these circulated images and 
phrases were warning of the physical coercion not far behind. Jawad 
in Coventry explained, ‘they think it might force you without … We 
don ’ t know what is going on but they ’ re dragging like in the force, so 
you don ’ t know what is going on, there is no human rights.’ 
 Another person in the same group described their own experience:
 Insaaf: I was in the same situation. I have been detained without a 
reason now they took me to the Pakistani high commission, Par-
liament, in front of everybody they put me in handcuffs and when 
they took me inside the Pakistan Parliament but I saw me, they 
said why have they brought you here, I said I don ’ t know … When 
they check my case they say oh we are sorry, we made a mistake. 
They took me in front of everyone like I ’ m a criminal, they put 
handcuffs. So then they are saying we are sorry, we did a mistake, 
so I was very embarrassed and the whole … In front of the whole 
… I was like … I was very embarrassed you know … I was very 
embarrassed from inside for the fi rst time in my life and very 
pent up. 
 (Coventry Focus Group, conducted by Kirsten) 
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 This personal testimony points again to the central role of humili-
ation in such displays: even when the exercise of authority is mistaken 
(‘oh we are sorry, we made a mistake’), the processes of public 
shaming remain. As other chapters discuss, those subject to border 
enforcement were painfully conscious of the many techniques being 
deployed to link migration and criminality in popular discourse 
and imagination and also, increasingly, in the practices of law enforce-
ment as described in the debates around ‘crimmigration’ ( Stumpf, 
 2006 ,  2013 ). 
 What those who had been subjected to such processes understood 
from the tweeted images of a raid is that such actions were taken to 
confi rm that an uncertain immigration status rendered you constantly 
vulnerable to state violence and public humiliation – and also that the 
state undertook actions to demonstrate this constant vulnerability to 
the wider population, even when no enforcement objective was likely 
to be achieved. 
 Although these discussion groups included people who had expe-
rienced the indignities of detention and attempted deportation, scepti-
cism was also expressed in relation to the performative aspect of the 
tweeted photographs:
 Ajala: I just want to say that I think they put this photo in Twitter 
on purpose to show the public or the local people that they are 
doing their job, they are catching people and they deporting them 
back. It ’ s just using … they are using this image to get … For a 
political reason, to get more voice to work for them, you know 
what I mean. This asylum thing in the UK is not a matter of 
human rights or rights yet, it ’ s a political matter. 
 (Coventry Focus Group, conducted by Kirsten) 
 This view that such displays on the part of the Home Offi ce revealed 
an attention to political interest above anything else was expressed by 
a number of respondents, both those seeking refuge and those who 
opposed immigration. Another Coventry respondent who had been 
subject to border enforcement explained in some detail how the cir-
culation of images of border control was designed to infi ltrate popular 
consciousness and elicit support without the articulation of an argu-
ment or presentation of evidence:
 Femi: We are a victim of a political matter between the political 
groups in this country, that ’ s why they put this photo on Twitter, 
to show the public they are doing better than the others of 
sending people away, whatever these people, this guy may be a 
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victim. Maybe his life really endangering in his country, they 
don ’ t care, they just … for them he is a fi gure, a number, in the 
end of the year they want to show the public X number, we 
deported X number. They don ’ t care, this X number, who they 
are and what has happened to them when they ’ ve been deported. 
So I think they put this one in purpose to show the public that 
they are deporting people. 
 (Coventry Focus Group, conducted by Kirsten) 
 Femi makes explicit the impact of different governmental discourses 
on how people are treated, in particular highlighting the wilful dehu-
manisation that comes with reducing people to ‘X number’. In the 
next chapter we discuss the tactical presentation of statistical data by 
government. Here it is enough to note that those who have experi-
enced the intimidation of immigration enforcement understand that 
the spectacular display of one raid is designed to enhance the credibil-
ity of statistical claims about immigration control. 
 Rupturing political space 
 The Go Home vans presented an unexpected intervention into public 
space and in public debate. First of all, the direct address to those 
unspoken presences of the undocumented (or ‘banned’ ( Agamben, 
 1998 )) created a new dynamic and theatre of immigration control. 
The public address through the streets revealed what had been previ-
ously avoided or brushed over: that, when we speak of ‘illegals’ and 
the enforcement of the border, these unwanted others are already 
among us. The geographer  Eric Swyngedouw  ( 2011 ) summarises a 
range of debates about the ‘postpolitical’ and the apparent closing of 
contemporary political space by suggesting that we live in a time when 
there is a push to empty political space of divergent voices and ‘unrec-
ognised’ actors. He goes on to suggest that the concepts of ‘the post-
political’ and ‘post-democratisation’ describe the process by which 
politics becomes increasingly closed through an assumption or impo-
sition of consensus in the name of management. Antagonistic interest 
cannot be voiced or even made visible. Against this tendency, Swyn-
gedouw argues that the struggles of those who are undocumented 
may represent an example of the reinsertion of the political into public 
space:
 Those un(ac)counted in the instituted order became the stand-in 
for the universality of ‘the People’. Today ’ s undocumented 
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immigrants, claiming inclusion, are a contemporary example of the 
political paradox, i.e., the promise of equality that is disavowed in 
the policing, categorization and naming of some as outside the 
symbolic order of the Law.  
 ( Swyngedouw,  2011 : 5) 
 This claim is based around the idea that the managerial politics of 
neoliberalism disallow some people from the status of political actor. 
The allowable space of political debate renders them both silent and 
invisible. The forced incursion into public space in order to undo this 
invisibility is described as the mark of the political and it is this 
moment of rebellion or disruption that interests Swyngedouw. What 
he seeks to describe are the events that reinsert politics into spaces 
that have been actively depoliticised. Yet in our research it is the state 
that disrupts the calm of existing political arrangements. 
 The Operation Vaken initiative and the Go Home vans seem to 
change the dynamic of political theatre altogether. There is an odd, 
almost cartoonish, ineptitude about them. Whereas other debates have 
indicated a falling away from participation in mainstream politics and 
alongside this an increasing scepticism towards what the government 
says and does, the Go Home vans appeared to be an attempt to 
somehow take the battle back to the street. If the public had ceased 
to believe in the actions of the political class then the Go Home vans 
appeared to be an attempt to change this through shifting the dynamic 
and location of political space. However, in the process, state enuncia-
tions appear to address the ‘banned’, those subject to immigration 
control and positioned as outside the realm of politics. Although this 
tactic amplifi es terror for those who have experienced the physical 
coercion of immigration control, for other audiences this is a theat-
ricalised interchange that further destabilises the pretence of sover-
eign authority. The address to the ‘banned’ reveals the limit of 
government authority and, unexpectedly, repoliticises the space of 
supposedly consensual community. The rest of this volume goes on 
to discuss the implications and impact of this disruption in different 
settings. 
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 Living Research Two: 
Emotions and research 
 Operation Vaken ’ s posters, newspaper adverts, immigration surger-
ies and mobile billboards were a dramatic display, designed to reas-
sure some citizens that the government was ‘getting tough’ on 
irregular immigration. However, the campaign also increased worries 
and anxiety. The survey carried out for us by Ipsos MORI of a nation-
ally representative sample of 2,424 people (for further details see 
the  Appendix ) found that the advertising vans that drove around 
London in 2013 stating ‘In the UK illegally? Go Home or Face 
Arrest’ made 15 per cent of the people who were aware of them 
‘concerned that irregular/illegal immigration might be more wide-
spread than they had realised’. 1 That Vaken may have distorted 
perceptions and feelings about the problem of irregular immigra-
tion was also a point made by Rita Chadha, Chief Executive of the 
Refugee and Migrant Forum of Essex and London (one of our 
community partners in the research). Chadha was quoted in a local 
newspaper in August 2013, saying that Vaken ‘incites racial hatred 
and … infl ames community tension. It ’ s just going to scare people 
to think that immigration is a huge problem when it ’ s not’ ( Ilford 
Recorder ,  2013 ). 
 The inciting of feelings and emotions is a crucial part of immigra-
tion campaigns, yet is challenging to research. How might we iden-
tify, track and convey multisensory experiences of fear, anxiety, 
sadness, shock, anger, shame, disgust? How do such emotions circu-
late, intensify, linger and change? To what extent do social media 
– the content of what people post using different platforms – convey 
these experiences? And what about atmospheres and fl ows of feeling 
– how the sight of an immigration raid or the words ‘Go Home’ can 
 1 92 people of 603 (weighted base 627) who were aware of the Go 
Home vans. 
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elicit panicky feelings, or make some of us feel unsafe? And then 
there are the feelings of researchers and how these can have an 
impact on fi eldwork, the analysis of data and ethical relationships 
(see  Living Research Four ). 
 Because feelings can be unconscious and are diffi cult to express 
in words, the risk is that research can end up fl attening out experi-
ence. An interview transcript, for example, will have inevitably lost 
bodily expression and vocal nuance. This is why some researchers 
work between an audio/visual recording and a transcript. Listening 
to or watching an interview or research interaction can enrich analy-
sis, helping us to notice extra-linguistic data – when someone is 
being sarcastic or feels uncomfortable. This type of work is also more 
time-consuming, so needs to be addressed in the planning stages of 
a study. Dissemination is another point in research where it is pos-
sible to reanimate data with some of its emotions and sensuality. As 
our project developed, we began to experiment with methods of 
conveying the emotional and embodied aspects of experiences of 
immigration control by using fi lm and dramatisations of fi eldwork 
scenes (practices that are discussed in the growing literature on 
‘performative social science’, see  FQS,  2008 ). 
 Although all research is emotional and sensual, immigration is a 
subject that arouses strong feelings across social and political divides, 
bringing with it particular methodological and ethical challenges. It 
is what methodologists sometimes call a ‘sensitive topic’, meaning 
that it can feel threatening to both research participants and 
researchers. Among the challenges of researching sensitive topics, 
 Julie Brannen  ( 1988 ), drawing from the ideas of the sociologist 
Erving Goffman, has identifi ed the increased risks of sanctions and 
stigma for those participating in such research. In addition, she 
suggests:
 respondents are likely to fi nd confronting and telling their stories 
a stressful experience. This is a problem for researchers as well as 
respondents. The researcher therefore has some responsibility for 
protecting the respondent. Protection is required both with 
respect to the confi dences disclosed and the emotions which may 
be aroused and expressed.  
 (pp. 552–3) 
 Building relationships with research participants over time, demon-
strating knowledge about the politics of an issue and carefully 
anonymising data are all ways of ‘desensitising’ and ‘dejeopardising’ 
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qualitative research (see  Lee,  1993 ). For example, the policy-makers 
whom Will interviewed (see Chapter  3 ) felt uncomfortable when 
talking about the government ’ s approach to immigration as they are 
expected to be neutral implementers of policy. One way of reducing 
the threat of the interviews was not to record them. In quantitative 
surveys, thought needs to be given to the format of questions, the 
order in which they are placed and how they are contextualised (see 
 Bhattacharyya,  2015 ). 
 But is it unrealistic or even patronising to think that we can shield 
individuals from the emotionality of a topic such as immigration? 
And how ethical is it for us to treat diffi cult emotions and experi-
ences as data? The latter point was an issue that came up in one of 
our focus groups with asylum seekers and refugees, facilitated by 
Kirsten. During the focus group, a young woman began to talk about 
the existential insecurity of being an asylum seeker, of feeling that 
she was wasting her life. She was unable to plan for a future, unable 
to study. She felt as if she was waiting in limbo while the Home Offi ce 
made a decision about her immigration status. Overcome in telling 
us her story, she broke down in tears. 
 Kirsten, herself a minoritised and migrant woman, did not record 
this part of the conversation (another participant in the focus group 
had asked her to turn off the audio recording). Kirsten ’ s fi eldwork 
notes describe how she and the group rallied around the young 
woman, trying to reassure and comfort her (the group had been 
meeting for three months, so people knew each other relatively 
well). In this case, Kirsten ’ s response went beyond that of the 
‘empathic witness’ ( Kleinman,  1988 ) and had practical conse-
quences: audio data were lost from the recording and the time given 
to comforting the young woman also meant that the focus group 
was cut short; there was less time for others to speak, resulting in a 
partial and shorter interview. For  Kamala Visweswaran  ( 1994 ) such 
redacted accounts are full of vital information. They can force us 
to feel and hopefully investigate further how historical and insti-
tutional contexts can affect the micro-interactions and ethical rela-
tionships produced by a project. For  Riessman  ( 2005 : 473), ‘The 
investigator ’ s emotions are highly relevant to conversations about 
ethics because emotions do moral work: they embody judgments 
about value’. 
 Although we can never know in advance how emotions might play 
out in a study, we had anticipated that the focus group interviews 
could be upsetting for some people and this was where our com-
munity partnerships were important. The local organisations that we 
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each worked with set up our interviews and were able to provide 
initial support to research participants and, if necessary, refer them 
to other local services for more specialist help. In practice this never 
happened (as far as we are aware). None the less, we need to think 
more critically about the ethical and political implications of this 
outsourcing of emotional support in the aftermath of research, 
especially when partnership working is increasingly valued by 
funders. Did we leave trails of damage behind us with consequences 
for others? 
 Looking back on the project and thinking about what we might 
have done differently, it feels as if we should have talked more about 
how we would respond to the emotions and feelings that are evoked 
by and which surround immigration campaigns and that become a 
part of research. We should also have talked to one another about 
our assumptions and ideas about what emotions and feelings  are . 
The latter point is especially important because it impacts upon the 
methods that are chosen for a project and how we interpret research 
data. For instance, if we recognise that research participants and 
researchers are ‘defended subjects’ ( Hollway and Jefferson,  2013 ), 
whose own biographies and feelings of anxiety can affect what is 
said and/or observed, then more complex forms of reporting and 
interpreting data are needed, which do not valorise what is said as 
a source of access to a true self ( Atkinson,  1997 ). This might include 
providing contextual description before using interview extracts to 
give a sense of where an extract is situated within a wider interac-
tion, social context or biography and why there might be layers of 
meaning underneath what is superfi cially meant. It can also include 
the iterative analysis of interview extracts with fi eldwork notes, iden-
tifying areas of tension and/or contradiction between and within 
accounts. 
 In hindsight it is apparent that as a team we took different 
approaches to emotions, which had an impact on our observations, 
interviews and basic recording practices. For instance, some of our 
fi eldnotes are rich in description about localities and research inter-
actions. They are more varied in the attention given to our own 
feelings and how we might make sense of these within the wider 
project, as individuals and as providing insight into our varying 
social differences, research roles, the differential distribution of 
emotional labour within the research team and how these might all 
impact on partnership working. As always the work of research and 
the thinking and feeling that goes with it extends far beyond the 
funding of a study. Even the publication of this book does not bring 
it to a close. 
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 In interviews on ‘sensitive topics’ emotions can be both 
intensely felt and closer to the surface of research relation-
ships. There are several issues to think about in research where 
topic threat is prevalent:
 1  What recording practices (such as audio/visual recording 
of interviews or events) might you adopt to lessen the 
threat of a topic? What consequences might these different 
practices have for the data? 
 2  What are your ethical responsibilities as a researcher when 
individual/s become distressed because of what is triggered 
for them by the subjects that are raised by the research? 
 3  What about the researcher? Can you think of any ways in 
which a researcher ’ s feelings can be taken account of in 
study? What support might be possible? 
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 Immigration and the limits of 
statistical government 
 Camden Town Hall in North London is a popular venue for weddings 
and civil ceremonies. In November 2013 it was the venue for the 
marriage of a Miao Guo, a Chinese national in her twenties and 
Massimo Ciabattini, an Italian man in his thirties, for which elaborate 
preparations had been made, including a post-service reception and 
a hotel room for the night. The ceremony was dramatically inter-
rupted by Home Offi ce Immigration Enforcement offi cers wearing 
fl ak jackets and accompanied, oddly enough, by journalists. 
 The couple were pulled apart and taken into separate rooms for 
questioning. Bridesmaids were also interviewed. This happened 
because of a tip-off from the registrar, who suspected the marriage 
was a sham (being undertaken to get a visa), after observing that the 
couple had had trouble spelling each other ’ s names. Half an hour of 
questioning later, and with abundant evidence that the marriage was 
not a sham, the government offi cials left and the ceremony was 
restarted ( Hutton,  2013 ;  Weaver,  2013 ). A Home Offi ce spokesman 
was reported to comment at the time of this failed raid, ‘it is either 
the best sham wedding I have ever seen or it is real’ ( Hutton,  2013 ). 
 Journalists had been invited to the raid in the hope that they could 
write about UK immigration control in a more impressive light than 
the one that transpired. ‘Performance politics’, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, requires the state to put on convincing public dis-
plays that the ‘audience’ fi nds compelling. The performance of the 
border as a space of fear and potential violence has to infi ltrate the 
public sphere, in this case with the help of the local media. 
 While the performance politics of raids work to spread fear, this 
incident also reminds us of the fragility, or even the stupidity, of con-
temporary immigration policy. Where policy is operating primarily at 
the level of affect, psychological manipulation and appearances, there 
is always the potential for this to blow back at those with power. 
Making things seem ‘real’ is an ongoing challenge, especially for the 
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Home Offi ce because – in a way which no other Whitehall department 
faces to the same extent – media attention to immigration is relentless 
and highly charged politically. As we learnt through our interviews, 
virtually everything the Home Offi ce does must be considered with 
audience reaction in mind, shaping its policy-making and implemen-
tation processes. 
 Developing the insights into performative politics drawn from 
 Shirin Rai ’ s  ( 2015 ) work in Chapter  2 , here we seek to understand 
government immigration campaigns in terms of the logics, rationali-
ties and anxieties that underpin them. We will do this by exploring 
the techniques of government used in Operation Vaken through an 
engagement with, and extension of, the terms circulating in policy 
circles themselves, framed through questions of liberalism, neoliberal-
ism, postliberalism and preliberalism. In doing so, we pull out some 
of the contradictions demonstrated in the previous chapter whereby 
tools of persuasion and enforcement rely each on the other. The 
analysis in this chapter is informed by a number of discussions and 
interviews with policy-makers and advisers, many of which were 
necessarily off the record. These included current Home Offi ce and 
former Home Offi ce offi cials, and also civil servants from elsewhere 
in Whitehall, including the Department of Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS) and the Treasury. 
 In summary, in this chapter we discuss government migration 
campaigns in terms of the policy logic that shapes them. Specifi cally, 
we argue:
 1  Liberal government treats issues like migration in the aggregate, 
meaning that statistics and macroeconomics tend to be the ulti-
mate arbiters of ‘good’ policy. 
 2  This emphasis on aggregates has lost legitimacy where migration 
is concerned, meaning that the politics and policy of migration is 
increasingly dominated by affective, symbolic and mediated issues. 
 3  In place of liberal government, a distinctive style of policy and 
politics has emerged in the Home Offi ce, that is an elaborate and 
occasionally threatening form of reputation management. 
 Liberalism via quantifi cation 
 We have the chance in this century to achieve an open world, an 
open economy, and an open global society with unprecedented 
opportunities for people and business.  
 ( Tony Blair , speech to the World Economic Forum 
at Davos,  2000 ) 
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 Migration is likely to enhance economic growth and the welfare of 
both natives and migrants … There is little evidence that native 
workers are harmed by immigration … The broader fi scal impact 
of migration is likely to be positive.  
 ( Cabinet Office,  2001 : 5–7) 
 In terms of the politics of migration, the above quotes seem to come 
from a very different political era to the one in which we write. The 
proportion of the British public mentioning ‘immigration’ as one of 
the most important issues facing Britain was under 10 per cent in 
2000, but had risen to over 40 per cent only eight years later ( Duffy 
and Frere-Smith,  2014 ). The case for greater migration at this time 
was both normative and utilitarian: people  should be allowed to live 
where they choose, and moreover this will bring  benefi ts in terms of 
levels of wealth and quality of life overall. Within a decade, this sort 
of rhetoric had disappeared from mainstream policy discourse. But 
in order to understand the rationalities (and irrationalities) of con-
temporary government of migration, we need to consider how the 
normative and utilitarian argument for freedom of movement has 
functioned until relatively recently. 
 In a lecture series given at the Collège de France in 1977–78, the 
French philosopher Michel Foucault identifi ed two parallel forms of 
political power that together constitute the modern state ( Foucault, 
 2007 ). Firstly, there is the ‘perspective’ that Foucault defi nes as ‘sov-
ereignty’, which aims at securing the borders and interior of a given 
territory. The chief purpose of a sovereign is to keep things as they 
are, that is, to continue to be respected as the sovereign within borders 
that do not shift. This conceptualisation was present in the sixteenth-
century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes ’ s classical vision of the 
modern state. For Hobbes, sovereign power is centralised and suffi -
ciently potent that it can oblige obedience from all of its ‘subjects’. As 
Foucault explains, ‘the end of sovereignty is circular; it refers back to 
the exercise of sovereignty. The good is obedience to the law, so that 
the good proposed by sovereignty is that people obey it’ ( Foucault, 
 2007 : 98). Securing borders, enforcing law and defeating enemies are 
the key tasks of a sovereign. 
 Secondly, there is the ‘perspective’ of ‘government’. Where sover-
eignty is focused on applying given laws within a particular terri-
tory, government looks at how to facilitate and encourage certain 
 dynamics within a population . This is a very different way of conceiv-
ing of politics:
 Population no longer appears as a collection of subjects of right, as 
a collection of subject wills who must obey the sovereign ’ s will 
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through the intermediary regulations, laws, edicts and so on. It will 
be considered as a set of processes to be managed at the level and 
on the basis of what is natural in these processes.  
 ( Foucault,  2007 :70) 
 The ‘processes’ in question are effects of individual behaviour and 
choices, scaled up to the level of the population as a whole. Births, 
deaths, marriage, sickness, productivity, income, assets and so on are 
aspects of the population that government is concerned to improve 
– or at least, not to damage. To this list, we might add migration, as 
it can affect the size of a population. 
 Over the eighteenth century, this form of power became predomi-
nant in European states, producing a new form of administrative 
government able to act on population in an expert and measured 
fashion. To do this, new forms of quantitative knowledge were required, 
capable of representing population dynamics. In particular, Foucault 
points to the rise of political economy in the late eighteenth century, 
focused on markets but also on other ‘natural’ dynamics infl uencing 
population such as agricultural production and birth rates. No less 
importantly, statistics offered a basis on which to represent things  in 
the aggregate , so that trends and empirical laws could emerge amongst 
events that otherwise would seem contingent, accidental or moral and 
political in nature. In this way, the statistical gaze takes normative 
questions of individual conduct or indeed chance, and scales them up 
until they are empirical questions of population dynamics. 
 This statistical view of society is simultaneously liberal and scien-
tifi c: its liberalism is entrenched in its methodology. There are various 
ways in which we can understand this synthesis of quantitative social 
science and liberalism. Firstly, modern statistics assumes that aggre-
gate processes are the result of diverse individual decisions, prefer-
ences and judgements. As Foucault puts it, the one thing that 
government assumes is common to all people is ‘desire’. Thus, the 
driving force behind migration fl ows, for instance, is assumed to be 
freely taken  choices to seek work, better quality of life, family reunifi ca-
tion, education or whatever else. The governmental perspective on a 
problem such as migration would involve seeking to alter the value of 
these different goals, so as to infl uence the aggregate dynamics in 
certain ways. 
 Secondly, statistics have a liberal quality because they aim to take 
 everyone into account. In the search for the normal or average indi-
vidual, statisticians were also seeking a way of representing society  as 
a whole . The governmental emphasis on the aggregate is a tacit form 
of collectivism that potentially allows individual conduct to be judged 
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in terms of how it effects net outcomes, rather than on the basis of 
any political, moral or cultural value or prejudice. 
 Thirdly, statistics  potentially have a cultural blindness about them, 
at least on some questions. All quantitative methodologies involve 
some assumption of equivalence ( Desrosières,  1998 ), through which 
multiple and separate cases can be treated in the same way. Where 
differences are being represented, they are represented on the basis 
of some principle of potential sameness. So, in order to say that ‘he 
is 20 per cent taller than her’, there must be a shared idea called 
‘height’ and a shared understanding of proportions. 
 What has become known as ‘evidence-based policy-making’ or 
doing ‘What Works’ is an effort to promote a dispassionate, scientifi c 
perspective within government. The utilitarian statistical ethos  can 
serve as a way of keeping unwelcome cultural and political questions 
at bay, bracketing issues of ‘policy’ as if separate from those of ‘poli-
tics’. France, for example, famously leaves out questions of ethnicity 
from its national statistics data, ostensibly on the basis that ethnicity 
does not affect the status of French nationals as citizens. But this 
omission makes it harder to speak authoritatively about the extent of 
racism in French society. In a more technocratic spirit, emphasising 
economic growth as the ultimate indicator of progress allows an issue 
like migration to be culturally and politically diffused (as New Labour 
sought to do), and each new arrival into the country can be viewed 
simply as another anonymous contributor to aggregate output. Eco-
nomics is potentially the most effective tool for depoliticisation of an 
issue. For instance, representing an issue as a matter of expertise, 
economic evidence and  policy is a way of keeping it separate from 
matters of identity, ethnicity and  politics . Viewing it from the perspec-
tive of  government can be a way of avoiding the perspective of  sover-
eignty . For various reasons, this strategy no longer seems to work in 
the British context. Before we explore this failure further, we need to 
consider two alternative rationalities of power that represent a depar-
ture from statistical liberalism. 
 Rationalities of disaggregation 
 As the sociologist and statistician  Alain Desrosières  ( 1998 ) has high-
lighted, the statistical focus on population aggregates depends for its 
legitimacy on some universalist, quasi-democratic idea of ‘society’, in 
which we all have a stake. Yet it is precisely a sense of the social aggre-
gate that has been gradually dismantled as an object of government 
since the 1970s ( Rose,  1996b ). While it was possible for New Labour 
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to use GDP as a justifi cation for migration in the early 2000s, it is 
telling that public anxiety about migration rose long before the reces-
sion, which began in early 2008. Aggregate welfare does not count 
for much when individuals are concerned about their own personal 
welfare, and view immigration as a direct threat to it. 
 What happens if statistical government is no longer adequate for 
purposes of administrative decision-making? Two alternative forms of 
rationality are worth noting: neoliberalism, and ‘postliberalism’ as it 
has been discussed in the recent British policy context. While these 
are mutually antagonistic in various ways, they share a tendency to 
disaggregate, dissociate and distinguish worthy populations from 
unworthy populations (see also Chapter  5 ). Rhetorically they are 
poles apart, but they have a mutual compatibility that is often over-
looked, as we now explore, starting with neoliberalism. 
 Neoliberalism 
 In Foucault ’ s account, the key difference between liberalism and neo-
liberalism lies in how the market is represented and idealised. Liberal-
ism views the market as a separate space of autonomous freedom, 
outside of the social and political spheres; neoliberalism treats all 
spheres of human conduct and all human capacities as essentially 
economic in nature ( Brown,  2015 ). From a neoliberal perspective, 
economic choices are not simply those which are exercised in the 
marketplace in the process of monetised exchange but  all choices 
regarding how to use one ’ s free time, who to marry, who to vote for, 
what to learn, and how to live. The key function of competition, from 
a neoliberal perspective, is that it distinguishes that which is most valu-
able, whether inside or outside the market. Hence, the main virtue of 
capitalism is its capacity to separate people out (winners from losers, 
leaders from followers, strivers from skivers), rather than to integrate 
in the way that economic liberals had celebrated since Adam Smith. 
For this reason, nationalism can play an important part within neolib-
eralism, to the extent that nations are acting like competitive units, 
striving to become the ‘best’ and to ‘beat’ others in the ‘global race’ 
( Davies,  2014 ). As the geographer  David Harvey puts it, ‘the neolib-
eral state needs nationalism of a certain sort to survive’ ( 2005 : 85). 
 One of the most celebrated exponents of the neoliberal worldview 
was the Chicago School economist Gary Becker, whose concept of 
‘human capital’ assumed that individuals had the freedom to augment 
themselves, through education and other decisions, so as to increase 
their economic value in the marketplace ( Becker,  1976 ). Viewing 
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humans as items of ‘capital’ rather than as members of population 
has a disaggregating effect, which represents a departure from liberal 
governmentality. In the sphere of migration, it is manifest in the 
much-heralded ‘Australian-style points system’, which assesses appli-
cations for residency by adding up points earned on the basis of age, 
skills, qualifi cations and linguistic ability. 
 This points-based system has been much celebrated by right-wing 
politicians in the UK, and was adopted as the offi cial policy of the 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the run-up to the 2015 election 
and the 2016 EU referendum – ignoring the fact that such a system 
had already been introduced by the Labour government for non-EU 
nationals, in effect from 2008. The curious forms of political triangu-
lation that the ‘Australian-style points system’ has enabled can be seen 
in the then UKIP leader Nigel Farage ’ s claim that this system is the 
only ‘fair’ one ( Farage,  2015 ) and UKIP ’ s defence of its ‘principle of 
equal application to all people’ ( UKIP,  2015 , n.p.). 
 The idea of a ‘points-based system’, rooted in calculations of 
human capital, has the veneer of administrative governmentality, but 
it conceals a more violent sovereign logic focused on inclusion and 
exclusion. It may even serve to entrench certain prejudices, regarding 
the work-rate or economic mindset of different cultural identities. 
Increasingly, immigration is a policy area where governmentality and 
sovereignty are entangled in ways that collapse arguments about eco-
nomics and national identity into one another. It is worth recognising 
the extent to which neoliberal rationality – which extends economics 
into all spheres of conduct – facilitates this entanglement. 
 Postliberalism 
 The idea of ‘postliberalism’ emerged in UK policy discussions in the 
years immediately following the global fi nancial crisis, along with 
the terms ‘Red Tory’ and ‘Blue Labour’. 1 As the names indicate, this 
 1 In the UK, red is associated with left-wing politics and the Labour Party 
(through residues of socialism) and blue with the right-wing Conservative 
(or ‘Tory’) Party (the opposite of these colours’ political associations in 
the USA). ‘Red Tory’ refers to Conservatives with political sympathies 
with certain ‘left-wing’ values, such as social security, community and 
equality. ‘Blue Labour’ refers to Labour supporters with political sympa-
thies with certain ‘right-wing’ values, such as tradition, nationalism, family 
and cultural homogeneity. These agendas are heavily overlapping and 
their protagonists are in regular dialogue with each other. 
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mixing up of categories was a way of transcending left/right political 
divisions, laying out a more socially conservative and economically 
localist new policy agenda ( Blond,  2010 ;  Geary and Pabst,  2015 ). 
Fuelling this new intellectual insurgency was a sense that policy ortho-
doxy had been set by a technocratic metropolitan elite, whose support 
for migration was out of step with the rest of the country (see also 
Chapter  6 ). In the words of Blue Labour ‘guru’ Maurice Glasman, 
‘on managerialism, modernity and the market, Blair ultimately served 
the interests of the rich and the status quo’ ( Riddell,  2011 , n.p.). 
Often, the blame was deemed to lie specifi cally with economists:
 Freedom of movement at moderate levels, like immigration itself, is 
a benefi t both to the movers and the country they move to. But the 
liberal economists and politicians who dominate the EU debate gave 
little thought to large-scale movement nor do they seem to have 
realised the extent to which they were eroding national social 
contracts. 
 ( Goodhart,  2014 ) 
 For the political commentator David Goodhart, who has done the 
most to advance the idea of ‘postliberalism’, opposition to immigra-
tion is an inevitable outcome of natural psychological tendencies that 
lead us to favour ‘people like us’ ( Goodhart,  2014 ). Liberalism, for 
Goodhart, is ultimately a denial of human nature, just as economics 
is when it views people as isolated rational utility-maximisers. In its 
avowed localism and populism, postliberalism explicitly rejects the 
centralised, technocratic perspective of the statistician and the eco-
nomic administrator. Part of the postliberal critique is that liberal 
government acts in an impersonal, generalising, calculated manner, 
preventing a more ethically substantive or publicly meaningful form 
of policy. Yet what such an alternative policy would be is  by defi nition 
impossible to formalise as a set of rules. Glasman, for example, sug-
gests that a much tighter immigration policy would still need to make 
‘exceptions’ on ethical grounds, but the postliberal ethos resists sys-
tematising these ( Riddell,  2011 ). 
 Despite this inconsistency, we can make out a certain resonance 
between the postliberal critique of economics and the psychological 
critique of economics, which has produced behavioural and happi-
ness economics. Goodhart claims that postliberalism ‘has a view of 
human nature that aims to capture people in their messy reality rather 
than reduce them to a single, dominant drive such as self-interest or 
a desire for autonomy’ (2014: 1). Yet he also claims that group attach-
ments are ‘hard-wired into us’ and that a preference for ‘people like 
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us’ is a ‘simple reality of life’, suggesting that for him there are nev-
ertheless a few dominant psychological (or biological) drives that can 
be isolated when developing policy. This is an example of what might 
be termed ‘neocommunitarianism’, in which psychological and bio-
logical evidence is used to help reconstruct the government of indi-
vidual decision-making ( Davies,  2012 ). The rise of ‘nudging’ as a way 
of altering individual behaviour through the redesign of ‘choice archi-
tectures’ is another example of this, through which everyday tech-
niques such as ‘social marketing’ and food-labelling can be seen as 
forms of intervention ( Jones et al.,  2013 ). 
 A key feature of behaviourally attuned policy is that it pays far 
greater attention to the aesthetics and affective dimensions of govern-
mental intervention, so that all sorts of other factors come into play, 
including the learnt habits, emotions, neurological substrates and 
social infl uences that condition behaviour ( Dolan et al.,  2010 ). Alter-
ing behaviour is a matter no longer simply of tweaking ‘incentives’ 
but of altering multiple aspects of the social and material environ-
ment, in much the way that advertisers have long done. As we shall 
explore, this heightened policy attention to emotions and behaviour 
related to migration is arguably a key feature of the postliberal govern-
ment and ‘performance politics’, although the notion that experts 
might seek to infl uence individual behaviour through manipulating 
their environment is far from new. 
 Attempts to anchor advertising and management in scientifi c 
psychology date back to the 1920s ( Baritz,  1960 ;  Rose,  1996a ). 
Governments have attempted to infl uence psychological indicators 
such as ‘public opinion’ and ‘morale’ for almost as long. But the rise 
of ‘nudging’ in the early twenty-fi rst century represents a renewed 
concern with small-scale cultural and visual messaging, which bypasses 
the conscious mind or explicit discussion. In that sense, it shares a 
communicative rationality with ‘dog whistle’ politics, recognising that 
the implicit and oblique dimensions of public discourse can be more 
powerful than what is explicit or direct. While nudging remains a 
technocratic pursuit, its concern with the performative, normative and 
symbolic dimensions of policy interventions is in keeping with post-
liberal critique. 
 In its antipathy to elites, technocrats and orthodox economics, 
postliberalism is ultimately a challenge to the very idea of ‘govern-
ment’, in Foucault ’ s sense of an ‘administration of things … a technol-
ogy of power’ ( Foucault,  2007 : 49). It is certainly an affront to 
 statistical government, which employs models and aggregates as the 
measure of all political action. It resists the very idea of treating all 
people in the same way, which it characterises as a metropolitan 
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conceit. Yet in doing so, it inadvertently corroborates aspects of the 
neoliberal project of rationalised discrimination, which seeks to sepa-
rate the enterprising from the non-enterprising. Both rest on a cri-
tique of the generalising aspect of liberalism, and an effort to develop 
policies capable of distinguishing the worthy from the unworthy 
migrant (see Chapter  5 ). Both depart from the abstractions of the 
free market, towards an account of underlying human drives – com-
petitiveness for neoliberals, and cultural sameness for postliberals. 
 Most signifi cantly, both neoliberalism and postliberalism signal a 
revival of sovereign power and a commensurate decline in liberal 
governmentality in Foucault ’ s sense. Political questions of territory, 
nationhood, border, security and law return to the fore, overwhelm-
ing (or perhaps co-opting) questions of effi ciency, macroeconomic 
growth, utility and aggregate welfare in the process. The need to 
 display ‘toughness’ on immigration, to speak in terms of national 
symbolism (as opposed to aggregate outcomes), to sympathise with 
personal and local experiences of migration (as opposed to evidence 
of macroeconomic effects) has led to a collapse in the imagined dis-
tinction between ‘policy’ and ‘politics’, to the point where Home 
Offi ce policy-makers mobilise images of state violence and far-right 
rhetoric in order to manage migration. We now consider how this 
intermingling of ‘policy’ and ‘politics’ appears from the perspective 
of the Home Offi ce itself. 
 Rationalities of contemporary migration policy 
in the UK 
 Being able to interview civil servants is always diffi cult. It involves a 
high degree of trust, and even then gaining consent to record an 
interview is almost impossible. Having an informal coffee with a 
government offi cial, accompanied by a notebook, is the more likely 
scenario. However, with migration policy, even this turns out to be a 
something of a stretch, such are the sensitivities, controversies and 
media interest in this area. The potential costs of any discussion of 
the topic are deemed too high to take risks. 
 Through a series of introductions, however, Will was able to meet 
with civil servants, including past and present Home Offi ce offi cials, 
although on very strict terms. Attempts to ‘snowball’ these contacts 
(i.e. to use them to establish contacts for further interviews) had 
mixed results. When a mere reference was made about wanting to 
meet another Home Offi ce offi cial, for example, a terse email quickly 
arrived from Will ’ s fi rst contact, pointing out that this was a clear 
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breach of the agreed secrecy surrounding their discussion. Employees 
of think tanks are understandably less paranoid, and interviews with 
infl uential immigration policy thinkers were more straightforward. 
 What follows, then, is a collection of impressions and reports from 
a series of conversations – in various coffee shops around Westminster 
– over the course of 2013–14. While these didn ’ t generate ‘data’ in 
any tangible, duplicable form, they played an important part in our 
project, helping us to glimpse something of the problem of immigra-
tion as it appears to those in Whitehall, and the Home Offi ce in 
particular. Especially for the latter, we got a strong sense of an organi-
sation that feels embattled and misunderstood, both by the rest of 
Whitehall and by liberal critics. This no doubt contributed to the lack 
of enthusiasm for co-operating with a sociological research project. 
 The governing rationality of the Home Offi ce seems to be very 
different from that of other Whitehall departments, and we were 
interested in understanding how and why this is, with a view to better 
understanding how a policy such as Operation Vaken becomes pos-
sible. In the terms outlined in this chapter, it would appear that 
various aspects of contemporary migration policy defy basic tenets 
of liberal government. The question is whether they might be any 
better understood in terms of neoliberalism or postliberalism. 
 One signifi cant feature of migration as a contemporary policy issue 
is that efforts to treat it as ‘just’ a matter of policy often produce the 
opposite of the desired effect. Liberal techniques of depoliticisation 
outlined in this chapter tend to be not simply ineffective but coun-
terproductive. Research carried out by the think tank British Future 
on attitudes to migration found that, when politicians or businesses 
discuss the economic benefi ts of migration to the national economy, 
this can produce some very negative reactions ( Katwala et al.,  2014 ). 
Talk of benefi ts to the ‘national economy’ in focus groups led to the 
response that this wasn ’ t a benefi t to  my economy. As one of the 
policy-makers we interviewed remarked, ‘while the Treasury might be 
believed on its growth fi gures, it will never be believed on its economic 
impacts of immigration’. A study conducted on belief in conspiracy 
theories across the UK population found that 55 per cent of people 
believe the statement ‘UK Government is hiding the truth about the 
number of immigrants living here’ is probably or defi nitely true, 
compared to only 25 per cent believing it is defi nitely or probably 
untrue ( Faulkner Rogers,  2015 ). 
 Research on attitudes repeatedly fi nds a common view, that people 
believe that politicians and policy-makers do not know or care how 
migration is affecting  local streets or  local labour markets. British 
Future classed the majority of the British public as the ‘anxious 
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middle’, to whom talk of the macroeconomic benefi ts seems untrust-
worthy or patronising. Efforts to ground a public debate about migra-
tion in a set of ‘facts’ or statistics are found to harden the position 
of those who are sceptical about immigration, to whom statistics 
are associated with the interests of politicians and elites. As British 
Future argues, ‘People understand “the economy” through their 
direct experience – jobs, wages and the money in their pocket – rather 
than through GDP and macroeconomic statistics’ ( Katwala et al., 
 2014 : 28). 
 Instead of focusing on statistics and economics, there is a percep-
tion that politicians and businesses need to speak a more emotional 
and communitarian language, focused on qualitative human experi-
ences and anxieties. For many of the policy-makers we spoke with, 
this meant sympathising with the view that it ’ s ‘not racist’ to want less 
immigration; recognising deep-set anxieties about the competence of 
the state to secure the border; understanding that immigration  can 
cause disorientating social change at a local level, including in the 
labour market. To do this, political rhetoric has to switch away from 
utilitarian liberalism (of economics and statistics) towards the lan-
guage of belonging, national identity, security and symbolism. Or 
in Foucault ’ s terms, migration policy needs to be viewed from the 
perspective of sovereignty not of governmentality. One interviewee 
gave an example of a meeting chaired by the then Prime Minister 
David Cameron, in which someone referred to migration ‘regula-
tions’, to which Cameron responded tersely – ‘those aren ’ t regula-
tions: they ’ re the law’. The message here is that migration cannot be 
treated as a purely administrative issue without inciting impassioned 
public responses. One way of pursuing this is to simply refuse engage-
ment in statistical-utilitarian discussion. A written question by Labour 
peer Lord Beecham asked the Treasury to reveal ‘the annual benefi ts 
paid to EU migrants in the UK and the contribution of those indi-
viduals to the public purse through income tax receipts and VAT’, to 
which the answer came back in February 2016 ‘the information is not 
available’ ( Waugh,  2016 ). On the other hand, it is argued that once 
the qualitative, emotional and local perspective of voters has been 
expressed, the legitimacy of more open borders and labour markets 
might be restored to some extent. This was the view expressed to us 
by many of the policy-makers we spoke to, including in the Home 
Offi ce. Subsequent political developments, particularly debates and 
developments around the UK ’ s June 2016 referendum on whether to 
remain a member of the EU, do not appear to have borne out this 
latter argument. 
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 The qualitative, affective impact that the state seeks above all others 
is an image of being ‘tough’ at the border. We were told that private 
polling had been carried out by the Home Offi ce under the Labour 
Home Secretary John Reid in the mid-2000s, which found that the 
public was more trusting of uniformed border agency staff (who are 
perceived as characteristically ‘tough’) than of politicians (who are 
perceived as characteristically liberal and metropolitan). Following 
this, a rebranding of the UK borders was undertaken in 2006, so as 
to amplify the sense of a national border, via fl ags, insignia, uniforms 
and other symbols (see also Chapters  1 and  2 ). Meanwhile, a com-
munications strategy aimed at getting more images of immigration 
raids into the media was launched as early as 2006, long before the 
Home Offi ce ’ s social-media-based campaigns of 2013. This included 
inviting journalists along to witness raids, so as to divert media atten-
tion to the physical ‘toughness’ of the border, and away from the 
rhetoric and perceived elitism of politicians. Ultimately, the very fact 
that vans displaying the message ‘Go Home’ were ever driven around 
Britain ’ s streets at all needs to be understood in the context of this 
perceived need for the state to  seem tough in the eyes of the voting 
public. Of course, this ignores the fear that such messages inculcate 
amongst various marginalised populations, as we will discuss in sub-
sequent chapters. 
 A second signifi cant feature of migration as a policy issue is that 
it has a very high media profi le, meaning that the Home Offi ce often 
tends to develop new policy and respond to policy failures at an 
unusually high speed. While some interviewees suggested that keeping 
migration out of the news altogether was the ideal political scenario 
for the Home Secretary, the medium-term implausibility of this means 
that any Home Offi ce needs to pay constant attention to the news 
cycle. We were unable to discover precisely how the Go Home vans 
and accompanying Twitter campaign had been conceived, but most 
interviewees took the view that it had likely been an ill-thought-out 
effort within the Home Offi ce communications team to win positive 
headlines amongst the anti-migration media. Interviewees suggested 
that being perceived as illiberal in the media (or upsetting the liberal 
media) is something the Home Offi ce communications team is gener-
ally pleased with. On the other hand, given deep levels of mistrust in 
the government ’ s ability to manage immigration, even very tough 
messaging can backfi re if it reminds the public of issues (such as 
illegal immigration) that have otherwise fallen out of the news cycle. 
 Coupled with the challenges that come with immigration having 
such a high media profi le is a recognition that, since the early years 
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of the twenty-fi rst century, migration has become one of the top two 
issues (and often the top one) that concern the voting public, accord-
ing to polls ( Duffy and Frere-Smith,  2014 ). Some of those inter-
viewed by Will argued that this places the Home Offi ce in a very 
different position from other, more technocratic, less popularly con-
troversial Whitehall departments. This context means that policy 
‘success’ and ‘failure’ are something other than mere technical effi cacy 
or effi ciency. Policies need to  look effective, as much as be effective, 
something which other Whitehall departments do not necessarily 
understand. As one policy-maker put it:
 its sheer salience is also important … an approach which says ‘let ’ s 
insulate rational policy from public politics’ just isn ’ t viable with this 
level of salience.  
 (Policy interview, conducted by Will) 
 Others suggested to us that the awareness of depth of public feeling 
on the topic pervaded the Home Offi ce, infl uencing migration policy 
development at every step. This emerged also in our negotiations with 
the survey company on the wording of some of the questions in the 
survey we commissioned, where there was nervousness about asking 
questions which might produce critical fi ndings about the Home 
Offi ce as one of its major clients (see  Living Research Six ). 
 The Home Offi ce ’ s own stated rationality for the Go Home vans 
was an economic one, as set out in their published evaluation ( Home 
Offi ce,  2013 ). Voluntary repatriations of ‘illegal immigrants’ cost the 
government on average £1,000 per person, while enforced ones cost 
£15,000, so encouraging those ‘in the UK illegally’ to ‘go home’ has 
apparent fi scal justifi cation. The Home Offi ce offi cial we spoke to 
explained that the policy of helping ‘illegal immigrants’ to leave the 
country is actually a ‘generous’ one, in that their airfare is paid for by 
the taxpayer. While the vans alluded to ‘free advice and help with 
travel documents’, they made no mention of the free airfare, which 
our Home Offi ce interviewee explained was necessary to avoid antag-
onising the tabloid press. From the Home Offi ce ’ s perspective, the 
position of the media makes this an impossible situation, in that the 
British state is unable to publicise the full ‘help’ it is actually provid-
ing people to ‘go home’, for fear that this would seem like a free 
handout to the undeserving. In other words, the messaging of ‘Go 
Home or face arrest’ came out of an effort to increase voluntary 
repatriation, while continuing to appear ‘tough’ on illegal immigra-
tion. There is little consideration here for whether this, or the posters 
stating ‘Is life here hard? Going home is simple’, ‘This plane can take 
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you home, we can book your tickets’ displayed in immigration report-
ing centres to asylum applicants might be viewed as threatening, 
rather than generous, by those seeking refuge from dangerous ‘home’ 
countries. As one of the speakers at a research event we held in 
Glasgow, a member of the ‘Glasgow Girls’ (see Chapter  4 ) who had 
gone through the asylum system herself and continued to campaign 
on migrants’ rights issues, said:
 I mean, having little planes hanging from the ceiling, you know, 
these are people who are seeking sanctuary and you ’ re basically 
telling them, ‘Life in the UK ’ s diffi cult, going home is simple.’ It ’ s 
not simple. You know, I would love to see them trying, go to some 
of these countries and see how long they would last in it. 
 (Amal Azzudin, speaking at MIC policy briefi ng in Glasgow, 
April 2014) 
 The emotional responses of those who were ostensibly targeted by 
the posters offering voluntary removal appeared less important to 
the Home Offi ce than the economic effi ciency of the campaign, 
however. The formal evaluation of the Go Home vans suggested that 
they represented a cost saving to the taxpayer. The campaign cost 
only £9,740, but was deemed responsible for sixty voluntary repa-
triations. According to the Operation Vaken evaluation, removal of 
these sixty people could otherwise have cost up to £830,000 in 
enforced departures or up to £260,000 a year in costs to public 
services ( Home Offi ce,  2013 ). A different question is whether they 
were also deemed a public communications success. It seemed as if 
the level of publicity that the vans attracted was never predicted, and 
there was anger expressed in various media outlets and by senior 
politicians. 
 The fact that the campaign was not repeated, despite the alleged 
fi scal benefi t, would suggest that it was not judged as a political 
success overall (see Chapter  1 for discussion of the challenges to the 
campaign by RAMFEL and those who complained to the Advertising 
Standards Authority). However, the publicity – which coincided with 
the Twitter campaign of raids being photographed – may be assumed 
to have had some ‘dog whistle’ benefi ts, from the perspective of com-
munication strategists seeking to appease the anti-immigration sec-
tions of the public. The extent of this ‘secondary’ messaging – and 
ways it may have backfi red, such as increasing anxiety that immigra-
tion is a severe enough problem to require such tough measures – was 
explored in our research and these fi ndings are discussed in subse-
quent chapters. 
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 The exceptional status of immigration, as an issue that defi es 
reduction to the status of an economic or statistical matter, needs to 
be seen in the context of the Home Offi ce ’ s own exceptional status. 
The ministry has been frequently mired in controversies and media 
attacks, leading it to be represented as a ‘political graveyard’ ( Painter, 
 2008 ). The Home Offi ce is responsible for areas of policy that are 
especially enticing from the perspective of the tabloid press: policing, 
prisons, terrorism, asylum, drugs, antisocial behaviour, all in addition 
to migration. This means that the department as a whole operates on 
a relentless communications cycle, which inculcates a sense of para-
noia and watching one ’ s back. In addition to this, there are deep 
structural reasons why the Home Offi ce encounters regular confl icts 
with other Whitehall departments, especially where the latter operate 
according to more liberal economic rationalities. For these reasons, 
one interviewee joked that the internal philosophy of the Home Offi ce 
could be summed up by the well-known chant of Millwall football 
fans, ‘No one likes us, we don ’ t care’. 
 Neoliberalism with a postliberal face 
 The celebratory rhetoric of ‘globalisation’ that characterised the early 
New Labour years may have been largely a reiteration of government 
commitments to ‘business’ and market ‘fl exibility’, but it had one 
political advantage as well. It offered a language with which elites 
could speak publicly about the political economy that they subscribed 
to, namely one based around market liberalism. From this perspective, 
as we have discussed, migration represents a net benefi t in the aggre-
gate, because it increases labour market effi ciency and represents a 
positive contribution to the macroeconomy. Lurking within this ideol-
ogy is the potential for a more discriminatory neoliberal perspective, 
which distinguishes between different migrants in terms of their 
human capital or capacity for innovation or likely balance of fi scal 
costs and benefi ts. However, we can at least say that the turn of the 
millennium represented a time when the openness of national econo-
mies to international markets (including labour markets) was some-
thing that was spoken of by politicians. 
 The context which gave rise to Operation Vaken and related initia-
tives was one in which this type of empirical discourse is no longer 
deemed acceptable, at least where the movement of human beings is 
concerned. The then Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, 
was able to say in early 2016 that the UK economy was vulnerable 
to a ‘cocktail of threats’ posed by global economic uncertainties, as if 
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this might strengthen him politically. However, the nature of migra-
tion policy and the political position of the Home Offi ce means that 
the Home Secretary cannot discuss the movement of people in eco-
nomic or statistical terms, let alone refer to it as something beyond 
state control. Least of all does it appear as something that can be 
celebrated. This represents a grave problem for democracy and the 
public sphere, as migration levels tend to rise and fall in tandem with 
macroeconomic growth, and the inability to discuss this from what 
Foucault called the ‘perspective of liberal government’ means that 
political rhetoric and policy ends up focused instead on seeking to 
shape attitudes and emotions of (sections of) the public. Attempts to 
speak scientifi cally or realistically about this policy issue are no longer 
viewed as legitimate by large swathes of the British political class. 
 Postliberalism does not offer a new paradigm of governmentality, 
as its purpose is to attack the very idea of centralised, technocratic, 
statistically informed government. It does however suggest that 
policy-makers should become more attuned to the affective, emo-
tional and symbolic dimensions of the state, and become more expert 
in manipulating how these are seen and felt. Arguably, Operation 
Vaken was a case of such postliberalism, in which the violent quali-
ties of the sovereign state were displayed in billboard form, in order 
to impress an alternative sense of toughness, reassurance and fear 
across particular communities. This postliberalism has certain formal 
qualities in common with  pre liberalism, or violent public demonstra-
tions of power as described by  Foucault at the opening of  Discipline 
and Punish  ( 1991 ), to the extent that it involves heightened attention 
to ritual, symbolism and the aesthetics of political action. And yet it 
also bears the hallmarks of postliberal ‘nudging’ and ‘dog-whistling’, 
in which a message is carefully crafted to communicate in an uncon-
scious or coded fashion with particular groups. Marketing and sov-
ereignty therefore reach new alliances, squeezing out the space of 
liberalism: the marketing campaign aimed at representing Britain as 
a ‘hostile environment’ or the rebranding of the UK borders to look 
‘tougher’ would be examples of such new alliances between the tra-
ditional goals of sovereignty and the latest techniques of affective 
management. 
 Leaving aside ethical questions, what is epistemologically and tech-
nically problematic about this postliberal or neo-communitarian 
emphasis upon emotional attachments and prejudices is that it is 
constantly at risk of being found out, given the underlying govern-
mental, statistical and economic reality from which it seeks to distract. 
The wishful thinking of postliberalism is that nostalgically imagined 
nationhood, cultural homogeneity and locality can be restored, despite 
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neoliberal trends pulling in the opposite direction. It represents a 
failure of political discourse to adequately represent the sociological, 
historical, political and economic forces that produce high levels of 
migration in the fi rst place, and opts for soothing communitarianism 
instead. Postliberal rhetoric tends to conceal neoliberal reality but not 
thwart it. What concerns us is that, in doing so, it further isolates and 
attacks those citizens and non-citizens who are seen as lacking value 
in both neoliberal and postliberal terms. 
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 Living Research Three: Migration 
research and the media 
 One of the motivations for our project was to use research to inter-
vene in public debates on immigration by providing alternative per-
spectives on what is often a polarised and entrenched debate where 
the perspectives of migrants and racially minoritised communities 
barely feature ( Conlan,  2014 ;  Migrant Voice,  2014 ) and where, as 
we found, research evidence on ‘what works’ in managing migra-
tion is rarely used by policy-makers. Indeed, the fi rst stage of the 
project, before it was fully formed or funded, involved an attempt 
to intervene. As members of a spontaneously formed group of activ-
ists, many of the members of the fi nal research team took part in 
carrying out a street survey which was published in  The Voice ( Chan, 
 2013 ), the main Black British newspaper in the UK. Throughout 
the research project, we communicated our research with the 
media via press releases, the @MICResearch Twitter feed and our 
project blog ( mappingimmigrationcontroversy.com ). The media 
coverage our project received included  The  Telegraph ,  The Independ-
ent ,  The Financial Times ,  BBC Woman ’ s Hour ,  The Herald , and  Russia 
Today . Here, we want to refl ect on some of the diffi culties of trying 
to engage with mainstream media when researching contentious 
issues. 
 Immigration research in a hostile media environment 
 The negative tone of debate on immigration in the British media 
poses particular challenges for communicating research within that 
context, as it is often a question of how research fi ts, or does not fi t, 
dominant narratives. Existing research has demonstrated how 
media coverage of immigration has been marked by moral panics 
about immigration as a threat to social cohesion and the scapegoat-
ing of immigrants for a variety of social anxieties ( Hall et al.,  1978 ; 
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 Cohen,  2011 ;  Philo et al.,  2013 ). Immigration has also been associ-
ated with criminality through journalists’ use of terms such as 
‘illegal’ or ‘bogus’ ( Alia and Bull,  2005 ) and dehumanisation 
through the use of terms like ‘surge’, ‘fl ood’ (Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 2007, cited in  Philo et al.,  2013 ), ‘swamp’ ( The Sun , 
 2002 ) or ‘swarm’ ( Holehouse,  2015 ). Government policy as a driver 
of migration in and from confl ict zones, including the UK ’ s role in 
wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, also tends to be ignored in mainstream 
media coverage (Lewis et al., 2005 cited in  Philo et al.,  2013 ). In 
 Bad News for Refugees , Greg Philo and colleagues examined how 
infl ammatory media coverage of asylum seekers and refugees legiti-
mates punitive offi cial public and policy responses, which in turn 
undermine the sense of identity and security for migrant and 
racially minoritised communities ( Philo et al.,  2013 ). This interac-
tion between infl ammatory media coverage and punitive immigra-
tion policy can be understood as what  Papadopoulos et al. term a 
‘regime of mobility control’, which includes both state and non-
state actors, and encompasses processes of observation and action 
( 2008 : 163). 
 This means that trying to translate research into media-friendly 
formats carries the risk of our research being interpreted within the 
terms of hegemonic anti-immigrant perspectives, framing what is 
deemed newsworthy and thus the coverage of research – which, as 
we found, tends to be selective, focusing narrowly on fi ndings which 
fi t into a polemical rather than data-driven approach, and more 
specifi cally an anti-immigration narrative (see examples below). Fur-
thermore, the popularity of UKIP and related populist viewpoints 
means that those perceived as defending immigration, including 
academics, become easily dismissed as an out-of-touch liberal met-
ropolitan elite (see Chapter  3 ) who hold positive views on immigra-
tion because they are sheltered from its consequences, in contrast 
with the beleaguered ‘white working class’. 1 This makes it all the 
more important that we as researchers intervene in debates on 
immigration. It also means that our research risks being either 
reduced to pro or con, pigeonholed as coming from an out-of-touch 
elite, or being misinterpreted. 
 1 For a challenge to this argument and a discussion of the implications 
for researchers, see  Gunaratnam and Jones  ( 2015 ) and also  Virdee 
 ( 2014 ). 
90 Go home?
 Media coverage of our research project 
 Our project received media coverage from several outlets, but we 
will focus on a few key examples that illustrate the challenges of 
communicating research to the media. The fi rst media coverage that 
our project received was from  The Telegraph , in response to a press 
release at the very beginning of the project, and emphasised the 
fact that we had received £200,000 of  public money to carry out 
the research, calling it a ‘sizeable grant’ ( Riley-Smith,  2013 ), even 
though this is not a large sum of research funding in relative terms 
(the budget included paying wages to eight researchers over the 
18-month duration of the project, fees to the community organisa-
tions, the costs of commissioning the survey, travel costs and other 
incidentals involved with carrying out the project). The rest of the 
article focused on the controversy surrounding Operation Vaken 
and the Go Home van pilot and the fact that the pilot had not been 
successful. The implication was that our project was problematic 
because it was using taxpayers’ money to criticise government policy 
– specifi cally a scheme which had been discontinued – and also 
because we were seen to be defending immigrants. The organisation 
Migrants’ Rights Network was asked by  The  Telegraph  for a negative 
comment about the project (as it was not one of the project part-
ners) and warned us of the story. 
 After analysing the results of the Ipsos MORI survey in October 
2014 (see Chapter  2 for details) and the fi rst stages of the qualitative 
research we conducted ourselves, we sent out press releases summa-
rising our interim research fi ndings, which resulted in media cover-
age in the  Financial Times and the  Independent  ( Jackson,  2014 ;  Green, 
 2015 ) .  Both articles focused on two key fi ndings based on qualita-
tive research: 2 that high-profi le government immigration campaigns 
caused anxiety and unease amongst migrants and those racialised as 
being from ‘Black and minority ethnic’ communities, and that they did 
not even reassure those who were concerned about irregular immigra-
tion, leading them to suspect that irregular immigration was worse 
than they had thought. Other aspects of our fi ndings were left out of 
the news coverage because they were deemed less newsworthy and/or 
less conducive to a polemical approach. The  Financial Times  article also 
cited quotes from the then Home Secretary Theresa May and Immi-
gration Minister James Brokenshire on how the Immigration Bill was 
 2  Though  The Independent seemed to confuse this with the Ipsos MORI 
survey. 
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making it more diffi cult for those who did not have a legal right to be 
in the UK, and how the van pilot was deemed unsuccessful ( Jackson, 
 2014 ). However, there were no direct responses from the Home Offi ce 
to our research. The article in the  Independent  emphasised how high-
profi le immigration campaigns increased racial prejudice. The point 
was also made that high-profi le immigration campaigns made those 
with legal immigration status and even British citizenship feel unwel-
come and reluctant to participate in political activism. 
 That we were able to put arguments into the mainstream media 
demonstrating the links between immigration control to racism, and 
provide evidence about the effects on racially minoritised communi-
ties (both are rare), shows the importance of intervening in the 
media. However, what was more problematic was the  Independent 
 article ’ s emphasis on ‘ethnic minorities’ becoming more suspicious 
of each other:
 Different migrant groups have become increasingly suspicious of 
one another, with hostility breaking out between asylum seekers, 
refugees and Eastern Europeans. Some migrants reported ethnic 
minority British citizens telling them to ‘go home’.  
 ( Green,  2015 , n.p.) 
 Passages such as this give the impression of generations of immi-
grants and settled ‘minority ethnic’ communities fi ghting amongst 
themselves, and it de-emphasises the role of government policy or 
communications in provoking community tensions, which was also 
a key fi nding in our research. It also potentially plays into narratives 
which claim that anti-immigrant sentiments are not racist because 
of being expressed by racially minoritised people (for a more 
detailed discussion of anti-immigrant sentiments amongst racially 
minoritised communities see Chapter  5 ). 
 Human interest stories and the politics of identifi cation 
 In addition to trying to communicate our research through news 
media, we also participated in public discussions about the repre-
sentation of migrants in the media. For example, at a workshop at 
the Detention Forum Salon in London (in which Hannah and 
Kirsten participated), Ian Dunt (journalist and editor of the blog 
 politics.co.uk ) argued that ‘politicians, journalists and decision makers 
still tend to be middle class white men who will identify more with 
“people like them”’ ( Jones,  2015 ). Dunt suggested that advocates for 
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the rights of migrants and asylum seekers should choose human 
interest stories involving people the British public (or journalists, as 
gatekeepers to the public) fi nd easy to identify with. This raises ques-
tions about how such choices might reproduce hierarchies of class, 
race, nationality, sexuality, etc. For example, an Australian NHS 
therapist who suddenly lost her status due to bureaucratic errors was 
seen to be easier to identify with than a Nigerian asylum seeker who 
had fl ed her home country because she faced 14 years in prison for 
her homosexuality ( Jones,  2015 ). In a blog post about the event, 
Hannah questioned the terms of identifi cation, and who is seen to 
be an ‘ordinary person’. She asked whether people could imagine 
themselves or someone they knew being persecuted for their sexual-
ity, and being on the sharp end of the immigration and justice system 
as a result (see further discussion of this in Chapter  6 ). 
 This incident shows the importance for researchers of not only 
providing alternative viewpoints and evidence but also challenging 
the terms by which media conventions such as the ‘human interest 
story’ operate, and the larger power relations such conventions 
refl ect. As we have discussed, doing so carries the risk of being (mis)
interpreted within the terms we wish to challenge. However, within 
the current political climate, the risk of not intervening in public 
debates on immigration is more dangerous. 
 Have you been involved in sharing details of a social research 
project in the mainstream media? What challenges did you 
expect? What challenges did you encounter? Did they differ? 
 In your view, what is the role of academic research in public 
debate, particularly on controversial issues? 
 Is media coverage a good way of making academic research 
fi ndings accessible? Are there different opportunities and risks 
associated with different forms of media coverage? How might 
you handle these? 
 What can be gained by persuading journalists to cover aca-
demic research reports? What can be lost? 
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 4 
 Spaces and places of governance 
and resistance 
 Amaal: I came to live in Barking and Dagenham twenty-fi ve years 
ago and at that time … very few black and Asian and ethnic 
minority communities … and within a short space of I would say 
maybe fi ve years or so the borough has changed dramatically and 
quite a lot of migrants arrived and that created a little bit more 
tension within the wider community and evidently you can see 
the changes, you know, people say ‘Oh, nothing ’ s changed’, but 
you can actually see the presence of people, family infl ux are 
coming in, but what we know as an organisation is that these 
people arriving in Barking and Dagenham, not necessarily come 
from abroad, you know, it is quite a mix. Some of them came [to] 
inner city London and moved to Westminster borough and Isling-
ton and those areas, where the cost of living is quite high and the 
rent has gone up and people cannot afford in private to rent. So 
those are families that are being really pushed from inner cities 
to outer London that we know and some really as far as, they 
come from within East London, Tower Hamlets and people who 
come to Barking and Dagenham from Tower Hamlets now also 
and other boroughs in Waltham Forest where there is cheaper 
houses here and affordable to live in Barking and Dagenham. But 
not everybody sees that, we know, because we have some of these 
families accessing our services, but people think, you know, that 
these people are new arrivals and they ’ re just sort of off the plane 
and just arrived in Barking and Dagenham, but there ’ s quite a 
big difference and the majority of them, they are resident in the 
UK, but just came to Barking and Dagenham because of the 
cheaper and affordable housing. 
 (Barking and Dagenham Activist Interview, 
conducted by Yasmin) 
 The philosopher and social theorist  Michel Foucault once said, ‘We 
are in an epoch of simultaneity: we are in an epoch of juxtaposition, 
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the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed’ 
( 1986 : 22). He might well have been in a conversation with Amaal, a 
community worker in Barking and Dagenham, quoted above. Amaal ’ s 
observations of her local area – how it has changed over the years, 
how there are more complex histories and lives beneath appearances 
– tells us something important about space and place in modern 
urban life. As places heave and pulsate with social changes and the 
proximities of all sorts of differences, we can also cling to place to 
provide some stable and idealised sense of belonging, community and 
home ( Bammer,  1992 ;  Probyn,  1996 ). 
 In this chapter we explore some of these themes and the role of 
spaces and places in the implementation and reception of, and resist-
ance to, immigration policing campaigns. First, the chapter examines 
the spaces where the campaigns have intervened, from people ’ s 
homes, to the street, to cyber space. Building on the argument that 
such interventions are closely tied to the increasingly domestic nature 
of border practices as part of a highly visible performance politics 
(see Chapters  2 and  3 ), this chapter focuses on the intended and 
unintended consequences of campaigns. These include acts of resist-
ance, increased fear and feelings of exclusion. 
 For us the spaces where these anti-immigration interventions (and 
reactions to them) unfold are not mere backdrops to action. Because 
space is alive, dynamic and relational, it is always affecting and being 
affected by what happens in it ( Massey,  1994 ;  Lefebvre,  1991 ). As 
we argued in Chapter  2 , immigration campaigns seek to intervene in 
political space ( Lefebvre,  1991 : 33). Here, we look more closely at 
how campaigns such as Operation Vaken, and resistance to them, feed 
into the production of particular spaces, for example the intensifi ca-
tion of fear associated with the street and with the waiting room at 
the local Home Offi ce reception centre. It is also the case that the 
history and meanings of particular places have been mobilised to 
resist these campaigns. 
 Drawing on interviews and focus groups carried out in our six UK 
case study areas (Glasgow, Bradford, East London, West London, 
Birmingham/Coventry and Cardiff), we highlight how local and 
national contexts come to matter in how immigration policing cam-
paigns are experienced and interpreted. Here local issues, such as 
histories of migration and resistance, and national contexts, such as 
debates about devolution and the 2014 Scottish Independence refer-
endum, impact on reactions to anti-immigration campaigns. Whereas 
in Ealing and Hounslow (West London), for example, the Go Home 
van ’ s appearance played into divisive discourses of respectability 
among established migrants and British citizens (discussed in Chapter 
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 5 ), in Glasgow opposition to Operation Vaken fed into debates about 
Scottish Independence. 
 This chapter argues for the importance of considering the follow-
ing when examining the impact of anti-immigration campaigns across 
the UK:
 1  the specifi c characteristics of sites of intervention and resistance 
 2  how local contexts shape reaction and resistance and, conversely, 
 3  how anti-immigration campaigns feed into the production of 
spaces and places. 
 Place matters: vans in the street, raids on the home 
 The ‘hostile environment’ of Operation Vaken and associated initia-
tives was a multilayered campaign intruding into different kinds of 
spaces: from the virtual environment to the street, to the intimate 
spaces of people ’ s homes. These spaces became interlinked as social 
media were used to circulate information about Vaken ’ s activities in 
the street and to organise counter-actions (see  Living Research Five ) 
– and, as we shall discuss below, the realms of the street and the digital 
also became interlinked through resistance to these campaigns. 
 The Go Home vans were possibly the most public aspect of the 
government ’ s increasingly hard line on immigration, intervening 
directly in the streets of several ethnically diverse London neighbour-
hoods (Hounslow, Barking and Dagenham, Ealing, Barnet, Brent and 
Redbridge). Promising a sense of security that ‘something is being 
done’ about an invisible bogeyman (while reinforcing a feeling that 
the bogeyman lurks among them/us), the impact of the Go Home van 
travelled beyond the localities through which the vans drove via exten-
sive media coverage. When considering the intervention that the vans 
made in London, it is not only the wider context of the city as ‘global’ 
( Sassen,  1991 ), or ‘superdiverse’ ( Vertovec,  2007 ) that matters but 
how this is lived within the specifi c contexts of the neighbourhoods 
where the vans and their message were experienced. 
 We conducted research in three of the boroughs where the van was 
piloted: Ealing, Hounslow and Barking and Dagenham. Activists in 
these areas reported how the vans exacerbated existing tensions in the 
community. For example, in Barking where feelings on immigration 
run high, an activist explained:
 Amaal: The Go Home vans affected the area, because Barking and 
Dagenham was one of the areas that was targeted, in terms of the 
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migrant community, I mean, you know, with all the incidents that 
happened … ‘Go home’, that sentence, really that resentment 
people feel and that is if someone ’ s going to be racist, that is the 
sentence people are really angry about and feel quite violated if 
someone says to them ‘go home’ and for the Government to come 
up with that … that is a green light for others to use [it] as well. 
So that was one of the things that really caused tension in Barking 
and Dagenham for both communities at that time. 
 (Barking and Dagenham Activist Interview, 
conducted by Yasmin) 
 The specifi c context of Barking and Dagenham is important here. It 
is a London borough that has seen a massive loss of jobs, most notably 
at the Ford factory, which went from employing forty thousand 
people at its peak in the 1950s to four thousand in 2009 (Hudson, 
2009 cited in  Simmons,  2014 ). It has a pressurised housing market, 
fuelled by the reduction in social rented housing following Thatcher ’ s 
1980s institution of the right to buy council properties without the 
power for local authorities to replace their housing stock ( Asthana, 
 2010 ). The area has seen signifi cant demographic change in terms of 
the ethnicity of the residents – the White British population decreased 
from 81 per cent in 2001 to 49 per cent in 2011 ( London Borough 
of Barking and Dagenham,  n.d. ). In the early 2000s Barking and 
Dagenham was targeted by the far right, culminating in the British 
National Party becoming the offi cial opposition to the Labour council 
in the elections of 2006, although it lost these seats in 2010.  Jones 
argues that after the 2006 election: ‘The borough came to symbolize, 
for both national press and policy practitioners across the country, 
the problem of far right mobilisation among the white working class’ 
( 2013 : 43). 
 This local context matters when considering the impact of the Go 
Home van. To return to the interview extract, the van circulating in 
this locality upset those who are imagined as part of the ‘migrant 
community’, by echoing the language of the far right. It exacerbated 
a division between those who might say ‘go home’ and those who 
might be on the receiving end of these comments. The van thus feeds 
into the formation of and antagonism between what Amaal terms ‘the 
two communities’. As the next chapter will explore in more detail, this 
division between two imagined communities does not correspond 
neatly to lines of ‘race’. As another activist told us:
 Ceebla: We ’ ve had political leaders, councillors defect in Barking 
and Dagenham to UKIP, who are from a minority ethnic 
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background and it ’ s incredible, it is absolutely incredible and on 
the basis that there are too many Eastern Europeans, it ’ s just, it ’ s 
so concerning that people are buying into this. 
 (Barking and Dagenham Activist Interview, 
conducted by Yasmin) 
 Interestingly, within this context the van did little to reassure those 
who held anti-immigration opinions. Participants in a focus group of 
white British women supporters of the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP), who describe themselves as being ‘in the indigenous minor-
ity’, dismissed the van as a waste of money:
 Annie: It just shows you how stupid this government is. 
 Chris: It is. 
 Annie: To think that any illegal person is going to read that and go 
home … not in a million years. 
 (Barking Focus Group, conducted by Yasmin) 
 So, for these women in this local context, the Go Home van also 
symbolises an out-of-touch government engaged in local theatrics that 
is not responding to what they feel is the real issue, for them, ‘control-
ling the borders’ (see also Chapters  2 and  3 ). 
 Meanwhile, on the other side of London, in Ealing and Hounslow, 
a focus group discussion with women of South Asian, African and 
Caribbean origin revealed a slippage between the understanding of 
the Go Home van ’ s campaign (which four women in the group had 
seen) and vans that had been seen taking part in immigration raids:
 Rita: It ’ s so racist, I can say in my words, it ’ s like we are Asian, we 
are from other country like Nigeria, Pakistan, India, so why is it 
only for us? It ’ s coming in my mind straight away, it ’ s showing 
so much racism. 
 Sukhwant: Why do you think it ’ s directed at Asian and African 
communities? Is there something on this that suggests to you? 
 Rita: Because they grab the people, if you are walking in the street 
like me and other white people, they grab the Asian fi rst, they 
don ’ t ask any questions to white people … they grab the people 
who have a dark complexion. 
 (Ealing and Hounslow Focus Group, 
conducted by Sukhwant) 
 The van is interpreted as ‘racist’ by this group because of its associa-
tions with immigration enforcement vans that ‘grab’ people rather 
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than because of the messages displayed on the van. This slippage 
shows how anti-immigration interventions are not interpreted in a 
vacuum but rather interact with each other. In this local context, 
where raids are visible and frequent, vans mean raids. 
 The issue of raids loomed large in the two focus groups conducted 
in Ealing and Hounslow. Raids and checks in the street had major 
impacts on how public spaces were experienced. Even those who had 
leave to remain in the UK expressed anxiety about being stopped at 
transport hubs. Rita also described how she panicked when she saw 
UK Border Agency (UKBA) 1 offi cers and dogs at the exit barriers 
of a London railway station (see Chapter  2 ). She became so nervous 
that she turned away from the exit barriers and jumped on a train. In 
this panic, she boarded the wrong train and when she eventually 
reached home she stayed indoors for some time because of a fear that 
her leave to remain might be revoked. 
 In the West London focus groups immigration enforcement was 
also seen as a threat to even the most intimate of spaces. Women in 
the Ealing and Hounslow focus groups talked about the frightening 
experience of having their homes raided. Others had seen them hap-
pening nearby, as Iram recounted:
 Iram: I also saw immigration raids in Southall. Where I was living 
an illegal young man was also living. He was sleeping and they 
came and took him from his home. These raids are happening 
quite a lot in Southall and I was scared. 
 (Ealing and Hounslow Focus Group, 
conducted by Sukhwant, translation) 
 It was not only UKBA which was making incursions into the focus 
group participants’ homes. Anjum, also in Ealing and Hounslow, 
remembered how her child was frightened by the landlord ’ s constant 
intrusions:
 Anjum: [He] used to knock the room twice a day and used to say 
we want copies of the passport and we want to know how long 
your sister is going to stay … my little son was so much scared 
that he still doesn ’ t meet that man [and] he has a problem in that 
house, he doesn ’ t go downstairs when that ‘uncle’ is there. 
 (Ealing and Hounslow Focus Group, 
conducted by Sukhwant) 
 1 UK Border Agency was the part of the Home Offi ce responsible for 
border control between 2008 and April 2013, when it was split into UK 
Visas and Immigration, and Immigration and Enforcement agencies. 
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 These stories from Ealing and Hounslow evoke something of the 
cumulative effect of the layering up of anti-immigration interventions 
in multiple places at different scales – the home, the street – and the 
experience that no place is safe. Several participants wept as they 
considered the implications of this hostile environment for themselves 
and for people they know. From witnessing night-time raids in shared 
houses to seeing people on the street being carted off, they talked 
about the visceral impact of immigration policy on their lives and their 
new or increasing sense of precariousness. 
 The public and policy image of Ealing and Hounslow is rather 
different to Barking and Dagenham. Whereas Barking and Dagenham 
has become shorthand for community tensions and far-right success, 
Ealing incorporates Southall, an area that was used as a good example 
of community cohesion by the government in the past ( Cantle,  2001 ). 
More widely, Ealing and Hounslow are home to a number of long-
standing civil society organisations for which highlighting and oppos-
ing the racist dimension of immigration policy has been a key focus 
for decades. There is a large South Asian population in both of these 
boroughs. 2 However, as described in the next chapter, heightened 
government and media attention to immigration has been divisive, 
including within the South Asian populations of these boroughs (see 
also  Living Research One ). Rita refl ected on her experience of nega-
tive reactions during a protest against immigration enforcement:
 Rita: SBS [Southall Black Sisters] took action against that van and 
I was with them, we were doing the campaign outside the Hima-
laya Palace and I was shocked, my Asian community they hate us. 
They were saying so many people, they are fi ghting, arguing with 
me now, and other people, they are saying ‘why are you support-
ing them? They have to go home.’ And I was shocked, my com-
munity hate me so what can I expect from British people? Of 
course they are going to be racist with me, they are going to hate 
me. If my community people they hate me, so who is going to 
 2  The 2011 Census fi gures for Ealing put the biggest ethnic group as 
White English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Ireland/British (30.4%), with the 
next biggest single category as White Other (15.4%) followed by Asian/
Asian British: Indian (14.3%). For Hounslow, the 2011 Census shows 
that 37.9% of the population identify as White English/Welsh/Scottish/
Northern Ireland/British, with the next largest group who identify as 
Asian/Asian British: Indian (19%), followed by 11.5% who identify as 
White Other. Source: Offi ce for National Statistics, Neighbourhood Sta-
tistics table ‘Ethnic Group (KS201EW): London’. 
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accept us? So of course it ’ s impacting my community, they have 
split us. My Asian community hate Asian people, it was so sad. 
 (Ealing and Hounslow Focus Group, 
conducted by Sukhwant) 
 In this case the lines drawn are not between resident and migrant but 
between ‘good (established) migrant’ and ‘bad (new) migrant’ (how 
this becomes discussed through the language of who is ‘deserving’ 
and ‘undeserving’ will be further explored in Chapter  5 ). In both East 
and West London the vans fuelled anti-migrant sentiments and divi-
sions but, because of different histories of migration, this was inter-
preted and experienced differently. The imagined fi gure of the migrant 
‘other’ is different in the two contexts. This depends on who the 
newcomers are in each community – the fi gure of the ‘unrespectable’ 
South Asian in West London, and the Eastern European in Barking 
and Dagenham, for instance. 
 But this government messaging did not circulate only on the streets 
of London. While the Go Home van element of Operation Vaken was 
implemented only in London, 26 per cent of Ipsos MORI ’ s survey 
sample (see  Appendix ) was aware of it, making it the most visible 
aspect of the communications campaigns we asked about nationally. 
The Go Home van was covered extensively in the UK press, thus 
circulating far beyond the neighbourhoods through which it was 
driven. This led to some confusion among our respondents about the 
exact places of intervention (see below). 
 In addition, the offi cial Home Offi ce Twitter account began to 
share photographs of immigration offi cers apprehending people, 
leading them in handcuffs into the back of enforcement vans, with 
text such as #immigrationoffender and #nohidingplace. After sub-
stantial criticism (see  Living Research Five ), the Home Offi ce quickly 
moved to a softer, less aggressive Twitter voice, focusing on missing 
persons and violence against women. But this short-lived social media 
strategy enabled the virtual circulation of these highly visible localised 
raids and therefore their use as anti-immigration propaganda. The 
tactic of making raids visible also included locally targeted actions 
such as taking journalists from local papers along to immigration raids 
on weddings, workplaces and homes (see Chapter  3 ). 
 At the same time, a more private poster campaign was taking place. 
The Brand Street (Glasgow) and Hounslow (London) Immigration 
Enforcement reporting offi ces were saturated with posters and stickers 
on the walls, chairs and fl oor, asking ‘Is life here hard? Going home is 
simple,’ accompanied by images of destitute people. There were also 
mobiles of planes hung from the ceiling. This campaign was much less 
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public than the street-level interventions in London and was targeted 
at those already in a vulnerable position within the immigration system. 
 The adverse effects of displaying these posters in a place that is 
already feared by those who use it were described in focus groups in 
Ealing and Hounslow. When asked by Sukhwant about who in the 
group had seen the van, Angela ’ s response was directly related to the 
reporting offi ce poster campaign:
 Angela: Yes not only on the bus, it was also in Home Offi ce because 
I used to go in there, to sign on. 
 Sukhwant: The reception centres? 
 Angela: Yeah … So when I went there, and saw it, oh – I just can ’ t 
describe how I felt because I thought they put it here because 
they want to scare every single person. And it wasn ’ t very good. 
 (Ealing and Hounslow Focus Group, 
conducted by Sukhwant) 
 As we also heard in Chapter  3 , the posters in the reception centre add 
to fear within an already intimidating situation. 
 In Glasgow, where the Home Offi ce posters were displayed without 
the van campaign, some of the focus group of asylum seekers and 
refugees had seen them in person but another person in the group 
refused to believe that this had happened in Glasgow – ‘that was in 
London, not here’ said one of the participants. In exploring why ‘not 
here’, the national context of Scotland becomes important. 
 National matters: telling Immigration Enforcement to 
‘Go Home’ 
 We now zoom out from these smaller places and localities to consider 
how anti-immigration campaigns intervened in national contexts in 
the different countries of the UK, focusing particularly on Scotland 
and Wales where anti-immigration campaigns were used to draw 
distinctions between the countries in the UK. 
 The timing in Scotland was particularly signifi cant, as the cam-
paign unfolded in the run up to the 2014 Scottish Independence 
referendum. The Home Offi ce reporting centre posters in Glasgow 
in particular and the campaign in general became reference points in 
the referendum campaign. The reaction to the campaign in Scotland 
was very negative. Key to the counter-campaign in Scotland was the 
argument that the posters were an intolerant Westminster imposition 
on (a more welcoming) Scotland. The  Herald newspaper published 
an editorial that argued: ‘The Scottish Parliament should make clear 
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that this kind of behaviour is not acceptable in Scotland. Perhaps it ’ s 
time to tell the UKBA to “Go home” ’ ( Herald View,  2013 ). This is 
just one example of how the campaign was used to distinguish between 
a punitive British state and a possible alternative Scottish approach, 
one that combines pro-immigration policies and civic nationalism. 
This also perhaps accounts for why one focus group participant from 
Glasgow refused to believe that the posters were displayed in Scotland 
(‘that was London, not here’). 
 The Scottish National Party (SNP) argued that UK policy on 
asylum and immigration was not in keeping with Scottish attitudes or 
the proposals for immigration and asylum in  Scotland’s Future (the 
White Paper on independence) that also included the proposal to close 
Dungavel Immigration Detention Centre. The White Paper explicitly 
references the ‘Go Home’ campaign to highlight these disparities:
 It is [also] diffi cult to conceive of a Scottish government that would 
ever adopt the crude ‘go home’ approach tried by the current West-
minster Government.  
 ( The Scottish Government,  2013 : 255–6) 
 Thus an inhospitable UK is held up against a welcoming Scotland 
and a promise of a fairer society to come. This position was echoed 
in a debate held in the Scottish Parliament in December 2013 on the 
poster campaign. All speakers of all political parties condemned the 
campaign but all SNP speakers used opposition to the campaign to 
stress the need for Scottish independence. 
 In a focus group carried out with refugees and asylum seekers in 
Glasgow we found strident pro-independence views. However, this 
seemed not to rely on feelings of belonging to Scotland as such, but 
rather on the specifi c policies on migration and asylum set out in the 
White Paper and on the idea of the Scottish state as generally more 
sympathetic than the Westminster government:
 Sirvan: There is not any guarantee for new Scotland, or independ-
ent Scotland, that make life easy for refugees or asylum seekers, 
but still we believe that would be better because there is a cam-
paign to support asylum or refugees. So the number of the popu-
lation of Scotland is quite small, so it ’ s quite easy to fi ght with 
the Parliament, you know Edinburgh Parliament, Scottish Parlia-
ment instead of UK. 
 Theresa: Because all the rules you are using here in Scotland … the 
Home Offi ce, their rules, they are from England. 
 (Glasgow focus group, conducted by Emma) 
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 In this focus group discussion, once again the Home Offi ce is associ-
ated with the UK state (and equated with English dominance) rather 
than the Scottish government, which is characterised here as easier to 
access. Within this narrative of a more welcoming Scotland, we also 
found Glasgow to have a particular resonance (explored further 
below). 
 Although this was less pronounced in Wales, there was discussion 
in the focus groups about how immigration enforcement campaigns 
were largely Home Offi ce, and therefore English, initiatives. In one of 
the activist interviews, Alex refl ected on the situation of refugees and 
asylum seekers in Wales:
 Alex: Compared to the rest of the UK, the situation in Wales is not 
as good as it is in Scotland, but it ’ s better than the situation in 
England. 
 (Cardiff Activist Interview, conducted by Roiyah) 
 Debates on immigration in Wales have not had the same vehemence 
as in England, perhaps because of different and earlier patterns of 
immigration centred on the port city of Cardiff and dating back to 
the late nineteenth century (see  Harries,  2015 ). 
 However, unlike Glasgow, in Cardiff devolution was not extensively 
discussed. The mood among immigration activists towards devolution 
was less positive than in the Glasgow research, and more sceptical 
opinions were voiced. One activist commented:
 Crystal: Wales Government has no power [over immigration] but 
where they have the powers what did they do? Education, health, 
housing, community cohesion, what do they do? What has come 
out of it? What has come out of it? I don ’ t know. I ’ m asking, what 
has come out of it? 
 (Cardiff Activist Interview, conducted by Roiyah) 
 There were signifi cant differences between how the campaign fed in, 
or not, to debates about devolution in these two countries. In Scot-
land, the presence of the posters within Scotland itself, and in the 
local context of Glasgow as the country ’ s most ethnically diverse city, 
during a time of fervent debate about Scotland ’ s place in the United 
Kingdom made the posters highly symbolic of an unsympathetic state 
intruding on Scottish soil. Although Cardiff is also unusually ethni-
cally diverse within Wales, here the campaign was not physically 
present but experienced via social media and the news. Unlike in 
Scotland, debate on devolution was not particularly heightened and 
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so the campaign did not feed into discussions of nationhood in the 
same way. 
 History matters: reaction and resistance 
 Within these national debates, other more local forms of belonging 
are drawn upon in terms of resistance and mobilisation against anti-
immigration campaigns. This was particularly noticeable in Cardiff 
and Glasgow, multicultural hubs in countries that are otherwise more 
ethnically homogenous than is England. In the Cardiff interviews and 
focus groups, the overwhelming majority of participants perceived 
Cardiff as different from other places in being more welcoming, 
friendlier and safer. The general street level conviviality, and the urban 
‘multicultured’ areas, places and streets in which to socialise, worship 
and ‘hang out’ were noted as contributing factors. In this extract from 
a Cardiff focus group, Omar argues that anti-immigration campaigns 
do not have much impact on Cardiff:
 Omar: I personally would think that Cardiff was a community itself. 
That would more or less bring them, bring the community 
together closer. And speaking from my experience because of the 
diversity and the way it ’ s changed going ten years back. You work 
with Polish people, Turkish people, Moroccans and you work 
with the guy from the valleys, pure Welsh boy and you got 
someone from Ireland, you know Scottish, and they ’ re all there. 
So who ’ s going to say he ’ s not from here? Who ’ s going to say who 
should go, the Scottish guy, or the Moroccan, or should we all 
pick on the Irish guy or me, the black man? 
 (Cardiff focus group, conducted by Roiyah) 
 Omar ’ s feeling is that because of the diversity in Cardiff, picking off 
specifi c groups as ‘others’, not entitled to belong, would not work. As 
well as this long-standing history of migration and multiculture, the 
twin factors of an increase in numbers of those seeking asylum in 
Cardiff since 2001 (since the policy of dispersal was introduced which 
moved thousands of asylum seekers to cities around the UK, in an 
attempt to ease pressure on services in London and south-east 
England) and the erosion of asylum seekers’ rights have given rise to 
a wave of refugee-related activism in the city ( Payson,  2015 ). The 
well-established anti-racist presence in Cardiff was another contribut-
ing factor. In the following exchange with Roiyah, Crystal, an activist 
Spaces and places 107
in Cardiff, considers whether the van campaign would have been 
possible there:
 Crystal: No, they couldn ’ t even bring in to Cardiff anyway. 
 Roiyah: What, do you think it wouldn ’ t have worked if they had the 
vans going up and down? 
 Crystal: It won ’ t work. We are so barbaric in Wales it cannot work. 
 (Cardiff Activist Interview 2, conducted by Roiyah) 
 Here ‘barbaric’ refers to the stridency of local activism. 
 Like Cardiff, Glasgow has responded to the dispersal of asylum 
seekers in the city through pro-migrant activism. In Glasgow, work 
by local statutory organisations and community campaigns to address 
tensions and anti-migrant feeling and incidents was galvanised by 
the murder of an asylum seeker, Firsat Dag, in the city in 2001. 
Community-led campaigns to protect asylum seekers, such as the 
‘Glasgow Girls’ 3 campaigns, arose following this, particularly as 
people became integrated into local communities, importantly through 
attending school together. These networks have many characteristics 
of long-standing trade union and political organising that have strong 
traditions in the city. The campaigns have been important in galvanis-
ing politicians’ and others’ characterisations of Glasgow as being 
hospitable to newcomers. 
 Ideas of Glasgow (rather than just Scotland) as a particularly wel-
coming place in contrast to a hostile Home Offi ce were also drawn 
on to counter the ‘Go Home’ campaign, in political speeches at dem-
onstrations (‘Glasgow is a welcoming city. It will take anyone to its 
heart that will love Glasgow back … The only people we don ’ t 
welcome is UKBA’, Nina Baker, Green Party councillor, Emma ’ s 
fi eldnotes, 9 September 2013) and in an editorial in  The Herald 
newspaper:
 This attempt to intimidate asylum seekers in Glasgow seems to be 
of the same Home Offi ce mindset. This is particularly offensive 
 3 The ‘Glasgow Girls’ are a group of seven young women who fi rst got 
together to campaign against the detention of one of their school friends, 
an asylum seeker whose claim had been refused. This grew into a cam-
paign for the rights of all children asylum seekers. Their story was made 
into a musical which was then turned into a musical drama for the BBC 
(see  Scottish Refugee Council,  n.d. ). 
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because Glasgow has a proud history of welcoming refugees into 
the local community without the kind of friction that has been seen 
in some parts of the country.  
 ( Herald View,  2013 ) 
 Such feelings were not only expressed by politicians and the media. 
There was a general feeling among the focus group with asylum 
seekers and refugees in Glasgow that Glasgow was a friendly place, 
that people there were accepting and that, although there was racism, 
it was better than other places. People talked about living in areas that 
were stigmatised and said that, although others thought these were 
bad places, for them this was home. Roselin, an asylum seeker from 
Zimbabwe, said:
 People say Ibrox 4 is a dangerous place to be, but to me I have never 
experienced that. I have been in that same place. For more than three 
years I have stayed in Glasgow, so it is like my birth home. 
 (Glasgow Focus Group, conducted by Emma) 
 In research in Glasgow for a previous project (AMICALL based at 
COMPAS, University of Oxford), Hannah was told by an offi cer in 
the local authority that the UK Border Agency had informed him that 
they found Glasgow to be the most diffi cult city in the UK from which 
to deport people whose asylum claims had been rejected. This was 
due to community-organised resistance campaigns which had physi-
cally prevented offi cers from entering properties to remove people, 
as well as mounting public demonstrations and letter-writing cam-
paigns ( Jones,  2012 ). This opposition between Glasgow activists and 
the Home Offi ce is echoed in our current research by an activist who 
suggested that the decision to pilot the ‘Go Home’ posters in Glasgow 
might have been the Home Offi ce testing whether pro-refugee activ-
ists were still able to mobilise:
 Jean: I think from time to time they just, they ’ re putting out feelers, 
‘have they fi nally got tired of it, has it fi nally calmed down up 
there?’ 
 (Glasgow Activist Interview, conducted by Emma) 
 There are similarities in this excerpt with the Cardiff discussion of 
people being too ‘barbaric’ to accept a campaign like the vans. As 
 4 A neighbourhood in Glasgow. 
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such, Glasgow and Cardiff are presented as rebellious places, kicking 
against the government. 
 The particular histories of Glasgow and Cardiff as places of resist-
ance – and as centres of dispersed asylum seekers – are important. 
Among the English case studies, we have found similar comparisons 
between cities with a good support infrastructure for refugees and 
those without. For example, in a Bradford focus group, Lucee 
explained:
 I used to live in Leeds when I fi rst came because I lived mainly in 
London and then I was brought to Leeds by the Immigration, and 
I found like in Leeds there was a few supporting groups, there 
weren ’ t as many, they weren ’ t like outreaching; when I came to 
Bradford I just found it ’ s totally different, multicultural; I can get 
food from my country, you know like, there ’ s all sorts going on, you 
know. And then there ’ s all these support groups, you know, there 
was the BAFR, I mean Bradford Action for Refugees, Red Cross, 
BIASAN, together, I mean there are so many projects, so I found, 
yeah, in Bradford there is more support and obviously being in the 
City, centrally it ’ s good. 
 (Bradford Focus Group, conducted by Hannah) 
 Like Glasgow and Cardiff, Bradford is a resettlement area for people 
seeking asylum. In the national imagination, Bradford tends to be 
discussed as a touchstone of community unrest associated with ten-
sions between British Muslims and white British communities, cen-
tring on moments such as the burning of Salman Rushdie ’ s  The 
Satanic Verses and controversy about the racist headmaster Ray Hon-
eyford in the 1980s ( Burnett,  2009 ); riots in the 1980s and 2001 
( Hussain and Bagguley,  2005 ;  Pearce and Bujra,  2011 ) and recent 
mobilisations of the far-right and anti-Muslim English Defence 
League (EDL) ( Treadwell,  2012 ). For activists we spoke to in the 
area, the major areas of unrest or worry tended to be around far-right 
mobilisations, with incidents in 2013 including UKIP electoral mobi-
lisation and EDL provocations at mosques, rather than the Home 
Offi ce migration rhetoric. However, the comments of refugees, asylum 
seekers and others also pointed to ways that immigration enforcement 
intervened in their daily lives, even if it was less visible in everyday 
public discourse of others. Similarly, Lucee ’ s view, quoted above, of 
fi nding Bradford a relatively well-organised place in terms of refugee 
and asylum seeker support, contrasted with some activist views about 
local political organising. Pete, an activist Hannah interviewed in 
Bradford who had been involved in labour and migration politics in 
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the area for decades, described the city as having plenty of people 
who would come to nostalgic fi lm screenings about the miners’ strike, 
but a more diffi cult place to mobilise demonstrations or direct action 
towards austerity or other current concerns. 
 Similarly, in the West Midlands an issue that emerged in interviews 
with activists was the difference between Birmingham and Coventry 
in terms of migrant and refugee organising. Coventry seemed to be 
a more conducive environment than Birmingham, which some saw 
as connected to Coventry ’ s history as a city of peace and reconcilia-
tion. By contrast, organising in Birmingham seemed to be particularly 
diffi cult due to the fragmented layout of the city, as well as pressures 
for voluntary sector organisations (not limited to Birmingham) to 
adopt a ‘servicing model’ – whereby immigration professionals act on 
behalf of migrants and asylum seekers rather than migrants and 
asylum seekers advocating on their own behalf. Accounts emerged in 
one of the interviews about how Home Offi ce imperatives to create 
a ‘hostile environment’ (see Chapter  2 ) were making it more diffi cult 
for voluntary sector organisations to support migrants and asylum 
seekers. 5 In these English cities (Bradford, Coventry and Birming-
ham) the ‘Go Home’ messaging was experienced – and responded to 
– as less of a spectacular event and more as an adding of another layer 
to an already diffi cult situation for asylum seekers and refugees. 
 In contrast, perhaps the most immediate and spectacular moment 
of resistance we saw during the research was the Southall Black 
Sisters’ spontaneous protest at Himalaya Palace, and its video record-
ing ( Malhi TV,  2013 ). As in Glasgow, this event provides an example 
of how long-standing anti-racist organisations can challenge divisive 
politics and mobilise networks of solidarity relatively quickly. 
 Some of the women who later contributed to the Ealing and Houn-
slow focus group discussions had been meeting at Southall Black 
Sisters (SBS), a women ’ s centre in West London, and discussing 
media coverage of migration, cuts in access to welfare, proposals that 
welfare benefi ts claimants should undergo English language tests, 
government statements about restricting student entry into the 
country and proposals for the 2014 Immigration Bill (since passed 
 5  Indeed, during our research two of the groups we were working with, 
Birmingham Asylum and Refugee Association (BARA) and Coventry 
Asylum and Refugee Action Group (CARAG), both lost their core 
funding after the Regional Asylum Association decided they would no 
longer fund self-organised asylum seekers’ groups. However, BARA sub-
sequently received £8,000 from the Lottery Fund. 
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into law). The women viewed these developments as deeply worrying 
and inhumane and they discussed ways in which they could protest 
against these incursions. This was when an immigration enforcement 
van pulled up a few doors from the SBS centre ’ s offi ces, and simmer-
ing unease ignited into spontaneous action. 
 A quick consensus was reached to go out on to the street to protest. 
The women scribbled slogans on to pieces of A3 paper, grabbed a 
megaphone, and started shouting ‘UKBA go away’. They also decided 
it was important to warn local residents of the likelihood of a raid by 
sounding the alarm ‘if you are illegal, run, leave the area, there ’ s a raid 
going on!’ (in Hindi). The women then followed the van to a small 
shopping centre. Enforcement offi cers had sealed the entrance to the 
shopping centre and they were questioning the small businesses and 
predominantly South Asian workers inside. 
 In a quick subversion of the Home Offi ce agenda, they enacted 
their own ‘hostile environment’ by demonstrating at the entrance to 
the building and using a megaphone to amplify their opposition – 
these offi cers were being made unwelcome and ashamed of what they 
were doing. They also made a point of shouting in Hindi so that local 
people could understand what was going on. Dozens of local shop-
pers and passers-by encircled the demonstrators, in solidarity or 
simply out of curiosity. Some of them voiced contrary opinions and 
some heated discussions ensued. 
 In this moment the street was seized, reclaimed and reorganised or 
‘reconstituted’ as an offensive against anti-immigration controls. Fur-
thermore, the YouTube video of this protest went viral. An image of 
one of the SBS workers became the logo for a network of activists – 
the Anti Raids Network – issuing similar calls to join them in protest 
against immigration raids across London. 
 Whose streets, whose place? 
 Our research has shown how anti-immigration campaigns can make 
people more fearful about immigration. Here we have explored how 
place matters within these processes. We began by looking at the 
specifi c places where the Go Home van circulated. In these London 
boroughs the van was not experienced in a vacuum, but rather was 
experienced and interpreted within other neighbourhood struggles 
and histories and, in conjunction with other anti-immigration inter-
ventions. So in Barking and Dagenham this fed into feelings of ‘us 
and them’ ( Anderson,  2013 ) – a division between migrants and non-
migrants. In Ealing and Hounslow, the van exacerbated frictions 
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within the South Asian population, while protests against it gave voice 
to an alternative perspective (see also Chapter  5 ). 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the places where the vans circulated and/
or posters had been displayed are the places where we found most 
street-level opposition to the campaigns. Just as Twitter was used as 
a space for Home Offi ce enforcement and was then reclaimed as a 
space for parody and organising (including the beginnings of this 
research project – see  Living Research Five ), in both Glasgow and 
Ealing and Hounslow protests sought to reclaim these localities 
through visible street protests. In Glasgow, this took the form of gath-
ering behind the campaign banner ‘Glasgow Campaign to Welcome 
Refugees’ and cheering on speakers who promoted the idea of 
Glasgow as a welcoming place. In protests in Ealing and Hounslow, 
Southall Black Sisters proclaimed ‘Whose streets? Our streets’. It 
should be emphasised that in both places these protests were not 
one-off events but came from networks with long-standing histories 
of protest and organising on immigration and refugee issues. Through 
these examples we can see how anti-immigration campaigns are not 
just rolled out over a fl at terrain but reverberate through particular 
places differently. 
 We also saw how Operation Vaken fed into ideas of nation. Primar-
ily and most notably we have explored here how an anti-anti-immi-
gration position was taken by the Scottish National Party (SNP) in 
the run up to the Scottish Independence Referendum. In this context 
the posters took on added meaning as symbols of an unwelcoming 
and remote Westminster-based Home Offi ce, highlighting the differ-
ence between a potential independent Scotland and the existing 
approach to immigration and asylum of the Westminster government. 
This did not unfold in the same way in Wales. Responses there had 
more in common with our Bradford and Birmingham case studies 
where the Operation Vaken campaign was seen as fanning the fl ames 
of racism and xenophobia but was not experienced as intensely as the 
places where the campaigns unfolded. 
 If we think of spaces as being continually produced, as suggested 
in the introduction to this chapter, we can also refl ect on how immi-
gration enforcement campaigns are a part of the production of space. 
They contribute to how space is practised ( Lefebvre,  1991 ) – the 
experience of seeing an anti-immigration van on your local high street 
and deciding to take a different route tomorrow. They feed into how 
offi cials conceive of and represent spaces; think of the van circulating 
in Barking and Dagenham, stirring up ill feeling and adding to the 
perception of those watching from afar of a divided community. But 
crucially they also produce new spaces and platforms for forms of 
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protest and the creation of other ideas of what specifi c locations could 
mean, resonating in the chant: ‘Whose streets? Our streets!’ 
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 Living Research Four: Ethics in 
uncomfortable research situations 
 The ethical bottom line for sociologists is, ‘fi rst, do no harm’. This 
can mean taking care that how we present our research does not 
add to raced, classed and gendered oppressions, and equally, avoid-
ing a well-meaning shrug and a response of ‘It ’ s complicated’. At its 
best, sociology takes seriously the personal, everyday struggles and 
inconsistencies of individuals; but it does this while also keeping in 
mind the larger structural forces that shape those everyday struggles 
and give them meaning. 
 Social life is nuanced and complicated, and capturing and repre-
senting this complexity in research is diffi cult. When producing our 
analysis we at least have time and space for refl ection, for multiple 
attempts to get it right (or to fail again, but fail better – following 
Samuel Beckett but also  Michael Keith ’ s  ( 2005 : 133) application of 
this formulation to social research). But we can face more immedi-
ate challenges in our data generation, which go beyond the ques-
tions of informed consent, anonymity, confi dentiality and fi delity to 
the data which are covered by most discussions of research ethics. 
Often in empirical research we can face unanticipated challenges of 
how to comport ourselves as researchers, and simply as human 
beings. 
 One example of such challenges in our project is illustrated by 
this extract from Emma ’ s fi eldnotes of a focus group she held in 
Glasgow with asylum seekers and refugees:
 Things got very emotional when the older woman from Zimbabwe 
started talking about her situation, including not being able to 
afford to repair her broken glasses that are held together with 
Sellotape, being refused a bus pass and most of all her separation 
from her children. She is in tears, as are two other members of 
the group and I am also blinking back tears trying to remain ‘the 
researcher’. I reach for the older woman ’ s hand and hold it for a 
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few minutes while she carries on talking. Her upset is laced with 
anger at the injustice of her situation. A few minutes later she 
describes the impossibility of her living situation and then looking 
me in the eye asks ‘ would you look after me in your house as well as you 
would look after yourself ?’ I am rather fl oored by this, even though 
it is a rhetorical question. But the message is, sympathy is not 
enough here. 
 (Emma ’ s fi eldnotes) 
 How would you behave in this situation? If you have been trained as 
a sociological researcher, you have probably thought about ques-
tions such as objectivity, positionality, reflexivity and rapport. But all 
of this training and reflection in advance cannot remove the discom-
fort and confusion from moments like this. Moments like this 
provoke questions about the practices we use to produce data, as 
well as the meanings of the data. They also, often, force us to think 
about what it means to be a researcher in these interpersonal situa-
tions. How you might behave in this situation depends on who you 
are, what you have experienced, and your personal and political 
beliefs, as well as your training as a researcher. 
 As anti-racist feminist researchers, we have not aimed for objectiv-
ity because it seems to us that this is always an illusion.  Objectivity is 
the idea that there is a single truth about the way the world exists, 
which researchers can aim to fi nd, without being biased by their own 
opinions, experiences or expectations. The idea that any interpreta-
tion of the world can be objective has been challenged by theorists 
who demonstrate that all knowledge is situated – that is, everything 
we know is informed by our ways of knowing, from the language we 
use to make sense of the world to the parts of the world we think 
are important or irrelevant (see e.g.  Haraway,  1991 ;  Rose,  1997 ). 
Instead, we have sought to recognise our  positionality – that is, to 
consider our own role in the research environment and generation 
of data, alongside the people we are studying. This means recognis-
ing that how researchers interpret the world is informed by our 
training as academic researchers in a particular discipline, who have 
read and been convinced by certain theories. It also means recognis-
ing that our infl uence on other people and the way we understand 
and interact with the world is informed by things other than our 
professional selves – for example, our gender, ethnicity, age, class, 
accent, the way we dress, the ways we talk to other people, the politi-
cal and ethical views we hold, our personal values, and our previous 
experiences. We believe this is true of all research, and so these 
elements need to be taken into account when we conduct research, 
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and when we analyse what our research encounters mean. This is 
what is meant by  refl exivity – not just acknowledging that everyone is 
positioned differently in relation to knowledge and power (much 
less, suggesting that as a result any interpretation is equally valid), 
but recognising that all knowledge is the product of specifi c rela-
tions in specifi c times and places, and that specifi city is part of the 
essence of understanding and making sense of research. 
 So what are the specifi cs of the interaction described in Emma ’ s 
fi eldnotes above, and how can we think about dealing with these 
kinds of moments as researchers? This was a situation in which a 
white British researcher employed by a university was in a room with 
a number of people of varying ethnicities and nationalities, all of 
whom had come to the UK to seek asylum; some of them had 
secured refugee status, others were still waiting to see if they would 
be allowed to stay and therefore very precarious in terms of their 
legal status, their living conditions and what they could expect in 
their future. Emma had not met the group before, though a worker 
from the community group with whom we were conducting the 
research was there too, and knew others in the group. Emma had 
explained the reasons for the research to everyone there, explained 
how we would use the data, asked for their permission to record the 
meeting and made it clear that they could withdraw if they wished. 
This is known in researcher jargon as gaining  informed consent and is 
partly a way of addressing power inequalities between researchers 
and those they research, by aiming to ensure that people being 
researched are willing and know what they are getting into. 
 Nevertheless, as a result of taking part in the research, the partici-
pant became visibly distressed, and explained a painful situation in 
which she still found herself. The researcher recorded this for use 
in her work (the story became data), while the participant herself 
would continue to have to live in this situation. The researcher was 
sympathetic and tried to express her sympathy (for example, by 
holding the participant ’ s hand), but then was ‘fl oored’ by the rec-
ognition of a direct challenge to the value of this sympathy when 
faced with the material conditions of their different situations. 
 The reason for pointing to this uneasiness in the research encoun-
ter is not to identify ways of (the researcher) being more comfort-
able with similar situations in future. Nor is the intention to put the 
researcher (or her feelings) at the centre of the situation, since the 
purpose of the event was to explore the experiences of the partici-
pants. Elsewhere in this book we have tried to show how we have 
listened to and analysed the experiences and data we gathered for 
our research, and situated these within wider social structures and 
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power relations. But here we think it might be helpful for other 
researchers who recognise these ‘uneasy’ situations we enter and 
provoke in our work, to think about what it means to practise 
research in this way – and to think about ways of acting in these very 
immediate situations when they occur. 
 There are a few more things to keep in mind when thinking about 
these uneasy research situations, and the ethics of bringing them 
about (however inadvertently), acting in the moment, and writing 
about them afterwards (see also  Dreher,  2009 ). First, the role of the 
social researcher is important. If Emma had been present at the focus 
group as someone who could help to fi x the research participant ’ s 
housing or immigration situation, she might have been of more prac-
tical help – but she would not have been able to document the longer-
term experiences of the group in the way she has as a researcher. One 
of the values of sociological research is to document social relations, 
to provide analysis of individual stories and wider trends, and to make 
the links between these. There is a value in this just as there is a value 
in the very different role of providing advocacy or support, and as long 
as it is made clear to participants  why  the researcher is doing what they 
do, this does not make the encounter ‘unethical’. 
 The notion of informed consent in research is important. Too 
often the practice of gaining consent is treated simply as a way of 
demonstrating the ‘good practice’ of the researcher. However, if it 
is meaningful, then the giving of consent and participation in the 
research is also a purposeful act by the research participant. Their 
choice to share their ideas and experiences with the researcher 
should be respected. In situations like the one described here, 
people are sharing their experience willingly, if not in conditions of 
their choosing (they might prefer, for example, not to have the kind 
of experiences that merit sharing in this way). Power inequalities are 
ever-present, but that does not mean that research participants, 
however vulnerable, should be treated as if they do not have their 
own agency and ability to make choices about sharing their lives – 
and, as in the example above, to question the situations in which 
they fi nd themselves, including the research situation. 
 We are not able to provide any easy solutions to how researchers 
‘should’ behave when such moments happen – except to suggest 
that they are important moments on which to refl ect, when power 
relations are sharpened or perhaps shift slightly. To this end, we have 
provided below some questions for researchers or aspiring research-
ers to refl ect on, which might help you to prepare for similar situa-
tions in your own fi eldwork. You might fi nd it helpful to discuss the 
questions below with others, particularly if they have different 
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experiences of research (or life) from yours. You could also think 
together about why your responses are different or similar, share 
similar experiences you have encountered in research, and ask the 
same questions of those situations with hindsight. 
 How would you respond in the situation described in Emma ’ s 
fi eldnotes? 
 Try to imagine the situation and place yourself in it rather 
than thinking about what the ‘right’ response might be. What 
would your immediate reaction be? How might others present 
react, both to the initial situation and your response? 
 How far do you think your response relates to your own 
presentation of self, and the ways others might perceive you? 
Might your reactions be perceived differently if you were a 
researcher of a different gender, ethnicity, nationality, class? 
How might previous personal relationships (or their absence) 
affect your possible response? 
 Finally, what effect might your possible response in these 
situations have on the data you could collect? Would it produce 
different data in terms of responses from participants? Would 
your feelings about the situation make it into your analysis – 
explicitly or otherwise? How far do you think the interaction 
itself is important to analyse? 
 You may also fi nd it useful to access an online video resource we 
have prepared based on another situation in our research, which 
raises similar questions. This can be found at  https://youtu.be/
GbvwuXOVLHI . 
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 Un/deserving migrants and resisting 
dehumanisation 
 Satwinder: Those that are good people should be given a visa and 
those who are bad people should be returned. 
 (Ealing and Hounslow focus group, conducted by Sukhwant) 
 Satwinder is someone who migrated to the UK, and who talked to us 
about the unfair treatment and prejudice she had received since doing 
so. Yet, her views seem close to the stance taken by the Immigration 
Minister Mark Harper, quoted in the opening to Chapter  2 . Satwinder 
spoke about herself as having ‘earned the right to live or settle in 
Britain’, and others as less deserving of that right. The difference from 
Harper ’ s ‘rational’ distinction (based on legal defi nition) is that here 
the distinction is being made on openly moral judgements of whether 
people are ‘good’ or ‘bad’. For Satwinder there are those ‘that are 
working’ (good) and there are those that ‘get caught up in drink and 
drugs and should not be here … women drinking and smoking’ (bad). 
A similar sentiment was echoed in a Bradford focus group by Nadia, 
an Iranian woman who had been settled in the UK for decades and 
now volunteers at a refugee and asylum seeker group. She said that 
perhaps it was good that the Go Home van scared some people:
 Nadia: But I think sometime maybe it ’ s good. Why I say that? I used 
to have a friend, and I haven ’ t seen her for years, she was Asian, 
Pakistani, she married another Asian, it took them years to call 
them here to get married, marriage took only 3 days, he used her 
3 days and after third days said, ‘I only married to come to this 
country’, and he just vanished. After 2 days they can ’ t fi nd him, 
so if for people like that I think it ’ s good. 
 (Bradford Focus Group, conducted by Hannah) 
 Though Nadia ’ s example might seem to be more closely concerned 
with the abuse of immigration rules than Satwinder ’ s, both women 
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emphasise morality rather than law: ‘for people like that I think it ’ s 
good’. What does it mean to draw such moral distinctions? What are 
the consequences? And how might we think about and understand 
the nature of such distinctions? In this chapter we will explore these 
questions by:
 1  extending the ideas presented in Chapters  2 and  3 on how moral 
judgements form part of a ‘postliberal’ politics, by discussing how 
our research participants positioned themselves within discourses 
of antipathy to (illegal) immigration 
 2  showing how many people judged as ‘bad migrants’ seek to portray 
themselves as valuable citizens deserving of respect and protec-
tion. They do this by pointing to other individuals who behave 
badly, and who thereby constitute the ‘real’ problem 
 3  identifying ways in which people targeted by immigration control, 
and anti-racist and migrants’ rights campaigners, have opened up 
debates about solidarity, belonging and deservingness in alterna-
tive and sometimes politically ambivalent ways 
 4  discussing how these perspectives have been used to develop 
forms of resistance to government anti-immigrant policies and 
rhetoric. 
 Devaluing migration 
 There has already been a great deal of academic analysis of the vili-
fi cation of certain, usually impoverished, groups of migrants in the 
context of the austerity agenda ( Hall,  2015 ), electoral politics ( Forkert, 
 2014 ), differentiated citizenship, nationalism and exclusionary dis-
courses of belonging ( Balibar,  2004 ;  Lentin and Titley,  2011 ;  Mez-
zadra and Nielson,  2013 ). Our aim in this chapter, however, is not 
simply to identify discourses of demonisation but to understand 
better the local and personal consequences of such discourses and 
some of the (often rebellious or contradictory) reactions to them. 
 The work of the migration researcher  Bridget Anderson  ( 2013 ) 
and the sociologist  Imogen Tyler  ( 2013 ) has provided us with a theo-
retical context for understanding this situation – a situation in which 
sharp distinctions are drawn between insiders and outsiders, and 
where belonging will always be precarious and conditional. Each 
scholar provides considerable food for thought on the links between 
the devaluing and segmentation of migrants into ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving’ and the scapegoating of other social groups, notably 
those existing at the margins of an ever-retracting welfare state: 
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benefi ts claimants, homeless people, single mums, sex workers and 
people with alcohol and drug dependency. 
 For Anderson, modern nation states are imagined as ‘communities 
of value’. By this, she is referring not so much to ‘British values’-type 
debates 1 but to the ways in which some citizens are seen to matter 
– to be of value – because of acting and existing in good and proper 
(valuable) ways. These ‘good citizens’ who are envisaged as ‘law-
abiding and hard-working members of stable and respectable families’ 
( Anderson,  2013 : 3) are then positioned by government, media and 
public discourses as being in need of external protection from Non-
Citizens (foreigners and migrants) and internal protection from 
Failed Citizens (‘benefi t scroungers’, paedophiles, rioters, criminals, 
etc.) ( Anderson,  2013 : 4). However, in reality, citizenship – even for 
the ‘good citizen’ – is not a natural and secured right: it is always a 
contingent relationship between a state and an individual, held open 
and differentiated along lines including race, class, gender, sexuality, 
disability and employment status ( Anderson,  2013 ). 
 Anderson also argues that the recent waves of anti-immigrant 
hostility have relied on notions of a ‘fantasy citizenship’, in which new 
‘rights’ – such as the ‘right’ to rent and the ‘right’ to work – have been 
named in public policy as if these actually mean something for 
national citizens (rather than being dependent on economic means, 
education and skills, or discrimination). According to  Anderson 
 ( 2015 ), the purpose has been to strengthen distinctions between those 
who hold national citizenship and those who do not. In other words, 
‘fantasy rights’ conjured up by the state rely on the exclusion and 
demonisation of others. Moreover, this scapegoating operates within 
both neoliberal and postliberal frames which value (in a moral sense) 
those citizens who create exchange value. That is, those who are pro-
ductive and aspirational (as good neoliberal subjects), and/or who fi t 
conservative social norms of good behaviour (as good postliberal 
subjects), bearing in mind that even such behaviour may not be 
 1 Claims to ‘British values’ have dominated debate about belonging and 
citizenship in Britain during the period of this study. They are often vague 
and disputed – particularly the idea that such values are exclusively 
British, or have been maintained historically or universally by Britain – 
but are defi ned, for example, in the guidelines for how such values must 
now be taught in schools, as values of ‘democracy, the rule of law, indi-
vidual liberty, and mutual respect for and tolerance of those with different 
faiths and beliefs and for those without faith’ ( Ofsted,  2015 : 36; see also 
 House of Lords Hansard,  2014 ). 
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enough given postliberal pessimism about cultural difference (see 
Chapter  3 ). Such framings have little use for those who are deemed 
economically unproductive or are seen to be unable to adapt to living 
in British society (learning English, etc.) – and they are often framed 
as a burden on limited resources. This is what  Gavan Titley and Alana 
Lentin  ( 2011 ) term ‘good vs. bad diversity’. The bad migrant is 
located within a neoliberal frame that holds individuals (their morals, 
character and behaviour) responsible for poverty and inequality 
rather than structures and institutions ( Rose,  1999 ). Social problems 
are passed off as the responsibility of individuals, and state interven-
tion focuses on individual self-improvement and criminalisation 
rather than structural change. 
 It is important to note that these classifi cations are also highly 
gendered. Anderson ’ s ‘good citizen’ combines the good behaviour 
expected of the modern liberal subject with traditional gender roles 
(the dutiful wife, the loving mother, the protective and providing 
husband – as we saw in Nadia ’ s comments above, and Sara ’ s reactions 
discussed in Chapter  1 ). At the same time the ‘Non-Citizen’ and the 
‘Failed Citizen’ are depicted as uncivilised and parochial, epitomised 
by the caricature of the immigrant who has too many children in order 
to manipulate the welfare benefi ts system ( Anderson,  2013 : 7). 
 In her book  Revolting Subjects  ( 2013 ), Imogen Tyler identifi es the 
affective and embodied dimensions of these characterisations of the 
modern state as reliant on the production of ‘abject subjects’ such as 
Travellers, asylum seekers and unemployed youth (2013: 4), who are 
identifi ed as outsiders, so that others can be considered insiders. Tyler 
argues that, by producing disgust and repulsion towards a set of 
people who are made to seem abject (‘revolting subjects’), govern-
ments encourage populations to align themselves as ‘good citizens’ 
against these ‘revolting subjects’, and thereby the limits of their own 
access to rights and citizenship are obscured. In developing these 
ideas, Tyler draws on the psychoanalytic concept of abjection, in 
particular Julia Kristeva ’ s  Powers of Horror  ( 1982 ) – whereby the 
abject is a threat to meaning, identity and the social order, breaking 
down the distinction between self and other. A response to the abject 
is hatred and disgust. Kristeva had developed these ideas to under-
stand xenophobia in  Strangers to Ourselves  ( 1991 ) as the ‘prickly 
passions aroused by the intrusion of the “other” in the homogeneity 
of … a group’ ( Kristeva,  1991 : 41). The ‘other’ then functions as a 
‘constitutive outside’: people defi ne their belonging by contrasting 
themselves with the ‘other’ or ‘outsider’ who does not belong. If we 
consider this in relation to postliberalism (as discussed in Chapter  3 ), 
this can help us understand the impulse of policy-makers to pay 
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attention to these sorts of ‘prickly passions’ about immigration, rather 
than cold statistics about the benefi ts of immigration to the economy. 
The performance of coercion, as discussed in Chapter  2 , is seen as 
an effective way of drawing attention to an outsider against whom 
people can defi ne themselves, in order to feel more securely ‘inside’ 
the nation. 
 In the following discussion, we consider the ways in which some 
migrants and people from racially minoritised backgrounds responded 
to Home Offi ce immigration campaigns by talking about and devalu-
ing ‘others’ in order to legitimate their own presence. We explore how 
people who feel devalued may use and reinforce pre-existing social 
classifi cations and divisions in order to gain value and respectability 
for themselves, and legitimise their own claims to citizenship. In par-
ticular, we consider the manner in which they make use of distinctions 
between types of migrants or migration in their interactions with 
others in order to escape the kinds of disgust associated with groups 
maligned by dominant discourses. 
 Deserving citizenship and dis-identifying from the 
‘bad’ migrant 
 A number of people we spoke to in the course of our research framed 
their own right to be in the UK (i.e. their sense of themselves as 
deserving citizens or good migrants) through recourse to narratives 
about work ethics and economic productivity:
 Kirsten: Do you feel that [your organisation] is affected by negative 
media coverage and if so how? 
 Nader: Yeah, [our organisation] of course is affected by it because 
all the members – or most of them … are failed asylum seekers 
… The media ruined the reputation of asylum seekers in this 
country. They made the asylum seeker look like he is a criminal. 
Asylum seeker is not a crime … We are innocent people who 
came here to seek refuge. Just give us refuge. Give us our rights. 
Our rights is not money. We don ’ t want money. We don ’ t want 
support, we don ’ t want housing. Give us the right of at least to 
work and I will support myself and all – I think most of the asylum 
seekers would do the same … I will work, I will rent, I will pay 
my contribution to the community, I will pay my tax, I will pay 
my rent, I will pay my Council Tax, I ’ ll buy a car, I ’ ll get a job, 
I ’ ll be helpful for the community I ’ m living in. I will integrate. 
 (Coventry Activist Interview, conducted by Kirsten) 
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 Here Nader, an activist and an asylum seeker who was not allowed 
to work, was responding defensively to a news story in the  Coventry 
Telegraph  about the 2014 Immigration Bill (now law), and how immi-
gration rhetoric and legislation position immigrants as not contribut-
ing to society. As part of this emphasis on ‘making a contribution’, he 
appeals for recognition and empathy on the basis of independence 
from state welfare. For example, when describing an encounter with 
a woman who believed that refugees were given free phones, cars etc., 
Nader emphasised that they were not in the UK for the welfare 
system:
 We are not here to seek support, we are here to seek asylum, we are 
here to seek refuge, a safe place to live, but we can depend on our-
selves and contribute to the community and work and pay our 
contribution. 
 (Coventry Activist Interview, conducted by Kirsten) 
 Some research participants used this ‘model migrant’ stereotype of 
hyper-productivity to validate themselves, but they also used it as a 
way of resisting a dominant narrative that derides ‘illegal immigrants’ 
as burdens on the taxpayer ( Yukich,  2013 ). Neesha, quoted below, is 
a second-generation Indian woman who was defending ‘illegal’ immi-
grants as part of her wider rebuttal of the racism of Home Offi ce 
immigration campaigns. However, her defence of ‘illegal’ immigrants 
relied on the characterisation of some white British people as lazy and 
dependent on benefi ts. Her comments contained expressions of 
disgust for the assumed characteristics of the ‘benefi t scrounger’ 
(namely idleness, smoking, drinking and use of drugs):
 Neesha: White people don ’ t work as hard as our own do … I think 
the government are emphasising the fact that it ’ s illegal but not 
the fact they [immigrants] are working. The message they should 
actually show is that this person is working, not that they are 
sitting at home, smoking god knows how many fags a day and 
drinking cans of beer and on drugs … why don ’ t they focus on 
the people who ’ ve been signing on and doing sweet ‘F’ anything 
for 20 years who say yes, I ’ m not gonna work because I ’ m better 
off on benefi ts? They are targeting people who are working, they 
may be illegal but they are working, they are contributing. 
 (Ealing and Hounslow Focus Group, conducted by Sukhwant) 
 Neesha ’ s reaction suggests the degree to which government immi-
gration campaigns are inciting and exacerbating division, pitting 
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excluded groups against each other. A defence of one excluded 
social group (the ‘illegal immigrant’) deploys moral judgements 
about the presumed lifestyles of other excluded groups (the benefi t 
claimant). However, this is a dangerous position. Arguments about 
hard work, entrepreneurship and non-dependence on the state can 
also potentially play into the xenophobic charge that immigration 
is undercutting the ‘white working class’ by working in exploita-
tive conditions that British people would not accept. This is the 
basis of many anti-immigration messages (e.g.  Field,  2014 ) and 
was one mobilised to great effect during the 2016 EU referendum 
campaign. 
 ‘Good citizenship’ is also seen to be embodied within certain 
behaviours, while other behaviours are seen as marking one as unfi t 
for being a responsible citizen. Sometimes even smoking cigarettes 
and drinking alcohol could become potent signs of the undeserving 
citizen, and participants made assumptions about other people ’ s 
immigration status solely on the basis of perceived ‘bad behaviour’, 
as Satwinder does here:
 There are a lot of men … in the area that … are paying money and 
coming here. And they are now in situations where they are taking 
drugs or alcohol. They are getting high and there are young women 
that are also getting into trouble or getting into bad ways. And this 
is a problem. So when people no longer have a visa, they should go. 
 (Ealing and Hounslow Focus Group, conducted by Sukhwant) 
 As with other participants we have heard from in this chapter, 
Satwinder associated undeserving groups with criminality, illicit sex, 
theft and, in extreme cases, terrorism. Historically, these behaviours 
have been associated with people in vulnerable or dependent posi-
tions: ‘racialised others, women, slaves, children, beggars, and those 
who were not able-bodied or those of “unsound mind” ’ ( Anderson 
 2013 : 96). The good liberal citizen has also historically been framed 
in relation to a particular temperament, defi ned against the less desir-
able temperament of the migrant or the colonised other, who are often 
depicted as irrational, hot-tempered and superstitious. Such charac-
terisations of temperament were also apparent within our focus group 
discussions where people who were seen as undeserving of the right 
to be in the UK were characterised as bad people not only in relation 
to a lack of productivity but also in relation to personality fl aws, 
notably insincerity, manipulation, unreasonable behaviour and a bad 
temper. 
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 Eastern Europeans were repeatedly singled out and characterised 
as being deceptive. For instance, Zimbabwean participants in a focus 
group in Glasgow described Eastern Europeans as ‘naughty’, ‘stealing 
and fi ghting’ and ‘begging’, and argued that ‘they don ’ t work’ and are 
‘playing the system’. Some participants in the Bradford focus group 
of refugees and asylum seekers from around the world were anxious 
to know what had been said about them in the focus group with 
Eastern European migrants. Yet in the focus group with Eastern Euro-
pean migrants, the claims to respectability, and attempts to distance 
oneself from disrepute, were very similar:
 Hannah: I just wanted to ask what you think of that picture [of the 
Go Home van]? 
 Lukas: Actually [what] they are saying is, they don ’ t feel like illegal 
here now we are in the Eastern European, eastern Europe, and 
we are legal, can work, and … 
 Hannah: Yes, no, and I ’ m not saying that that ’ s – for you … 
 Lukas: They say just that these people supposed to go home, who 
is stealing, making problems, who are not working … They are 
here for the work, to work, that ’ s why they come here. She would 
do any job, she can ’ t get job, she would do any job. 
 (Bradford Focus Group, conducted by Hannah, 
English–Slovak interpreter (Lukas)) 
 Through the interpreter, this group of mainly Slovakian nationals 
(and EU citizens) made clear that they were aware of their citizenship 
rights in the UK, and that the injunction to ‘go home’ could not now 
be legally applied to them. Nevertheless, they still felt their ability to 
be seen as part of the ‘community of value’ as somewhat tenuous. 
They insisted on their desire to work and provide for themselves; 
acting as ‘guardians of good citizenship’ ( Anderson,  2013 : 6), they 
contrasted themselves with others, ‘who is stealing, making problems, 
who are not working’. Similarly, some of the women that participated 
in the Ealing and Hounslow focus groups (of South Asian, African 
and Caribbean origin), suggested that Eastern Europeans were benefi t 
cheats. It seemed that for some participants, the simple act of access-
ing one ’ s legal entitlement to welfare benefi ts could be construed as 
fraudulent behaviour. 
 As Bradford and Ealing and Hounslow activists noted, many of 
these distinctions settled on top of the unfi nished business of histori-
cal and contemporary political tensions within local communities 
(see also Chapter  4 ). In particular, they pointed to existing schisms 
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between Sikhs and Muslims, between Asians and newly arrived Roma 
communities, between Asians and Somalis. These communitarian 
schisms were criss-crossed by numerous nation and local dynamics. 
For example, there were also the divisive tactics of Muslim funda-
mentalist mobilisations on the one hand and of the government ’ s ‘war 
on terror’ agenda on the other. These dynamics played out alongside 
racialised class politics which stirred up resentment among poor white 
communities by pointing to ‘immigrants’ in general as the reason for 
lack of jobs, housing or prospects, while long-term disinvestment in 
post-industrial areas such as Bradford, Coventry and elsewhere was 
ignored (see also  Haylett,  2001 ). 
 We also heard how assumptions about migrants being morally 
unsound could be a part of institutional decisions. In the following 
extract, John, a Birmingham migrant rights advocate, talks about the 
culture of disbelief within the asylum system and social care responses 
to asylum seekers and refugees, by describing his struggle to get a 
mental health assessment for an Iranian asylum seeker who was suf-
fering post-traumatic disorder due to experiencing torture and sexual 
abuse in prison:
 John: We were asking for a mental health assessment [of an asylum 
seeker] and Mental Health Services told him, without even having 
met the asylum seeker, that ‘we ’ ll meet with him but he ’ s probably 
putting it on for his asylum claim’. 
 (Birmingham Activist Interview, conducted by Kirsten) 
 The perception that asylum seekers are faking or exaggerating mental 
health problems in order to support their asylum claims, in line with 
media stereotypes of the ‘bogus asylum seeker’ ( Smart et al.,  2005 ; 
 Thomas,  2012 ), has real consequences: a UK citizen with symptoms 
of mental distress is seen to be in genuine need, but the signs of pain 
or emotional distress for an asylum seeker are suspected of being 
fabricated. 
 You will now have a sense of the ways in which distinctions between 
migrants can be drawn in everyday conversations. However, we felt 
that it was not suffi cient to conclude that people have simply inter-
nalised and are reproducing dominant messages about the untrust-
worthiness of (other) migrants, refugees or asylum seekers. One way 
of understanding what can be at work in these discourses is to con-
sider them in relation to the sociologist  Beverley Skeggs ’ s work on 
value and respectability ( 1997 ,  2014 ). In particular, we think it worth-
while to consider Skeggs ’ s exploration of the ways in which working-
class women from the North-East of England attempted to distance 
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themselves from their class by talking down other groups. Here is one 
of Skeggs ’ s research participants talking about other working-class 
women:
 You know, you see them walking around town, dead fat, greasy hair, 
smelly clothes, dirty kids, you know the type, crimplene trousers 
and all, you know the type, I ’ d never be like that.  
 (Therese, quoted in  Skeggs,  1997 : 83) 
 Such responses exist in a context where being working-class is seen 
both as shameful, especially when applied to women, ‘as used to 
signify everything that is dirty, dangerous and without value’ ( Skeggs, 
 1997 : 74) and as a form of judgement and categorisation, ‘trying to 
fi t people into pigeonholes’ as one of her respondents put it ( Skeggs, 
 1997 : 77). The disparagement of others was a way in which the 
women could defend themselves from a dominant discourse that 
devalues them, and yet they could not entirely disconnect themselves 
from others because of the material reality of their class position. 
 Unsurprisingly, the claims for legitimacy we heard tended to be 
couched within the terms of the dominant discourse. Yet, because of 
the racialisation of discourses on immigration (see Chapter  6 ), the 
continued prevalence of racism and the material realities of the 
research participants’ class positions, it was not necessarily possible 
for the people making these claims to escape the group identities that 
they appeared to be talking down. As we will discuss in the next 
section, a number of people we spoke to in the course of our research 
also pushed against these deserving/undeserving distinctions. 
 ‘Values beyond value’? Resisting 
anti-immigrant messaging 
 While some people we spoke with expressed their claims to belonging 
through appeals to individualised neoliberal values of productivity 
and aspiration, others resisted these values and reached instead for 
– to use Skeggs ’ s phrase – ‘values beyond (exchange) value’ ( 2014 ). 
Seemingly banal comments about warmth, hospitality and love could 
be profound in a context where migrants were struggling against 
the daily strictures of immigration controls that are material, social 
and emotional. The following participants highlighted examples of 
everyday acts of kindness that had impacted positively on their own 
or other migrants’ sense of self-worth, serving to resist or subvert 
dehumanisation:
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 Mary: And what I can say, it ’ s a tough, very, very tough, asylum life 
here, it ’ s horrible … but I ’ m lucky … I fi nd warm and honest 
friend, British, in Birmingham … well I can say I like it, my city, 
and I love the British because they have honest people and good 
friend, very, very good friend, and look after me … I appreciate 
everything single one who support me, this city. 
 (Birmingham Focus Group, conducted by Kirsten) 
 Wendy: We ’ ve had other occasions where someone ’ s arrived and 
have spoken hardly any English and neighbours … they bring 
them down to our organisation. They don ’ t particularly want to 
get involved themselves but they just happen to know that we ’ re 
there … and they turn up with them and say, ‘We thought that 
they should know about your organisation.’ So there are some 
marvellous acts of kindness actually. 
 (Bradford Activist Interview, conducted by Hannah) 
 Adam: There ’ s one very interesting thing I fi nd about Cardiff, you 
walk on the streets and people tell you ‘good morning’ in Cardiff 
… A woman told me ‘good morning’ this morning as well … It ’ s 
good for you to be around good people. That someone to tell you 
‘good morning, good morning’ it ’ s good. 
 (Cardiff Focus Group, conducted by Roiyah) 
 In a sense these thoughts and experiences are part of an attempt to 
rehumanise social relations against a torrent of government interven-
tions that are profoundly dehumanising. Some people went further 
than describing existing acts of kindness, to suggest that a wholly 
different type of politics was needed:
 Mosef: If I was gonna change that [Go Home van] poster I ’ d have 
a poster saying love is the strongest emotion. Love don ’ t fear. 
 (Cardiff Focus Group, conducted by Roiyah) 
 Lukas: He say it ’ s no matter if you from Bangladesh, if you from 
India, or Czech Republic or Slovakia, with love! You can treat 
everything. You love somebody – or – treat somebody with love. 
It ’ s completely different. There wouldn ’ t be things like this. 
 (Bradford Focus Group, conducted by Hannah, English–Slovak 
interpreter (Lukas)) 
 More practically perhaps, participants at the Glasgow focus group 
suggested that anti-immigrant sentiment could be tackled by, for 
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instance, creating space for people to tell their stories and be heard 
by decision-makers, forcing politicians into more empathetic responses:
 Rose: I think if you can call that Theresa May, say to come down 
here [thumps table], we want to talk to her nicely, not badly, nicely. 
 Immaculate: Or to ask her what do you think about people who left 
their families more than ten years ago … 
 Rose: I would suggest you have the next plan maybe in the future, 
you publish this information, article, and public event, I would 
suggest would be better if you invite some maybe speaker or some 
other people to share their stories, quite important and very live 
for people, make a very big impact on people. 
 (Glasgow Focus Group, conducted by Emma) 
 Other parts of the same focus group conversation provided insights 
into possible ways out of this all-pervading anti-immigrant rhetoric. 
These surfaced when some in the group wanted to distinguish them-
selves from the alcohol and drug users with whom they shared hostels 
and were challenged by another participant:
 Rose: I says to them, ‘Please do something, put us in grades not to 
put asylum seekers together with the alcoholics, we are not like 
them, we don ’ t do wrong to people, we are nice people.’ 
 Immaculate: Not just the drug addicts they are all just alcoholics. 
 Rose: Both, drug addicts and alcoholics. 
 (Glasgow Focus Group, conducted by Emma) 
 As with many of the examples discussed in the previous section, Rose 
and Immaculate seemed to judge the addictions of other residents, 
while simultaneously making a bid not to have their hard-fought-for 
asylum claims tarnished by the behaviour of other hostel residents. 
However, in response to this, Sirvan observed that passing moral 
judgements on other people ’ s problems or circumstances involves 
validation of the same logic that informs Home Offi ce anti-immigrant 
campaigns:
 Sirvan: See my understanding, if you make, say we are different 
with them, so that ’ s the base of the things that they do, they said, 
‘We are better than you’ … See if we do this it ’ s discrimination, 
make you … that ’ s why they do discrimination against us, they 
say ‘we are better than you’, if you say ‘we are better than other 
people’ that ’ s the same principle. 
 (Glasgow Focus Group, conducted by Emma) 
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 For Sirvan, asylum seekers saying ‘we are better than you’ to addicts 
is a repetition of the same pattern of discrimination whereby asylum 
seekers and refugees are treated as lesser humans by others. Similarly, 
while discussing an image of the Go Home van, Grace problematised 
the distinctions being made by her peers between migrants arriving 
through different routes and with different visa statuses:
 Grace: Even some of my friends said that immigrants should ‘go 
home’. They say ‘I ’ m not talking about you, but let them go – the 
Eastern Europeans’. It ’ s not like that, they can ’ t say they ’ re not 
talking about me, they are talking about me – we are all in the 
same boat, you can ’ t just say ‘you ’ re okay’ [and others are not]. 
 (Bradford Feedback Session, conducted by Hannah) 
 Echoing Martin Niemöller ’ s famous poem ‘First they came …’ 
( Niemöller,  1946 ), Grace argued that, if the Home Offi ce started by 
targeting irregular migrants, they would soon come after others. She 
suggests the possibility of solidarity between different groups of 
people who are treated as a social problem, rather than the approach 
of seeking a more abject group against whom to defi ne oneself as 
more deserving. 
 Interestingly, many participants emphasised the connection 
between generating alternative values and pro-immigrant protest. The 
starting point for some participants was a stand against apathy – the 
need for people to actually believe that they can change the terms of 
the debate. Within most of the focus groups, participants talked at 
some point about the need for local people to self-organise in order 
to defend the migrants in their area. For instance, while talking about 
the impact of the poster campaigns in Glasgow, Sirvan made the fol-
lowing point:
 we could stop this campaign … encourage people to participate in 
the community and their organisation to fi ght for our rights. 
 (Glasgow Focus Group, conducted by Emma) 
 In Bradford, on learning of the Go Home van for the fi rst time, 
Aminata also suggested alternative direct action that might engage in 
– and shift – the terms of the performative politics of immigration 
control, by putting the ideas of home and belonging in question and 
erasing the illusion of a simplistic answer to immigration debates:
 Aminata: Yes, I said like these people doing it, their van, ‘go home’. 
Like the Red Cross or the Refugee Council or World Health 
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Organisation, they can make their own van to protect the asylum 
seekers, to say, ‘I don ’ t have home’. 
 (Bradford Focus Group, conducted by Hannah) 
 The values base of pro-immigrant protest 
 During our research we observed many calls to action, street protests 
and demonstrations. These ranged from spur-of-the-moment activi-
ties to those involving detailed planning and preparation; from tactical 
engagements with the politics of performance to more traditional 
actions rooted in histories of labour and other liberation movements; 
and from those engaging with neoliberal logics of economics to post-
liberal logics of morality, to those which suggested an alternative logic 
of social justice. 
 Alongside, and linked to, these on-the-ground activities, at a 
national level, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants and 
Movement Against Xenophobia ’ s ‘#IAmAnImmigrant’ campaign 
brought together myth-busting information and individual testimo-
nies in the runup to the 2015 General Election (see also Chapter  6 ). 
The campaign comprised photographs of fi fteen people introducing 
themselves and the contribution they had made to society, and declar-
ing themselves to be immigrants, displayed on 440 billboards across 
the London Underground and another 550 at railway stations across 
the country. The popularity of the campaign was demonstrated by the 
fact that over £50,000 was raised through crowd funding within a 
matter of weeks to fund this public advertising. Thousands of people 
have now used the hashtag to share photographs of these posters, 
which carry short testimonies of people who at some point migrated 
to the UK and have been involved in improving the quality of others’ 
lives – a nurse, a fi reman, a teacher and a lawyer are among those 
depicted. In addition, many members of the public have taken up the 
invitation to add their own story to their website in a similar format. 2 
In putting a ‘human face’ to the fi gure of the immigrant, this cam-
paign has been seen as important for rehumanising the debate about 
migration and emphasising the contributions being made by migrants 
in relation to the economy but also in relation to civil society and 
social welfare. 
 We would also suggest that there are limits to how far such a 
framing challenges the underlying logic of a distinction between good 
 2  See  www.iamanimmigrant.net/my-story . 
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and bad migrants, or deserving and undeserving citizens that we have 
discussed in this chapter. It fi gures the poster boys and girls of the 
campaign as human and relatable (see Chapter  6 ), but on the basis 
of their contribution to society, rather than their existence as fellow 
human beings. Nevertheless, it is a pragmatic response to the per-
formative politics of stigmatisation, using the same tools of perfor-
mance to attempt to create a (post?)-political space in which the 
consensus that might be reached is one about the human face of ‘the 
immigrant’. 
 Elsewhere, we have seen that while the Westminster postliberal 
consensus has seemingly rejected the neoliberal idea that the eco-
nomic contribution of individual migrants has any weight in political 
debate (see Chapter  3 ), there are ways in which campaigns based on 
economic arguments have infl uenced aspects of the ‘hostile environ-
ment’. Hot on the heels of the decision not to extend Operation Vaken, 
there was stiff opposition to the coalition government ’ s 2013 proposal 
to introduce £3,000 ‘visa bonds’ for applications by those entering 
the UK from six specifi c countries – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Nigeria and Ghana – identifi ed as at ‘high risk’ of overstaying 
their visa. Jasjit, an activist in Ealing and Hounslow (interviewed by 
Sukhwant), explained that these proposals were dropped because a 
number of government departments – including the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Offi ce, the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills and the Department for Communities and Local Government 
– expressed their opposition, and the then Deputy Prime Minister 
Nick Clegg threatened to veto the plans. Politicians who had otherwise 
been silent on the development of the Home Secretary ’ s ‘hostile envi-
ronment’ raised concerns about the implications for a government 
courting trade relations with India and Nigeria. While the attempt to 
discuss migrant contributions to the national economy have lost 
favour in political debate, within diplomatic circles it still seems that 
money talks. 
 In more on-the-ground political protests, some of our participants 
had themselves been involved in demonstrations. In response to an 
image of people opposing the poster campaign in Glasgow, Immacu-
late noted that people subject to immigration rules are at the forefront 
of protests against the government ’ s communications:
 Immaculate: At the moment there ’ s a group of asylum seekers and 
refugees they ’ re actually going to the Home Offi ce campaigning 
in front every week, they have just decided they ’ re not any organi-
sation to support them, they ’ re doing it on their own, they are 
doing it every week now, and they said they won ’ t stop. They will 
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be there every week in front of the Home Offi ce, whether it ’ s one 
or two turn up, they are going to do every week. 
 (Glasgow Focus Group, conducted by Emma) 
 Manoj, a London activist who works for an anti-racist advocacy 
project (interviewed by Sukhwant), described how the contribu-
tions of immigrants to the economy were made visible in a more 
oppositional and grassroots-led way, in the community resistance of 
2013 that came to be known as ‘the Chinatown shutdown’. After 
Home Offi ce Enforcement teams increased the intensity of their 
‘fi shing raids’ looking for migrants working illegally in businesses in 
London ’ s Chinatown, concerns were raised about both the racial 
profi ling of the Chinese community and the impact on Chinese busi-
nesses. This gave rise to a broad-based resistance that included busi-
nesses, anti-racists and cultural organisations, whereby staff in 
restaurants throughout Chinatown closed their businesses and took 
to the streets to protest about the heavy-handed immigration raids, 
on 22 October 2013. 
 Other activists sought to reorient the discussion to address those 
issues that are veiled by anti-immigrant rhetoric because, as the politi-
cal scientist Shamit  Saggar  ( 2004 ) has argued, immigration is often 
a proxy for other concerns. As discussed in previous chapters (see 
especially Chapter  2 ), we held a focus group in Dagenham with 
people who identifi ed themselves as British National Party (BNP) 
supporters. Their discussion suggests how immigration becomes the 
empty signifi er into which people pour a range of concerns and com-
plaints, such as those relating to housing needs, cuts to the National 
Health Service, health and social care, local authority accountability 
and the contracting out of local council services. Notably these were 
all concerns about the distribution and management of public goods. 
Moreover, it was clear from the speakers at a September 2013 dem-
onstration outside the Glasgow reporting centre (Emma ’ s fi eldnotes), 
that focusing political resistance back on to jobs, housing and health 
has been an important angle for counter-mobilisations. This was also 
the cornerstone of the response by Gary, a leading trade union activist 
in London, who argued that counter-messaging should focus on 
getting behind the immigration façade and focusing on those other 
concerns:
 Gary: We ’ re trying to come up with a project which looks at trying 
to change the nature of the debate that we have around migration 
to focus instead on, if you like, shifting the blame. So migrants 
are getting blamed for various things and people see migrants as 
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a problem. So what you do is try and come up with ways of 
shifting the blame for migration from migrants to other people 
… [For example] it ’ s not the fault of migrants that there are these 
problems. It ’ s the fault of employers. Because what employers are 
doing is using migrants to exploit their labour. It ’ s not the fault 
of migrants because there ’ s problems about access to local ser-
vices, for two reasons. One, migrants are providing local services 
and it ’ s easy to fi nd [evidence for that]. And secondly … services 
are under pressure because they ’ re getting cut … Because from 
our perspective, migration is a proxy issue. Yeah, there ’ s a level 
of racism there and xenophobia but the real concern about people 
when you hear them talk about migration is they don ’ t just talk 
about immigrants, they talk about immigrants in relation to 
getting jobs, getting access to services, getting housing. 
 (London Activist Interview, conducted by Sukhwant) 
 Gary suggested that solidarities between newly arrived migrants and 
racially minoritised citizens who are settled in Britain will inevitably 
arise because the latter will be affected by the same ‘hostile environ-
ment’, as landlords and employers decide to ‘play it safe’ by discrimi-
nating against non-white applicants to avoid falling foul of the 
Immigration Act 2014 and Immigration Bill 2015–16, which make 
private landlords liable for checking the visa or settlement status of 
their tenants. However, he argued that, beyond this coincidence of 
concerns, solidarities need to be actively mobilised and produced by 
identifying shared experiences of exploitation and material conditions 
across racial divides.
 Gary: At the moment, what you have is very similar kinds of exploi-
tation but this barrier that comes down … well yeah, you ’ re 
getting exploited but that ’ s fi ne because you ’ re a migrant, I ’ m 
getting exploited but that ’ s not okay because I ’ m a Brit … One 
of the potentials for me is … to [show] people that their stories 
are very similar. 
 (London Activist Interview, conducted by Sukhwant) 
 Gary argues for changing the conversation from one that continues to 
be located within the neoliberal frame of productivity to one that coun-
ters anti-immigrant sentiment from an anti-racist and socialist per-
spective. Others recognised the value of revisiting histories of racism 
and colonialism to revive historical solidarities, particularly within local 
areas where anti-racist mobilisations have been linked to a defence of 
immigration and public welfare services (see also Chapter  4 ). 
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 Participants in many of our focus groups made connections 
between the treatment of asylum seekers and the legacy of colonial-
ism, particularly the double standards in terms of the presence and 
treatment of British people in other countries, as compared to the 
hostility faced in the UK:
 Parveena: I ’ m from India, they ruled my country for 250 years, and 
they have taken everything. I wouldn ’ t say that all our population 
are coming here, people who are in need are coming here, then 
why don ’ t they give the hospitality for the people? 
 (Birmingham Focus Group, conducted by Kirsten) 
 Amadou: In other parts of the world, in the foreign countries if these 
people or any foreign people come, they respect them. And they 
treat them more than as a guest. 
 Mohammed: Why don ’ t they treat us the same? 
 (Birmingham Focus Group, conducted by Kirsten) 
 When participants conceptualised issues in these ways, it seemed to 
us that they were moving beyond either the neoliberal (economic) or 
postliberal (moralistic) framing of immigration. In a way they were 
politicising and historicising the valuing of warmth, hospitality and 
love described earlier by Mary, Wendy, Adam, Mosef and others. If 
there is a moralistic element to this politics, it is not the call to ‘respect-
ability’ of postliberalism but a call for fairness and justice, for taking 
into account the historical injustices of colonialism and capitalism that 
have led to the current geopolitics of migration. 
 As with the women who came together at Southall Black Sisters to 
protest against immigration enforcement raids (see Chapter  4 ), it was 
clear from the local area studies that voluntary-sector contexts, or 
simply spaces to discuss these issues, could facilitate the ability to 
think of ‘values beyond [exchange] value’, to return to Skeggs ’ s term, 
and build networks of solidarity that could help to translate these 
values into action, and counter the tendency to pit groups of people 
against each other. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have argued for the importance of contextualising 
narratives of deservingness by situating them within wider social set-
tings. Our fi ndings suggest that, as migration is devalued, claims to 
economic productivity are increasingly used to validate citizenship 
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and to talk down other groups, so that work, aspiration, productivity 
and conformity with socially conservative behaviour codes have 
increasingly become proxies for nationalism, rights and belonging. In 
addition, the recourse to a fantasy citizenship based on a continually 
recalibrated array of distinctions and entitlements is a way of negotiat-
ing and often sidestepping existing differentiation in citizenship on 
the basis of race, gender, sexuality, disability and class. 
 Our research has also shown that anti-immigration messages from 
government and the media are not simply internalised. Some of the 
people we interviewed resisted anti-immigration messaging by coun-
tering the imperative for people to pit themselves against each other 
on the basis of their immigration status or nationality. The organisa-
tions they belonged to often created the space for these discussions 
to take place. Most importantly, recoupling debates on racism and 
immigration control seemed to help to challenge distinctions between 
deserving and undeserving migrants, as in the connections between 
colonial histories and the current geopolitics of migration control 
drawn by Parveena, Amadou and Mohammed. Protest actions both 
real (the SBS street protest, the Chinatown Shutdown, #IAmAnIm-
migrant) and imagined (the ‘I don ’ t have a home’ van Aminata 
describes, the ‘fi ght for our rights’ Sirvan imagines) can help create 
solidarity across national, ethnic and class lines. The appeal to recog-
nition of the worthwhile character of (some) migrants as productive 
neoliberal subjects of the #IAmAnImmigrant campaign contrasted 
with the more traditional trade-union-inspired politics of a with-
drawal of labour and demonstration of power in the Chinatown 
Shutdown. Yet both can be seen as attempts to counter the postpo-
litical and postliberal politics of immigration control (see Chapters  2 
and  3 ) with alternative performances. Coupled with the attempts to 
refi gure discussions to recognise colonial and labour histories, as 
many of our participants described and attempted, this has the 
potential to be a powerful antidote to the performances of toughness, 
threat and exclusion which currently dominate public debates on 
immigration and its control. The increasingly controversial nature of 
such debates shows the importance of both creating networks of soli-
darity and articulating such alternative values – and as publicly as 
possible. 
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 Living Research Five: Public anger in 
research (and social media) 
 At our end-of-project conference, one participant said that the event 
had made her think that ‘when outraged by something’ she would 
try to research it; ‘combine activism with academia and your socio-
logical imagination’. Strikingly, this comment captured much of 
what brought us together to develop the research discussed in this 
book. In this section, we will tell a story of how sparks of outrage 
and anger led to this research, consider how social media allowed 
us to connect and channel that anger, refl ect on the ways in which 
we tried to use these emotions and technologies in the process of 
our research and identify some of the fi ndings from engaging with 
social media as a research tool. 
 Twitter and anger as motivators 
 When the Home Offi ce launched Operation Vaken in July 2013 (see 
Chapter  1 ) all of the authors of this book were angered by the 
seeming overt and unapologetic racism of the Go Home van slogan, 
apparent racial profi ling in immigration checks in public places 
and the Home Offi ce ’ s publication of images of raids through 
Twitter using the #immigrationoffenders hashtag (see Figure  3 ). We 
expressed this over email, on social media and in conversation. 
Several weeks earlier, some of us, with others, had met as a group of 
academics and activists when Gargi organised a workshop on ‘race 
critical public scholarship’ at the University of East London (for a 
sense of the discussions there, see  Murji and Bhattacharyya,  2013 ). 
Drawing on links we had established there and elsewhere, and using 
a combination of online and offl ine communications, we came 
together as a research team in response to developing Home Offi ce 
initiatives, as described in Chapter  1 . 
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 Figure 3:  Storify of Twitter interactions which helped to initiate the 
research for this book 
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 We managed – at least by the standards of academic research! – to 
act quickly to gather networks, plan and begin the project. This was 
aided by communication tools like Twitter (see Figure  3 ), in con-
junction with ‘in-person’ relationships between colleagues, friends 
and collaborators. We were motivated to do this research by a mutual 
commitment to ‘public sociology’ ( Burawoy,  2005 ) – that is, a belief 
in the importance of bringing sociological analysis of people, power 
and institutions to a public audience for use in understanding eve-
ryday questions, struggles and situations. We worked as a group 
because this made the most sense in terms of pooling ideas, exper-
tise and resources and learning. We also tried to maintain dialogue 
beyond the research team throughout each stage of the research – 
including with wider publics through Twitter, blogs, public meetings 
and media engagement (see also  Living Research Three and  Six ). 
 It might seem odd to suggest that research – never mind collabo-
rative, publicly engaged research – could be motivated by anger. 
Anger is often viewed as a negative emotion – either as destructive 
or as distracting from calm analysis or action. However, the writer 
and activist Audre Lorde has written powerfully of the value of anger 
as a motivator:
 Every woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful 
against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which 
brought that anger into being. Focused with precision it can 
become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change. 
And when I speak of change, I do not mean a simple switch of 
positions or a temporary lessening of tensions, nor the ability to 
smile or feel good.  I am speaking of a basic and radical alteration in 
those assumptions underlining our lives …  anger expressed and trans-
lated into action in the service of our vision and our future is a 
liberating and strengthening act of clarifi cation.  
 ( Lorde,  1984 ; emphasis added) 
 Lorde is here talking about anger and passion in motivating activism 
and political change. As academic researchers, our role might be 
more readily imagined as  fi nding out and  analysing rather than  chang-
ing things. However, in the lines emphasised in the above quote, 
Lorde speaks of change as ‘a basic and radical alteration in … 
assumptions’. Part of social research must always be about gathering 
evidence that helps to demonstrate contradictions in common-sense 
assumptions, and producing new ways of thinking that help us 
understand those assumptions and their contradictions – and 
perhaps thereby change things. The power of anger as a motivating 
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force, as Lorde argues and as our research here demonstrates, does 
not necessarily remove space for analytical and careful thought, but 
instead can point us to areas where such thought is urgently needed 
(see Chapter  1 for a discussion of how this relates to ideas about 
‘militant investigation’ ( Casas-Cortes et al.,  2014 ) in migration 
research). 
 Anger and activism on Twitter 
 We built analysis of social media into our research – since the Home 
Offi ce had used them in its own campaigns, but also as an increas-
ingly important format for political debate, and a medium whose 
role in political activism has not yet been fully understood. We 
wanted to see how people used Twitter to respond to Home Offi ce 
campaigns, not just in terms of the content of what they said but 
also the ways in which this use interacted with other forms of 
response. If people were angry, did they let off steam with a tweet 
and then forget it, as  Jodi Dean suggests in  Blog Theory ? Dean asks 
whether social media constitute ‘communication for its own sake’, 
and cautions that ‘the affective charges we transmit and confront 
reinforce and extend affective networks without encouraging – and, 
indeed, by displacing – their consolidation into organized political 
networks’ ( 2010 : 119). That is, Dean suggests that interactions on 
social media do not go beyond sharing humour or outrage. But we 
wanted to ask whether, in sharing through this medium, possibilities 
were created for ‘anger expressed and translated into action’, as 
Audre Lorde might imagine. 
 One method we tried out as part of our online ethnography was 
to organise Twitter debates using the project ’ s @MICResearch 
Twitter account, asking our Twitter followers provocative questions 
which we hoped would open up debate. While there were a few 
interesting exchanges, overall there was not much discussion. We 
found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the more dynamic engagements 
and online conversations emerged organically in response to our 
project tweets and blog posts, and especially during our workshops 
and conference, rather than through deliberately orchestrated 
online discussions. Perhaps this points to the need to engage with 
social media through its own logic – to understand its fl ows of discus-
sion and meaning organically, rather than something that can be 
engineered through tools more suited to other forms of interaction, 
such as focus groups. Importantly, we recognised that the ‘organic’ 
ways in which Twitter worked to develop discussion and action was 
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not simply in an online forum, but through the interactions between 
‘real-life’ events and engagements, and online ones. 
 Many responses to the Home Offi ce both politically and playfully 
highlighted the heavy-handedness of their campaign – at the same 
time increasing its reach as a news story and topic of public debate. 
Some responses demonstrated the absurdity of the government cam-
paign by taking it at its word. The Twitter user Pukkah Punjabi wrote 
about how she had called the number advertised and asked for help 
to go home – to her home in Willesden Green, North London 
( Punjabi,  2013 ). Hundreds of people followed suit (asking to be sent 
back to Scotland, the West Country and East London for example), 
and the Home Offi ce ’ s own evaluation of Operation Vaken found 
that 1,034 (66 per cent) of the texts and 13 (14 per cent) of the calls 
received in response to the van were classifi ed as ‘hoax’; added to 
this, 123 (8 per cent) of the texts and 21 (23 per cent) of the calls 
they received were complaints ( Home Offi ce,  2013 ). Though appar-
ently minor acts of protest – and perhaps in some cases simply jokes 
– it seems to us that these responses managed to respond nimbly, 
turning the government ’ s own choice of communication method 
back on itself, jamming the signal, within the tradition of ‘culture 
jamming’. 1 
 The image of the Go Home van, like the #racistvan hashtag, 
became a meme which long outlasted the summer of 2013. The civil 
rights organisation Liberty produced its own (real-life) van with the 
slogan ‘Stirring up tension and division in the UK illegally? Home 
Offi ce, think again,’ targeted at gaining press and social media atten-
tion. More informally, photoshopped parodies multiplied on Twitter; 
examples included a slogan telling the Romans to go home (playing 
on the Monty Python ‘what did the Romans ever do for us?’ joke); 
another told the Australian lobbyist Lynton Crosby (rumoured to be 
behind the idea of the Go Home van) to go home, pointing out the 
irony of an Australian telling immigrants to leave the UK. Later, 
Mark Harper MP (Immigration Minister at the time of Operation 
Vaken) was caught employing a cleaner whose visa was not in order 
and forced to resign, and so his face ended up on the side of a 
photoshopped van too. The Go Home van reappeared as a satirical 
template in the run up to the May 2014 European Parliament 
 1 The term ‘culture jamming’ was coined in 1984 by Don Joyce of the 
experimental music band Negativland, and since then has become more 
widely used to mean the appropriation and subversion of media repre-
sentations. See  Chandler and Neumark  ( 2005 ). 
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election, this time with the anti-EU and anti-immigration UK Inde-
pendence Party (UKIP) more often than not the target of the joke. 
 Twitter was used also as a means of organising on-the-ground 
resistance to immigration raids. Where the Home Offi ce had tried 
to disseminate news of its success in numbers of arrests during 
raids, activists shared sightings of (increasingly visible) Immigration 
Enforcement vehicles and offi cers on streets around the UK. Some-
times this was through organised activist groups like the Anti-Raids 
Network and London Black Revolutionaries, in other cases individ-
ual Twitter users shared the locations of their sightings. In some 
cases, this simply alerted others that raids were taking place; in 
others, it seems to have enabled activists to arrive on the scene and 
disrupt enforcement actions. This use of social media, not just to 
raise awareness but to organise and co-ordinate direct action in 
person, suggests that its role in the political arena should not simply 
be dismissed as ‘clicktivism’ – the idea that political action is reduced 
simply to the click of a mouse, without further engagement. As the 
journalist  Laurie Penny said after the 2015 General Election, ‘an 
angry population is hard to govern; a depressed population is easy’ 
( 2015 ). Anger can also provoke us to act, as was the case for us and 
our project. Online platforms present both possibilities and limita-
tions in terms of how anger and humour can be used to mobilise or 
to create dialogue, within and beyond research. 
 If you conduct social research yourself, what motivates you to 
do it? If you read or use social research, what motivates you to 
do so? 
 What do you think is the place of anger, or other emotions, 
in social research? How would you reconcile the idea of 
research motivated by anger with ideas of scientifi c objectivity 
or ideas of situated subjects (see also  Living Research Four )? 
 Do you use social media such as Twitter? If so, what do you 
use it for? Do you see it as a tool of the social researcher? What 
are the challenges and limitations of using social media as:
 1  a source of already-existing data to analyse 
 2  a method or tool for producing new data 
 3  a tool for disseminating research fi ndings? 
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 6 
 Conclusion: ‘Ordinary’ people and 
immigration politics 
 We construct borders, literally and fi guratively, to fortify our sense 
of who we are; and we cross them in search of who we might 
become. They are philosophies of space, credibility contests, lati-
tudes of neurosis, signatures to the social contract, soothing contain-
ments, scars. 
 ( Frances Stonor Saunders,  2016 : 8) 
 In January 2001, with the Twin Towers still standing, Lehman Broth-
ers still trading and Blairism at its most popular, the UK government ’ s 
Cabinet Offi ce published a paper, ‘Migration: An Economic and 
Social Analysis’ ( Cabinet Offi ce,  2001 ). Reviewing various sources of 
economic evidence on migration, the general thrust of the analysis 
was unambiguous: immigration is economically benefi cial. It opened 
with a bullishly liberal quotation from Tony Blair at Davos the previ-
ous year, ‘we have the chance in this century to achieve an open world, 
an open economy, and an open global society with unprecedented 
opportunities for people and business’ ( Blair,  2000 ). The  Cabinet 
Offi ce report itself found that ‘migration is likely to enhance economic 
growth and the welfare of both migrants and natives … There is little 
evidence that native workers are harmed by immigration … [and] The 
broader fi scal impact of migration is likely to be positive’ ( 2001 : 5–7). 
 The journey from that historical moment of seemingly free market 
cosmopolitanism to the Go Home vans of 2013 and the subsequent 
EU referendum decision in 2016 for Britain to leave the European 
Union, in part as a response to fears about immigration (see Chapter 
 1 for the connections between the referendum and anti-immigration 
discourses), is one shaped by a number of diverse forces, events and 
conditions. In the early 2000s, real wage growth slowed dramatically, 
before turning negative in early 2007, heralding the start of the global 
fi nancial crisis ( Machin,  2015 ). Following global upheavals including 
civil war in Sierra Leone, land reform and economic collapse in 
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Zimbabwe, and the NATO invasion of Afghanistan, asylum applica-
tions in Britain reached a peak. They were at their highest with 84,130 
applications (excluding dependents) in 2002 (up from 4,256 in 1987; 
the 2014 fi gure was 24,914) ( Blinder,  2015 ). As the number of 
asylum applications grew, a system of dispersal was put in place from 
1999, with asylum seekers temporarily housed in centres around the 
UK, to ‘ease the pressure’ on housing and services in London and 
south-east England. This meant that many cities, such as Glasgow 
and Cardiff, saw a large number of new arrivals from around the 
world, and in a relatively short period of time. The 2004 enlargement 
of the EU, plus the UK ’ s decision not to restrict access to citizenship 
for the new entrants, greatly increased the levels of immigration from 
within the EU ( Vargas-Silva and Markaki,  2015 ). 
 In the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century, British political 
debate in Britain led by Tony Blair as Prime Minister focused on 
‘good’ economic migration (people coming to the UK to bring skills 
and increase national wealth). This focus was sharpened by the simul-
taneous demonising of ‘bogus asylum seekers’ as an illegitimate 
burden on public services and a risk to a cohesive and peaceful society 
( Back et al.,  2002 ;  Home Offi ce,  2002 ). Although there has been some 
reduction in the use of demeaning epithets such as ‘illegal asylum 
seeker’ and ‘bogus asylum seeker’ in public discourses – following 
guidance from the Press Complaints Commission in 2003 1 – the idea 
of illegitimate migrations remains (see Chapter  1 ). Although the 
heightened visibility of the European ‘crisis’ of migration since 2015 
has led to prefacing of some anti-immigration rhetoric with an empha-
sis on a historical imagining of Britain as always offering welcome to 
people fl eeing persecution, this sits alongside the effort to create and 
portray a palpably hostile environment for certain migrants in ways 
that we have explored throughout the book. 
 Within this hostile environment there remains recognition that 
immigration touches all of our lives, as world populations are increas-
ingly on the move, and where this movement is full of historical and 
geo-social layerings and legacies of transit and encounter. Politicians’ 
calls to ‘ordinary people’ who are affected by immigration control are 
often imagined as summoning an audience that is sedentary, racially 
‘pure’ and ‘at home’, but affected by the migrant ‘other’. However, 
even as migration for better opportunities, for family reunion and in 
search of safety are each deemed suspect or threatening, we also see 
 1 Because it cannot be illegal to seek asylum, although asylum may not be 
granted. 
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a fracturing of populist posturing on immigration. At times a sense 
of common humanity breaks through, so that even those crossing 
borders outside of designated and orderly channels can be perceived 
as ‘ordinary people’. Here, there is perhaps an opportunity to shift 
the terms and register of the conversation. 
 Throughout this book we have discussed the ways that British 
government communications about immigration control have crept 
into everyday, ordinary lives. Sometimes this is in a manner that jolts 
people out of complacency. The Go Home van is one example. This 
initiative seemingly planned to be high-profi le and provocative, reas-
suring certain sections of the public that the government was taking 
action, not only raised public concerns about immigration numbers, 
it also incited questions about whether immigration enforcement itself 
was ‘out of control’. Sometimes the communications are less spec-
tacular, a banal seeping into local and national news reports of the 
numbers of ‘immigration offenders’ apprehended from their homes, 
workplaces or weddings; perhaps a visible presence of offi cers and 
vehicles on the lookout for offenders, telling us that irregular migrants 
are everywhere and enforcement offi cers are ready to pounce on 
those who seem suspicious. We have drawn on our research with 
people in England, Scotland and Wales to consider what the conse-
quences might be of these everyday prompts that associate certain 
forms of migration with suspicion and unlawfulness, for people who 
are worried about migration as a threat, for people who feel under 
suspicion and for those who reject this idea and want to embrace 
migration as both valuable and inevitable. In these concluding 
thoughts, we will draw together some of the themes outlined in the 
book by:
 1  refl ecting on what our fi ndings mean for ‘ordinary people’, and 
what is meant by ‘ordinary people’ in different contexts 
 2  discussing how immigration politics is entangled with questions 
of race and racism 
 3  considering some of the lessons we have learnt in writing the book, 
and how the book might be useful for others. 
 Who is ordinary? 
 For too long, the benefi ts of immigration went to employers who 
wanted an easy supply of cheap labour; or to  the wealthy metropolitan 
elite who wanted cheap tradesmen and services – but not to the 
 ordinary, hard-working people of this country.  
 ( Brokenshire,  2014 : 8; emphasis added) 
‘Ordinary’ people and immigration politics 151
 In this speech by the then Immigration Minister, James Brokenshire, 
to the Demos think tank in 2014, we hear a refrain that has echoed 
throughout the book in how concerns about immigration itself (par-
ticularly in terms of the numbers of new arrivals and people breaking 
immigration rules) are characterised as the worries of ‘ordinary 
people’. This appeal to ‘ordinary people’ is in contrast to concerns 
that immigration control is too harsh, a view often allied with a ‘liberal 
metropolitan elite’. It is worth stopping to ask where these characteri-
sations come from, and what purpose they serve, as well as asking 
what truth there is to them. 
 In  Keywords ( 1976 ), Raymond Williams complicates the use of the 
term ‘ordinary’ by examining its etymology, which originally denoted 
something mandated by rule (with the same roots as ‘ordinance’). The 
word has come to mean ‘something done by custom’, but has also 
taken on a negative sense, with connotations of inferiority (e.g. ‘very 
ordinary looking’) (p. 225):
 Thus ‘ordinary people’ can be used to express a social attitude or 
prejudice in effectively opposite ways. ‘What ordinary people 
believe’ can, in different contexts, mean either what ‘uneducated’ 
… people know or think, in what are then clearly seen as limited 
ways, or what ‘sensible’, ‘regular’, ‘decent’ people believe, as distinct 
from the views of some sect, or of intellectuals.  
 ( Williams,  1976 : 225–6) 
 This is a very clear description of how ‘ordinary people’ are named 
and centred in immigration debates. In Brokenshire ’ s speech above, 
for example, we can see the political rhetoric that connects with the 
shifting policy tendencies outlined in Chapter  2 . When the tendency 
shifts from a neoliberal to a ‘postliberal’ approach, it follows that 
former neoliberal approaches are blamed for favouring economic 
measures over social ones. A populist call is made to ‘ordinary, hard-
working people’ (and who, after all, does not see themselves as ordi-
nary and hard-working?). It is posited that problems in the economy 
and elsewhere that affect ordinary people are associated with immi-
gration; that ordinary people will be listened to and those problems 
addressed. This same logic emerged with the results of the EU refer-
endum in June 2016, when UKIP ’ s leader Nigel Farage declared that 
the result was a ‘victory for real people, a victory for ordinary people, 
a victory for decent people’ ( Asthana et al.,  2016 ). 
 Certainly, some of the people we interviewed in our focus groups 
did feel threatened by immigration, and, as we saw in Chapter  3 , they 
also felt that tough rhetoric and highly visible government enforce-
ment campaigns were intended to reassure them (as ‘ordinary people’), 
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that something was being done. But some also saw through this rheto-
ric. The populist call did not always convince them that the govern-
ment was any more in tune with them. This was what was conveyed 
in a focus group interview in Barking and Dagenham, quoted in 
Chapter  2 . As Alan put it: ‘They ’ re [the Home Offi ce] trying to give 
the idea to the general public that they ’ re doing something about it, 
but they ’ re doing absolutely nothing.’ 
 In James Brokenshire ’ s speech, the Minister positions himself as on 
the side of ‘ordinary, hard-working people’ rather than callous employ-
ers or wealthy elites. There is a profound irony to this declaration 
made by a government minister to an audience at a London think 
tank – the very epitome of the ‘wealthy metropolitan elite’. But of 
course, the ‘metropolitan elite’ are always elsewhere. They are fi gures 
of speech that enable concerns about immigration control (in this 
instance) to be positioned as out of touch with gritty reality, as a fancy 
of those with too much money and/or education, who live in a pro-
tected ‘bubble’. The ‘ordinary people’ are positioned as a ‘silent major-
ity’ without the economic, social or cultural capital to access forums 
used by the ‘elite’ (such as newspaper columns, broadcasters or par-
ticular forms of social media such as Twitter). This is a very similar 
position to how an idea of the ‘white working class’ is used in British 
political discourses of the early twentieth century ( Haylett,  2001 ). 
Brokenshire can then claim to speak on behalf of a beleaguered minor-
ity, without making reference to his position and that of his immediate 
audience as part of a class (as politicians and establishment journalists 
and policy-makers) which is both elite and institutionally closed off. 2 
 Fears that other people (‘them’) might be doing better than ‘us’ 
(‘ordinary people’) are not investigated, much less addressed, by 
interventions like Brokenshire ’ s. Rather, fears are re-created and 
infl amed (see also  Ahmed,  2008 ). In doing so, a divide between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, between ‘ordinary people’ and others is widened. This 
leaves little space for recognition of points of commonality or ‘ordi-
nariness’ among people whose lives are different. It closes down the 
opportunities to see migrants, refugees and asylum seekers as part of 
the an imaginary ‘ordinary people’ on whose behalf the Home Offi ce 
 2  51 per cent of the UK ’ s leading journalists, 32 per cent of MPs, and 74 
per cent of top judges were privately educated (compared to an estimated 
7 per cent of the population as a whole); 54 per cent of journalists, 47 
per cent of Cabinet ministers, and 74 per cent of judges in the UK in 
2016 attended the same two universities (compared to less than 1 per 
cent of the population as a whole) ( Kirby,  2016 ). 
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Minister might have obligations of care and responsibility. At the same 
time, there are complexities to this seemingly stark divide in which 
pro-migration activism is also ensnared. For example, in the ‘I am an 
immigrant’ campaign discussed in Chapter  5 , which aimed to combat 
xenophobia by highlighting the lives of high-achieving migrants, a full 
spectrum of migrant lives – such as those who are not socially suc-
cessful or might even be claiming welfare benefi ts – is obscured. In 
such idealised, or perhaps normative, representations, migrants are 
still not allowed to be ‘ordinary’. They must be extraordinary. 
 Racism and immigration 
 Our minds are conditioned to think of our nations as maps and 
fl ags rather than collections of actual people. If only we can love 
humanity rather than maps, we ’ d all be much happier. 
 (Shivam  Vij,  2012 : n.p.) 
 Throughout this book, we have argued that an understanding of 
immigration control at this contemporary moment must engage with 
questions of race and racism and their intersections with other social 
differences. Sometimes this link can be hard to grasp – surely immi-
gration laws are about nationality, not race or ethnicity? Aren ’ t most 
countries in the world multiethnic anyway, in which case isn ’ t it actu-
ally ‘racist’ to say there is an association between immigration laws 
and race? By focusing on racialised differences aren ’ t you actually 
being racist? An exemplary version of this refusal to recognise any 
association between racism and immigration control was the Con-
servative Party ’ s 2005 election slogan, ‘it ’ s not racist to impose limits 
on immigration’. 
 Such refusals are not just straightforward denials. They engage 
with an affective register of affront.  Sarita Srivastava ( 2005 ) has 
written lucidly about the way that the enraged, hurt cry ‘are you 
calling me a racist?’ shifts conversations that are begun to address 
institutionalised discrimination. Instead, they become focused on 
tending to the injured feelings of the person who has been accused 
of racism. The logic is that racism is recognised by all as bad; therefore 
accusing someone of racist behaviour is among the worst accusations. 
There is no space for asking how such feelings of hurt or affront 
compare to being the subject of racist acts or a racist system (see also 
 Ahmed,  2010 , on feminist killjoys). 
 Our work on this book is not a project to demonstrate racism at 
work in immigration control, in order to demonise those responsible 
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and therefore leave questions neatly solved. We are more interested in 
how current forms of immigration control and related discussions 
tend to close down debate about discrimination and race, whilst those 
forces remain unchallenged. As we see it, the tactic of separating nar-
ratives of immigration control from discussions of racism is complicit 
with the sorting and enforcement processes of bordering. It produces 
new forms and consequences of racialisation, where the  idea of race 
as an absolute difference has real effects, such as dispossession, slavery 
and death, what  Lentin identifi es as ‘crimes … that mark and shape 
whole groups of people, often for generations’ ( 2008 : 497). These 
crimes – physical and psychic – are also entangled with forces of 
displacement, exile and statelessness. In this way, immigration, or, 
rather, immigration control and bordering practices cannot be under-
stood without a historical understanding of racism and colonialism, 
and of how these are entangled with more recent discourses of 
multiculturalism and migration. We note, with Gurminder K.  Bhambra 
 ( 2016 ), the insidiousness of European immigration discourses and 
policies that are based upon racialised class divides. As  Sandro 
Mezzadra and Brett Neilson  ( 2008 : n.p.) remind us, ‘borders in the 
contemporary global order serve not simply as devices of exclusion 
but as technologies of differential inclusion’. 
 Traces of the complicated relationships between race, racism and 
immigration control are visible in our research. Aside from the Go 
Home van, another mobile technology of demonstrating the tough-
ness of immigration control was the introduction of a more visible 
liveried set of vehicles for immigration enforcement offi cers to use 
when on patrols and raids. When Ipsos MORI asked British adults 
who were aware of these immigration enforcement branded vans on 
UK streets how they felt about seeing them (see  Appendix for meth-
odological details), 31 per cent said they felt reassured that the gov-
ernment was taking action against illegal or irregular immigration; 28 
per cent said it made them concerned that some people are being 
treated with unnecessary suspicion in everyday situations. And 16 per 
cent said it made them think that illegal or irregular immigration 
might be more widespread than they had realised. This suggests that, 
like many of the measures used to demonstrate ‘toughness’, these vans 
barely reassure more people than they worry – and they actually 
increase worry among a signifi cant number of people who see them. 
 But then we looked at the breakdown between the reactions of 
white respondents, and racially minoritised respondents, to that ques-
tion. More white respondents (34 per cent) were reassured that the 
government was taking action against irregular or illegal immigration 
than for the population as a whole. And far fewer ‘BME’ respondents 
(21 per cent) were reassured by these Immigration Enforcement vans. 
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This was reversed somewhat for those who were concerned that the 
vans might indicate that some people were being treated with unnec-
essary suspicion – only 25 per cent of white respondents thought this, 
but 36 per cent of ‘BME’ respondents. That is, racially minoritised 
(‘BME’) respondents were much more likely to see the enforcement 
vans as an intervention that could result in unfair treatment. They 
were also signifi cantly more likely to be aware of these vans (23 per 
cent) than white respondents (16 per cent). 
 This suggests to us a connection between being able to see oneself 
in a situation, and how one reacts to it. That racially minoritised 
respondents were so much more likely than the white respondents to 
worry about people being treated with unfair suspicion as a result of 
more highly visible immigration enforcement raids may well have 
something to do with their experience – directly or indirectly – of 
being unfairly treated with suspicion in similar situations. As Lucee, 
a woman from Sierra Leone who had been granted refugee status and 
was settled in Bradford, told us during a focus group:
 And for example like where I live it ’ s like predominantly white 
people and I ’ m not saying like white, all of them, but there have 
been a few racist things going on, so, and these are people who 
obviously don ’ t care whether I ’ ve got my stay or not, every time 
they ’ ve seen me they ’ ve always told me to go back to my country. 
So imagine if they saw this [the Go Home van] they ’ d probably call 
them, pick me up [laughs] do you know? 
 (Bradford Focus Group, conducted by Hannah) 
 Lucee had not seen the van herself and was not subject to immigra-
tion enforcement any more. Yet she feared the government campaigns 
because of the way she imagined them creating or further legitimising 
the xenophobia and racism she had experienced from her neighbours. 
Not only that, she also pointed to the way that suspicions (about 
immigration status) become attached to particular bodily markers, 
such as her dark brown skin and her West African accent (see also 
Rita ’ s experience explored in Chapters  2 and  4 ). 
 ‘Relatable’ migrants 
 In February 2015, Hannah and Kirsten were asked to speak about 
our research at an event organised by the Detention Forum, a charity 
that campaigns for the rights of people in immigration detention in 
the UK (see also Living Research Three). At the main offi ces of 
Amnesty International in East London, they sat on a panel along with 
Harley Miller, an Australian whose dispute with the Home Offi ce over 
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her leave to remain in the UK had become a public campaign issue. 
Other panellists were Ian Dunt, an online journalist who has written 
on migration issues; and Aderonke Apata, a Nigerian lesbian facing 
deportation after a High Court judge ruled that she had ‘fabricated’ 
her sexuality in order to settle in Britain ( Dugan,  2014 ). At this 
meeting, we were struck by comments from Ian Dunt to the effect 
that news and comment stories about migration (or anything else) 
needed to be ‘relatable’, that is, in order to care about an issue, or 
even read to the end of an article, readers should be able to see that 
it could happen to them or someone close to them. In other words, 
they had to see the protagonists as ‘ordinary people’. To this end, he 
argued that stories such as Harley ’ s (or cases of non-EU spouses 
separated from their UK partners by immigration law) were more 
meaningful to most people in the UK, and therefore more likely to 
be picked up by news outlets and politicians, than experiences like 
Aderonke ’ s or those of others held in immigration detention. 
 The fact that such language and assumptions are mundane does 
not make them less powerful or, indeed, violent in their consequences. 
In fact, we might argue that it is in the very banality of such assump-
tions that their power lies. The shock that broke through when the 
British government associated itself publicly with the racists’ slogan 
‘go home’ mobilised political action and outrage. But when the less 
spectacular identifi cation of some British residents as undeserving of 
care or innately suspicious (for example, through reminders in NHS 
waiting rooms that ‘hospital treatment is not free for everyone’ (see 
Chapter  2 ), or alerts to enforcement actions in the local press) 
becomes unremarkable, the process of excluding (some) migrants 
from what  Bridget Anderson terms the ‘community of value’ ( 2013 ) 
is much more powerful. 
 Similar dynamics have been described by the psychosocial theorist 
 Gail Lewis  ( 2007 ), invoking and developing  Raymond Williams ’ s 
( 1958 ) work on ordinary culture to show that ‘racialising culture is 
ordinary’ too:
 such cultural practices stand right at the heart of contemporary 
everyday life and mediate individual experiences and the social 
relations of ‘race’, gender, class, sexuality, and age. Moreover … 
hegemonic projects are never fully achieved, are always unstable, 
making possible forms of appropriation, destabilization and change. 
Thus, whilst cultural practices of racialization occur within net-
works of power and contestation their trajectories and outcomes are 
never certain, never guaranteed.  
 ( Lewis,  2007 : 873) 
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 This second point in Lewis ’ s quote is important. We have tried, 
throughout the book, to understand the rippling effects of govern-
ment communications on immigration control – and to recognise the 
contradictions and unexpected consequences as well as those that 
might have been predictable to some. The racialising logics of a claim 
that solidarity with ‘ordinary people’ can only come from association 
with ‘people like us’ – where the ‘us’ is in the imagination of the (white, 
male) London journalist and therefore vested in citizens of majority-
white countries whose heteronormative families or respectable career 
paths are interrupted by immigration control – seems clear to us (the 
authors), given our training as social scientists. They are not obvious 
to all, and they are worth unpicking and analysing for the record, as 
a part of public debate, which too often goes unacknowledged. 
 However, we do not want to stop our analysis there, at the point 
of ‘racism is everywhere’, because we have seen more than that. 
Lewis, and others, remind us that the process of racialisation, like 
other social struggles over power, is never fi nished, it evolves and 
changes and is therefore unpredictable. The identifi cation of some 
people on the sharp end of immigration control who are ‘ordinary 
people’ opens up the question of who an ordinary person might be, 
and in what manner they are ordinary. Similarly, the re-entry of 
immigration into public debate in the UK over the last twenty years 
has unsettled a seeming settlement about the place of ‘ethnic minori-
ties’ in British society. The reminders of colonial processes, which led 
former British colonial subjects to the UK, are roused again by the 
arrival of new movements of populations from other parts of the 
globe. New kinds of resistance, identifi cation and rejection form in 
response to this, as we have seen throughout the book and especially 
in Chapters  4 and  5 . So when we agree that racialising culture is 
ordinary, and that we might see many instances of immigration 
control in the present moment as part of a process of racialisation, 
that does not mean that old logics of racism and opposition are being 
produced in the same formations as in the past. 
 As we heard in Chapter  4 from Rita, opposition to new migration 
is not restricted to white British-born residents, as she witnessed 
opposition to immigration from local Asian people in Southall and 
was ‘shocked, my Asian community they hate us … My Asian com-
munity hate Asian people, it was so sad.’ Similarly, Mark, a pro-
migrant activist in London, told Sukhwant that ‘one of the scariest 
things we ’ re seeing … at the moment is migrant communities thinking 
it ’ s a good idea to stop immigration’. As we discussed in Chapter  5 , 
there are multiple forces at work here in reconfi guring who is seen 
(by whom) as part of a ‘community of value’ worthy of being part of 
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the nation. Not only that, but those who are at the edges of a com-
munity of value sometimes have more at stake in distinguishing them-
selves from the ‘real’ outsiders by participating in these processes of 
what we would call racialisation, though it may not be along the lines 
predicted by received ideas about racial divisions. 
 The appeal to toughness in the government campaigns we have 
been following attempts to seal off – or at least bypass – this complex-
ity, to produce a postpolitical consensus (as discussed in Chapter  2 ). 
As we saw in Chapter  3 , these campaigns seem to create a self-
perpetuating problem – can government measures ever be thorough 
enough to get migration ‘under control’? In a world that is ever more 
mobile, and where capitalism relies on the movement of people – not 
just as labour but where the immigration-industrial complex is 
increasingly an arena for private profi t (see  Anderson,  2014 ) – migra-
tion control seems to be reduced to a performance, albeit a perfor-
mance with real and dire consequences. While migration is seen as a 
threat in need of control, and that control has to be visibly performed, 
how can anyone be safe from either migration or migration control, 
except, as we saw in Chapter  5 , by positioning themselves as less of 
a threat than some ‘other’ group? 
 Stuart Hall coined the term ‘multicultural drift’ to recognise ‘the 
increasing visible presence of black and Asian people in all aspects of 
British social life’, not as ‘the result of deliberate and planned policy’, 
but rather ‘the unintended outcome of undirected sociological pro-
cesses’ ( 1999 : 188). We might say that a similar process is now under 
way, not simply of migration becoming or having become an everyday 
aspect of life but (perhaps more of a departure) migration  control and 
anti-migrant rhetoric have become mundane. The drift of migration 
enforcement into the banal tasks of education administrators (see 
 Back,  2016 : 32–6), human resources departments, private landlords 
and healthcare professionals is accompanied by a drift of migration 
talk, migration suspicion and endless debate about who has the right 
to resources and to existence in a specifi c national space. In what ways 
might the research presented in this book help us not only to under-
stand, but also to intervene in those conversations? 
 Conversations 
 We must create a polyphony, a tune of many voices that is truth for 
all of us. 
 ( Syed Khalid Hussan,  2013 : 281) 
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 Not everyone thinks that being ordinary means being identical to 
themselves, or that either of those things equates to a person being 
worthy of care and basic quality of life. When politicians and others 
appeal on behalf of ordinary people, this is not a call of solidarity. 
Instead, they are reasserting the political voicelessness of those groups, 
rather than listening to their concerns. In a classic work of cultural 
studies,  Policing the Crisis,  Stuart Hall and colleagues described such 
moves when made by news media as ‘taking the public voice’ ( 1978 : 
63). What we have tried to do in this book and this project is to rec-
ognise a multiplicity of ordinary voices, their varying experiences and 
how the public performance of immigration control resonates in daily 
lives. We have tried not to ‘take’ those voices but to consider their 
various viewpoints and concerns seriously. In doing so, we have seen 
some of the ordinary effects of reproducing ideas of threat and control 
around immigration; a variety of unsettling senses of fear and inse-
curity, tempered sometimes – when anger escapes through a crack in 
the fear – into political solidarities and action. 
 We are still stuck with this dismissal of concerns about the harsh-
ness of immigration control as a preoccupation of a ‘liberal metro-
politan elite’. Who are they? Probably the authors of this book would 
be prime candidates to be included. We are all academics with decent 
pay who live in cities and get paid to write about the state of the world, 
and who care deeply about the consequences of immigration control 
(among other things). But we are also ordinary people. We all have 
families, friends and homes that we care about, both spread across 
the UK and overseas. Most of us have some form of migration history 
in our lives or the lives of our families; some more immediate than 
others. We are affected when public services are underfunded, and 
when housing becomes unaffordable – though we are able to cope 
with this, at this point in our lives, in ways that people with less eco-
nomic means might not be. We recognise this. And we don ’ t think our 
privilege or our pain means that those who do not share them are less 
‘ordinary’ than us, or less worthy of a decent life. 
 We also know that thousands of other people, ordinary and extraor-
dinary, do share our concerns; we know this because they have told 
us so through our research, because we have seen them mobilising in 
political demonstrations, because we have seen them give of their 
time, energy and resources to help others. This is not an elite but a 
hotchpotch of people with different motivations and experiences, dif-
ferent kinds of privilege and vulnerability, and different views, but 
enough in common to be concerned about what the consequences of 
immigration control outlined in this book are doing not just to 
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individuals at the sharp end but to our democracy and common 
humanity. 
 These concerns don ’ t always get articulated in the same ways. The 
performance politics of immigration control set out not only to dem-
onstrate toughness and control held by government, they mask or 
dismiss the everyday pain and uncertainty of varying intensities that 
immigration  control causes, that touch increasingly on everyone ’ s lives. 
This might range from the (ordinary) person renting out a property, 
who must take responsibility for their tenants’ residency papers being 
in order, under threat of possible imprisonment; to the (ordinary) 
person seeking a home to rent but whom landlords avoid as soon as 
they hear that person ’ s ‘foreign-sounding’ name ( Grant and Peel, 
 2015 ); to the (ordinary) person whose children are in danger in a 
home country but is refused refugee status, and then sees no prospect 
of them being safe other than undertaking a treacherous journey by 
land and sea with the hope of a new home, but the risk of death. These 
stories are not headline news. But when we think of Ian Dunt ’ s seem-
ingly common-sense explanation about what makes something news-
worthy, we might also think back to  Hall et al. ’ s  ( 1978 ) demonstration 
of how that which becomes news is also that which serves a dominant 
narrative, or hegemony. 
 As we discussed in Living Research Five, a key motivator in our 
research was anger; anger about social injustice, anger at repugnantly 
racist and xenophobic immigration control narratives and practices 
becoming normalised. We channelled this anger through our profes-
sional training as social researchers to fi nd out more about the dynam-
ics and consequences of what had angered us. And throughout the 
process (as described in Living Research Six), we have tried to do 
this in conversation and collaboration with people more embedded in 
these currents, from activists to policy-makers to refugees to those 
feeling threatened by immigration. This process has been a conversa-
tion, and as a conversation our intention has always been to continue 
the exchange, to proffer our analysis, fi ndings and theorisations to 
add to and perhaps enrich in a small way the public conversation. 
 One way in which we have done this is simply through the focus 
of our research. As we noted in Chapter  2 , we aimed to focus less on 
attitudes to ‘immigration’, towards an understanding of how govern-
ment campaigns about immigration worked, and their consequences 
for different audiences. Another attempted shift is in our aim to treat 
our research as what  Les Back ( 2007 ) describes as a ‘listener ’ s art’, 
bringing confl icting and neglected perspectives together, not simply 
to ‘give voice’ but through our attention and analysis giving weight to 
those voices; unpeeling some of the layers of contradiction, confl ict 
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and surprising affi nities in understandings of migration (and its 
control), which can too often be easily polarised. 
 Our research has deliberately been intended as public scholarship, 
work using rigorous academic methods while engaging with collabo-
rators and audiences beyond the university. In recent years there has 
been much discussion of public sociology attached to an address by 
Professor  Michael Burawoy ( 2005 ) to the American Sociological 
Association. We have looked more widely and further back to root our 
ethos of public scholarship with thinkers such as W.E.B. Du Bois, bell 
hooks, Audre Lorde and Angela Davis, whose scholarly writing was 
a part of their activism, always to inform social struggles and make 
ideas accessible to publics beyond universities. 
 But of course, the conversation shifts regardless of scholarly inter-
vention, and often unpredictably in relation to world events, policy 
changes, or chance incidents, which break through the cracks of what 
seems a settled conclusion. In a blog post in September 2015, in the 
days after Alan Kurdi ’ s death became a global spectacle (see Chapter 
 1 ), Hannah wrote:
 The tone of the public reaction is shifting fast. We ’ re starting to hear 
less about the threat posed by these people and more about the 
‘unbearable’ sight of a three-year-old boy washed up, dead, on the 
shore of Turkey, and everything it implies.  
 ( Jones,  2015 ) 
 At that moment, the shocking image of Alan ’ s body breached the 
apparent certainties about border control, and brought ‘ordinary 
people’ across Europe on to the streets in support of welcoming more 
refugees into their homes. In a sense nothing had changed with the 
death of Alan; children had been dying on that same crossing and 
others for months and years. But until then, none had been captured 
in an image that so eloquently broke through the xenophobic rhetoric 
and performative politics of the UK government and others. As we 
have noted in Chapter  1 , a shift did occur in public debate – but it 
was short-lived. In the UK, the then Prime Minister Cameron ’ s 
promise that Britain would take twenty thousand Syrian refugees 
from UN camps over fi ve years seemed to close down the debate, 
allowing some to feel that a problem had been addressed. This despite 
the criticisms that this gesture amounted to a relatively small number 
of refugees compared to either the national population or the number 
of refugees worldwide; that adequate resources to support those even 
that would be given refuge had not been made available to local gov-
ernment; that by only taking people through the UN resettlement 
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scheme nothing was done to address the plight of people already in 
Europe seeking sanctuary; and that by restricting the scheme to 
Syrians, victims of other confl icts less covered by European media 
continued to be ignored. 
 In trying to engage in public scholarship we will sometimes be 
outrun by changing developments. As we try to highlight shifts in 
circumstances and their signifi cance, they just as quickly change 
again. In our research and this book we have tried to avoid such an 
ephemeral engagement. We have noted how a set of individually 
short-lived interventions – the Go Home van, visibility of enforce-
ment raids, reminders of immigration control in everyday life – 
together present a more signifi cant trend: the drift of immigration 
enforcement, of an obsession with borders and of hatred, into the 
ongoing concerns of ordinary life. 
 We should not forget that what is at stake is not simply a conversa-
tion, but has material, harsh consequences. This includes the death, 
detention and destitution faced by Aderonke Apata and Alan Kurdi; 
the unheard lives of others in indefi nite immigration detention, living 
in destitution, in fear of deportation, separated from families; and 
those like Joe, Carol and Alan whom we heard in Chapter  2 , scared 
by immigration and its effects in their local areas, fearing new 
migrants as an uncontrollable threat to jobs, homes and prosperity. 
We should note too, that the material consequences of the drift 
towards the everyday mobilisation of the border and immigration 
control can sometimes be generative – bringing people together in 
new ways to mobilise politically, perhaps because the connections 
between different types of ‘ordinary people’ affected by immigration 
control become clearer, or as people who previously thought immi-
gration control relevant only to ‘other people’ start to respond to this 
very everyday reality. 
 We hope that the many interactions that have been a part of this 
book will continue, as people read and talk about what we have written 
here. These are small attempts to make a shift, with others, in how we 
think about immigration control in our everyday lives. Ultimately it 
is a plea to recognise our common humanity. 
 And it is an unfi nished, unfolding conversation. 
 Postscript 
 In the fi nal days of preparing our manuscript for publication, we were 
reading back through what we had written, thinking carefully about 
the claims we have been making about the relationships between 
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the performative politics of immigration policing campaigns and 
increasing xenophobia, intolerance and racism. It was during this time 
that the Labour MP Jo Cox, an active advocate for the rights of 
migrants and those seeking asylum, was violently murdered on 16 
June 2016 (see also Chapter  1 ). During his court appearance, the 
murder suspect Thomas Mair was asked to confi rm his name and 
replied: ‘My name is death to traitors, freedom for Britain’. Like 
thousands of others, from all walks of life and from all parts of the 
globe, we were horrifi ed and angered at this murder. The thought that 
it had been motivated by a hatred for a young woman whose compas-
sion for others was felt to be so deeply treacherous and threatening 
was sickening. ‘Jo ’ s killing was political, it was an act of terror designed 
to advance an agenda of hatred towards others’, said Cox ’ s husband 
in a moving speech given at Trafalgar Square to celebrate what would 
have been Jo Cox ’ s forty-second birthday on 22 June ( Addley et al., 
 2016 ). Brendan Cox went on:
 What a beautiful irony it is that an act designed to advance hatred 
has instead generated such an outpouring of love. Jo lived for her 
beliefs, and on Thursday she died for them, and for the rest of our 
lives we will fi ght for them in her name. 
 As we complete this project in the wake of the June 2016 EU refer-
endum result, reports have been appearing in the mainstream press 
and social media of an increase in xenophobic and racist abuse and 
violence. We do not know yet exactly how widespread this is or 
whether the narrative of ‘taking control’ of our borders and immigra-
tion that was so prominent in the Leave campaign will continue, or 
kindle new forms of nationalism and racism (see  Davies,  2016 ). 
 It need not be this way. We hope that the conversations into which 
we have invited you might contribute to the collective work of imagin-
ing and building a more inclusive future for us all. 
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 Living Research Six: Collaborations 
 Our research on Operation Vaken was rooted in several different 
forms of engagement, with the hope not only of intervening in social 
injustices (see  Passy,  2001 ) but also of producing knowledge differ-
ently; a less elitist and collaborative knowledge. The root of the word 
collaboration, from the Latin  collaborare – to work together – carries 
ambivalence. To collaborate can also suggest betrayal, even treach-
ery. Here we discuss what was involved in our research relationships, 
from those between ourselves as academic activists and ‘resisting 
others’ ( Autonomous Geographies Collective,  2010 : 248) to our 
work with an established, profi t-making research company, which we 
subsequently found also carried out work for the Home Offi ce. 
 We will try to describe as best we can what we did to deal with 
confl icting pressures and approaches in our partnerships, highlight-
ing what we learnt. As the feminist theorist  Robyn Wiegman ( 2012 ) 
has argued so brilliantly, our attachments to radical alternative 
futures can often come at a price, including a seductive delusion in 
how we read and diagnose the  status quo and possibilities for trans-
formation. There can be a tendency to close down ambivalence, 
Weigman believes, in order to tell a particular version of a story – 
one in which we know best. 
 Building collaborations 
 Researcher-activists working across a range of social-justice platforms 
spend a huge amount of time thinking, talking and theorising about 
– and researching – how to make meaningful interventions. Research-
ers do not hold all the interpretative cards, but they may add some-
thing in terms of intellectual resources, skills and methodologies. In 
our case, our research funding was also able to support and recog-
nise the research work of our partner organisations. 
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 One of the most fundamental partnerships in our project was how 
we worked with each other. Noting the largely individualised accounts 
of activist researchers ( Autonomous Geographies Collective,  2010 ), 
we believe that the very fact we came together as a group is impor-
tant. As a large research team, we corresponded regularly in group 
email exchanges and scheduled intensive meetings over the course 
of the research to plan and to discuss troubles, successes and new 
ideas. We were able to write together, as well as to contribute and 
comment on each other ’ s blog posts, draft papers and conference 
presentations. When our ways of working were sometimes ques-
tioned within some university regimes, we were able to defend and 
support ourselves by making reference to our commitments to the 
wider research team. 
 Our team comprised some people whose experience of activism 
was street-level and community-facing, while others were more aca-
demically based. Some team members already worked within the 
frameworks of the live ( Back and Puwar,  2013 ), inventive ( Lury and 
Wakeford,  2012 ) and real-time ( Gunaratnam and Back,  2015 ) style 
of sociological research that underpinned the study; others were 
new to such approaches. The team included academics at all stages 
of their academic careers. As a group, we provided a critical mass of 
expertise that was important to the funding body and at the same 
time provided a support structure that allowed us to work together 
collectively, while operating individually with a variety of frames of 
reference, environmental contexts and employment statuses. Our 
sociological standpoints differed, yet we managed to collaborate and 
thrive as a large research group with a shared commitment to critical 
social research. Common leanings towards activist and anti-racist 
feminist research informed our approach and ethos and oiled the 
conversations, decisions and steps taken throughout the research 
process. 
 Collaboration also underpinned our work with our community 
research partners, many of whom we had worked with before there 
was any prospect of securing research funding. They helped to shape 
the questions we might ask and how we might ask them. It was 
important to us, and to the success (and ethics) of the project, that 
the work done by community groups to develop and support our 
research was properly remunerated – both because of their precari-
ous funding and to formally value the time and expertise they pro-
vided. Our existing connections and working relationships allowed 
us to develop these connections relatively quickly, to exchange vital 
information about the project, and to engage locally. 
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 Collaborating across sectors – in this case, between community-
based organisations and large universities – is not without its chal-
lenges ( Saltus,  2006 ). It is evident that such work requires constant 
negotiation and sensitivity to the different demands made upon 
partners, to different standpoints and sometimes to different 
agendas. In our working relationships, we were very much aware of 
the challenges faced by our community partners. These included 
precarious funding, staffi ng and time constraints and the need to 
prioritise face-to-face immigration work (e.g. dealing with destitu-
tion and deportation) and campaigning. Although a partnership 
template devised by the team was drafted, the programmes of work 
in our local case studies varied depending on the circumstances 
facing partners in each of the six areas and on the individuals who 
carried out the research. In some cases, we worked with more than 
one local organisation to ensure we captured a range of views and 
experiences. The degree of involvement differed, with some com-
munity research partners playing a signifi cant role in key stages of 
the data-collection process (for example, facilitating focus-group 
discussions, and maintaining clear and steady lines of communica-
tion and engagement), with the commitments of other partners 
resulting in less involvement. 
 Our partners’ approach to the research funding and their experi-
ence of this type of collaboration also varied. One organisation 
insisted that it could do more with the money allocated to organising 
two focus groups, while others took great care in facilitating access 
to local immigration activists and in planning for the interviews. We 
also had experience of the research being done more haphazardly 
or ‘on the trot’, because of staff shortages and the huge workload 
of a research partner. We felt unable to comment directly, knowing 
all the time that the organisation ’ s services were in a precarious 
position and the research funding was vital. In effect, the empirical 
research bore the brunt of the challenges, uncertainty and instability 
faced by some of our partners. 
 On commissioning critical survey research: 
the questions we ask 
 The fi ndings from the small-scale street survey conducted days after 
the launch of Operation Vaken and the Go Home vans suggested 
that attitudes to migration might not be so simply divided into ‘for’ 
or ‘against’, but were more complicated (with answers often having 
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a ‘Yes, but …’ element). We wanted to produce survey data that 
could refl ect some of the complexity and ambivalence of public 
opinion on migration and its control. Linked to this, our qualitative 
research had revealed the understanding that ‘being seen’ to be 
tough on immigration is about performance – captured in actions, 
gestures, costumes (uniforms), props (enforcement vehicles) and 
displays (for instance the documenting and publicising of immigra-
tion raids) (see Chapter  2 ). All performances use triggers that work 
to elicit an emotional response, and so we wanted our survey to test 
the kinds of responses such performances might elicit. Our focus 
was to identify public attitudes to immigration control when faced 
with the realities of the techniques used as part of that control. 
 A common practice in UK academic research aiming for large-
scale polling data is to commission this work from external compa-
nies that have the infrastructure to produce such data quickly. This 
is a practice we followed, engaging a large market-research company 
to undertake this element of the project. In negotiating the design 
of our survey questions – which were going to be inserted into the 
company ’ s longer weekly ‘omnibus’ survey – the challenges of 
working across different epistemological approaches and across 
research cultures with very different priorities (academic versus 
commercial) became apparent. Many of the questions we originally 
developed, and the ways we wanted to ask them, appeared ‘risky’ 
and ‘emotive’ to the polling company. 
 Negotiations over the wording (which had been carefully dis-
cussed and crafted by the team and was rooted in the original survey 
work done during the Go Home campaign) often focused on refram-
ing the language to be objective and neutral. This process derived 
from a need to arrive at a set of ‘unbiased’ questions, placed within 
the context of established wisdom and expertise in market research 
(see Living Research Four for a critique of this approach). For us, 
an underlying tension concerned differences in how we understood 
the limits and the basis of polling research. A problem for us was 
the largely unchallenged perception that the offi cial framing of 
immigration questions routinely used in such surveys is not emotive 
(a separate but related matter being whether any survey questions 
can be without emotion). Another tension was the careful develop-
ment of the draft survey questions and the collaborative, iterative 
effort underpinning them, which remained important as a methodo-
logical and analytic framework. 
 One question where there seemed to be a particular mismatch 
between our epistemology and that of the market-research company 
was our attempt to get a sense of public opinion on racial profi ling 
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in immigration checks. The question of whether such profi ling had 
been carried out was raised by Baroness Doreen Lawrence (see 
Chapter  1 ) and we wanted to fi nd evidence of whether the general 
population thought such practices were acceptable. During the 
process of negotiating the commissioned research, this question 
went through several iterations. Our original version was as follows:
 Eyewitnesses have suggested that white people are less likely to be 
questioned during immigration raids and checks. Do you think it 
is acceptable to target people for immigration checks on the basis 
of their appearance? [You can choose more than one option]
 a  Yes, it saves time and resources 
 b  Yes, if you have done nothing wrong you have nothing to fear 
 c  No, it can lead to persecution of British people 
 d  No, it is racist 
 e  Something else [record open-ended answer] 
 (Original question in commissioning request 
by Mapping Immigration Controversy (MIC) team 
to Ipsos MORI, July 2014) 
 This question became something quite different in one draft we 
were sent:
 ASK ALL 
 WU07. In your opinion do you think the Home Offi ce Immigra-
tion Enforcement team target particular types of people during 
immigration raids, or not? 
 (DP: SINGLE CODE, RAN) 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don ’ t know 
 IF WU07  = CODES 1, THEN ASK WU08 
 WU08. You said you thought the Home Offi ce Immigration 
Enforcement team target particular types of people during immi-
gration raids. What type of people do you think they target and 
why? 
 Please type in as many reasons as apply 
 (DP: ALLOW DK) 
 (OPEN ENDED) 
 (Revised question in email from Ipsos MORI to Hannah, 
13 August 2014) 
 On receiving this draft, Hannah asked for ‘a discussion of why this 
has been changed so radically, especially since I have explained our 
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objective with this question was to ask whether people thought 
racial profi ling in immigration checks was acceptable/appropriate, 
not to ask the general population to guess at whether or not this 
goes on’ (Hannah ’ s email to MIC team, 13 August 2014). In the 
end, a question closer to what we wished to ask was restored to the 
corpus:
 ASK ALL 
 WU07. Some people have suggested that white people are less 
likely to be questioned during checks or raids on suspected 
irregular/illegal immigrants. How acceptable or unacceptable, do 
you think it would be if immigration offi cers carried out checks 
on the basis of someone ’ s skin colour? 
 (DP: SINGLE CODE, FORWARD AND REVERSE LIST)
 1  Very acceptable 
 2  Fairly acceptable 
 3  No opinion either way 
 4  Fairly unacceptable 
 5  Very unacceptable 
 6  Don ’ t know 
 IF WU07  = CODES 1–5, THEN ASK WU08A 
 WU08A. Why do you say that? 
 (DP: ALLOW DK) 
 (OPEN ENDED) 
 (Question used on Ipsos MORI Capibus survey for MIC 
project, between 15 August and 9 September 2014) 
 For us, the prompts (drawn from our preliminary street-survey work 
and qualitative data) were key in shifting the register in which immi-
gration is so often framed in national polls. They did this in ways 
that allowed an exploration of concerns about the racist and violent 
impacts of everyday immigration control. This is an extremely chal-
lenging ambition when dealing not only with quite different starting 
points about ‘neutrality’ and the production of knowledge, but also 
with the commercial and political imperatives of potential survey 
partners. 
 Additionally, in the context of commissioning commercial survey 
companies to conduct research as an element of a larger academic 
study, matters of ownership and dissemination become important. 
Most companies place a high premium on their rights to, and owner-
ship of, the data collected – and, moreover, wish to control how the 
fi ndings are disseminated. Although to some extent understandable 
in terms of wanting to ensure the integrity and reputation of their 
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business – and to be able to build on the fi ndings of previous polls 
in similar areas – the contractual terms and conditions in place risk 
subsuming the intellectual labour of the commissioning body, in this 
case the research team. Of equal importance, such contractual 
framings can work to sever the ties that may connect the survey 
activity with linked work programmes that stand outside the 
commissioned work. In our case, these were the qualitative elements 
of the project from which many of the survey questions emerged, 
and our ability to publish from that integrated work without 
interference. 
 Collaborative knowledge-sharing and representation 
 Towards the end of the project, we organised a national conference 
and a series of smaller, targeted events to share emerging analysis 
and what we had learnt. The aim was to create platforms in which 
to showcase the fi ndings from the study and to offer collaborative 
spaces for the range of stakeholders to come together to explore 
immigration debates, campaigns and performative politics (see 
Chapter  2 ). As  Ravensbergen and VanderPlaat  ( 2010 ) have argued, 
although text remains a dominant part of the production, analysis 
and dissemination of research fi ndings, this can involve exclusions, 
not least in matters of representation. For the end-of-project event, 
we set ourselves a task of fi nding ways to include people most affected 
by the anti-immigration campaigns. The conference placed ‘beyond-
text’ methods ( Spencer,  2011 ;  Beebeejaum et al.,  2014 ) – such as 
fi lm- and performance-based provocations – alongside text-laden 
presentations, and it privileged participant dialogue over ‘talking 
heads’. For us, the conference was as much about creating spaces 
for engagement and creative exploration as it was about problema-
tising established forms of dissemination that can silence voices and 
knowledge outside the confi nes of academia. 
 A group of storytellers from the Hope Projects was one of the 
performance-based provocations at the conference. Founded in 
2003 in the Midlands, the Hope Projects is a user-led organisation 
that works to empower destitute asylum-seekers and others barred 
from public funds. The organisation runs a number of activities, 
including a group for storytelling. The group performs around the 
UK, drawing on its own stories of forced exile, arrival and settlement 
journeys, as well as composite stories taken from the many other 
people they have met or have been told about who share a similar 
experience of forced migration. At the conference, the group gave 
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a performance, with each member telling a story; they then all 
shared their views and refl ections in a short question-and-answer 
session. 1 
 Hannah asked the fi rst question, enquiring how the group felt 
about performing their stories to an audience. The question, which 
pointed to something that had troubled us for a while, raises a 
number of issues in terms of critical research and its focus on col-
laboration, intervention and transformation. Of importance are the 
politics of storytelling – not least, storytelling by those whose per-
sonal narratives have been shaped by the move from what is under-
stood as a personal trauma to an asylum application set within the 
context of political aggression and legal discourse (Shuman and 
Bohmer, 2004, cited in  Pulitano,  2013 : 117). In subsequent retellings 
(in everyday life), migrants must often respond to questions about 
their arrival and settlement. 
 However, the members of the Hope Projects responded to Han-
nah ’ s question by explaining that for them the act of storytelling in 
this context was cathartic. Giving expression to painful stories can 
be an important part of a healing process, as the fi rst performer 
stated when she stood to talk:
 We are not actors; we are just a group of women from the Hope 
Projects. We will try and tell you our story … I don ’ t like to talk 
about my story because always when I start, I cry. But I will try 
today. 
 (Member of the Hope Projects, MIC End-of-Project 
Conference, June 2015) 
 Other performers said that narrating their own – and other people ’ s 
– experiences was one way to ensure that they themselves became 
and remained visible; that their stories were told and heard. From 
the performance, we gained insights into how some people taking 
this particular journey have sought to understand and give meaning 
to their lives and their shifting social worlds. The group suggested 
that our conference and spaces like it provided a space to share what 
they wanted to share, and to tell their stories the way they wanted 
to tell them. 
 1  You can watch the whole performance, and listen to the questions and 
answers here:  www.youtube.com/watch?v = RRqUAF5G1mY [last accessed 
1 July 2016]. 
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 The research feedback sessions we held in each of the local 
research sites went some way to circulating stories that had been 
shared with us by research participants. Each session provided an 
opportunity for the researchers and community partners to com-
municate both local and overall emerging fi ndings, so participants 
could hear our analysis of their own situations both separately and 
within the context of the wider project. Questions were asked, com-
ments raised and further points made, and we used these interac-
tions to inform our ongoing thinking and analysis. In some cases, 
participants added further context. In others, they seemed satisfi ed 
to have heard the outcomes of the research in which they had par-
ticipated. These were some of the ways we sought to mediate the 
sharing of stories and experiences within the formal research-
gathering context. Those who attended the end-of-project events 
were there to hear about the fi ndings, and were given an opportu-
nity to refl ect on their views, experiences and knowledge, and to 
share these with others. 
 Of equal importance to us was fi nding ways to extend the research 
fi ndings to different audiences. One way we did this was through a 
short fi lm about the research, commissioned and produced for us 
in the last six months of the project by the feminist fi lm-maker 
Samantha Asumadu. 2 Since it became available, the fi lm has been 
used in university teaching and by activist groups, as well as circulat-
ing online. It can be considered an example of an output that has 
travelled beyond academic circles (see also Chapter  1 ). 
 We also disseminated fi ndings through policy briefi ngs in West-
minster and Glasgow, to showcase the study ’ s fi ndings to government 
and policy-makers in particular, and to the wider immigration and 
asylum-rights communities in general. The London event, a break-
fast policy briefi ng, comprised short presentations by the research 
team; refl ections from Pragna Patel of Southall Black Sisters (one 
of the community research partners); questions and comments from 
the audience; and a showing of our fi lm. In a space not necessarily 
conducive to dialogic creativity, the use of fi lm to convey different 
facets of the experience of immigration control worked well. In all 
three contexts – the end-of-conference event, the focus groups and 
feedback sessions, and the policy briefi ngs – we tested methods of 
creating new types of dialogic space, but not always without con-
straints or compromises. 
 2  You can view the fi lm here:  www.mappingimmigrationcontroversy.com/
fi lm . 
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 As we have shown, there are two factors that are crucial to us in 
our research: close engagement and sustained collaboration with 
those outside of the university; and an ongoing attempt to forge 
more equitable methods of knowledge production. In reality, not all 
of our collaborations were productive. There were also many times 
when we did not know how things would turn out. Sometimes we 
were pressured – perhaps even co-opted – into uneasy and pragmatic 
choices. And there were many things we wish we could have done 
differently. This is indeed the ambivalence that comes with trying to 
build alternative futures and knowledge. 
 How would you describe collaboration? Why is collaboration 
important in social-justice research? How can it ‘go wrong’? 
 What role do you think ‘beyond-text’ methods (e.g., perfor-
mances and visual art) can play in understanding social injus-
tice and/or in communicating social science? 
 What are the challenges and opportunities of critical survey 
design? What steps could be taken to address some of the chal-
lenges outlined above? What would you do differently? 
 Whose ‘voice’ is heard in the dissemination of research fi nd-
ings? What must be considered when producing multi-voiced 
research? What are some of the power dynamics at play? 
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 Afterword 
 I am a migrant. After 15 years in Britain, I am now also a citizen but 
I insist on claiming the migrant label as a form of protest and a badge 
of pride. The ever intensifying anti-immigrant rhetoric and the expan-
sion of border control into all areas of life, as part of the current 
government ’ s hostile environment campaign, makes migrants like me 
feel that their citizenship is always conditional and their sense of 
belonging is fragile. 
 Getting indefi nite leave to remain status meant that I was free from 
immigration control and gave me a sense of freedom. I felt free to 
protest against the injustices of the immigration system. I am ashamed 
that I waited until I felt ‘safe’; many others in far more insecure situ-
ations speak out at great risk to themselves. But, like many others, I 
had kept my head down for years, anxiously monitoring Home Offi ce 
pronouncements on immigration, trying to fi gure out how to stay 
ahead of a tightening net, navigating the uncertainty of fi nding out 
that you no longer qualify for the immigration category you ’ re in. It 
felt like a fi nish line of sorts. Finally, I was home. 
 When I took up citizenship in 2013, the Go Home vans were 
already on London streets, ostensibly to encourage those who might 
be in the country illegally to return home. In reality, it felt like they 
were talking to all migrants, but especially ethnic minorities – regard-
less of immigration status – who had long heard the phrase ‘Go 
Home’ from the far right. For this message to be espoused so openly 
by the government of the day marked a turning point in how I viewed 
Britain and my citizenship. The message I heard was that while I held 
two homes in my heart, as far as this country was concerned, my right 
to claim this one would always be conditional. 
 During my citizenship ceremony I stood with people of all ages 
and experiences, each with their own stories of how they got here. 
For the fi rst time I was told that my contribution to Britain mattered, 
that the vision for the country was for ‘the common good’. My letter 
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from the Home Secretary, who would go on to defend Operation 
Vaken and the Go Home vans in the face of criticism, told me for the 
fi rst time that I was welcome, not far from one of the areas that the 
infamous van had been on tour. 
 The atmosphere in Britain at the moment does indeed feel hostile 
to migrants but its chill wind touches us all. Recent years have seen 
multiple Immigration Acts; no sooner had the 2015 Immigration Act 
passed than the Immigration Bill 2016 was being prepared. Yet 
despite the fl urry of ever more restrictive legislation, public confi -
dence in the immigration system does not improve and public anxi-
eties about the level of immigration are not assuaged. Immigration 
critics like to say that we don ’ t really talk about immigration but we 
talk of little else; the issue also underpins other debates – such as the 
EU referendum. Unease about immigration is expressed by politi-
cians on behalf of ‘the public’. In reality they are only listening and 
talking to one sector of the population. And instead of engaging with 
tangible concerns about services such as housing or living with dif-
ference and change, all too often they trade on fear with cheap gim-
micks and soundbites, ‘gesture politics’ that give the impression of 
being tough on immigration. 
 However, it goes beyond crass stunts like the Go Home vans or 
staged immigration raids with the Prime Minister in tow. There are 
policies that undermine the rights of migrants and citizens alike. As 
the authors of this book show, the hostile environment campaign also 
entails the outsourcing of border control to private citizens such as 
landlords, doctors, teachers, lecturers – even the police, who under 
the newer Operation Nexus are forced to take a more active role in 
immigration enforcement, potentially jeopardising relationships with 
vulnerable groups and deterring those with insecure immigration 
status from seeking help. The media play their part in this ‘performa-
tive politics’ of immigration, sometimes reproducing, sometimes 
countering invasion imaginaries or the narrative that the UK is a soft 
touch when it comes to exploitation by certain migrants or ‘bogus’ 
asylum seekers. Media narratives reduce migrants to stereotypes – 
most often villains or victims, reinforcing the narrative of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ migrants and denying the complexity of life, which continually 
overspills neat immigration categories. 
 What does this do to us? Despite the rush for headlines, policies 
and publicity stunts, there is scant refl ection on what this performative 
politics means for communities, for migrants and British citizens 
alike. This body of research is a timely and vital exploration of the 
changing face of immigration control, government communication 
campaigns and their effects. 
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 Migration is not just about a journey; it is also the story of settle-
ment – be it for a little while or a lifetime. Infrequent tabloid stories 
about the children of foreign-born parents sometimes label them as 
migrants despite the fact that most, along with their parents, will be 
British citizens. When do we get to belong? Who gets to decide? Is it 
dependent on the right paperwork? These are some of the questions 
that underlie the research discussed in this book. 
 In this context, for people like me reclaiming the undesirable label 
of migrant is an act of resistance. It shouldn ’ t have to be. But this is 
one of many effects of the contemporary immigration debate and 
policy; the many strands of which are unpicked in this research. The 
lives and rights of migrants and citizens are more entwined than ever; 
where migrant rights are eroded, so are those of the most vulnerable 
British-born. Resistance requires solidarity, breaking out of the arti-
fi cial categories that immigration legislation puts us in. After all, 
Britain ’ s story is one of migration. The gesture politics mobilised for 
the purposes of immigration control, not only mystify the past, they 
are a failure of imagination and courage. 
 Kiri Kankhwende is a freelance journalist and commentator on immigra-
tion and politics and a member of Media Diversifi ed. 
 Appendix: Further details 
on research methods 
 What we aimed to do 
 Our research began in 2013, with the following aims:
 •  to document high-profi le Home Offi ce campaigns against irregular 
immigration, in six local areas of the UK and at a national level 
 •  to identify how government communications on migration interact 
with public debate and activism 
 •  to produce analysis that informs debates, community action and 
policy, and that is useful to community organisations 
 •  to develop new research methodologies that link digital, face-to-
face and ‘traditional’ communications and policy channels 
 •  to evaluate the effectiveness of the research and dissemination 
methodologies used in the project, and the project ’ s impact. 
 Our research questions 
 We wanted to investigate these main questions: 
 What are the impacts of the Home Offi ce high-profi le publicity campaigns 
about migration?  How are the messages of these government cam-
paigns understood by residents in targeted areas? What forms of 
activism and community organising are being developed in response 
to these campaigns? 
 What are the relationships between public attitudes to ‘illegal’ migration, 
migration policy, racism and good community relations, particularly in a 
context of austerity?  Who is aware of the government campaigns and 
activist responses to them? What are the class, ethnicity and gender 
dimensions of public debates at a UK level on migration? Do these 
differ at a local level? What is the role of social research in this? 
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 What we did 
 Our qualitative research was based in six places: Barking and Dagen-
ham; Bradford; Cardiff; Glasgow; Ealing and Hounslow; West Mid-
lands (Birmingham and Coventry). Some of these (Barking and 
Dagenham, Ealing and Hounslow) were targeted by the Go Home 
vans. Others (Glasgow, Ealing and Hounslow) included reporting 
centres for migrants where similar advertising was used. All of the 
areas had experienced high-profi le immigration raids; immigration 
had been covered in local news items with reporters accompanying 
border agents; signs about the limitation of migrant rights were dis-
played in public places (such as hospitals); and/or the areas had been 
involved in national debates about race and migration. 
 Across these areas, we conducted 13 focus groups with 67 people 
(including new migrants, long-settled migrants, ethnic minority and 
white British citizens), to understand the local effects of government 
campaigns on immigration. We also interviewed 24 local activists 
about the effects of Operation Vaken and other immigration enforce-
ment initiatives on their work, and we spent time documenting local 
events and protests. 
 Nationally, we interviewed policy-makers about the intentions and 
thinking behind such campaigns (one MP, fi ve civil servants located 
in Treasury, Business Innovation and Skills, Home Offi ce and three 
people from Westminster think tanks) and attended two Westminster 
roundtables discussing immigration, organised by think tanks and 
lobby groups. 
 We also commissioned a survey from Ipsos MORI to investigate 
awareness and reactions to the government campaigns. Questions 
were placed on the Ipsos MORI Omnibus (Capibus) amongst a 
nationally representative quota sample of 2,424 adults (aged 15 and 
over). Within this, a total of 580 black and minority ethnic individuals 
were interviewed. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in peoples’ 
homes between 15 August and 9 September 2014, using Computer 
Assisted Personal Interviewing software. All data are weighted to the 
known national profi le of adults aged 15 + in Great Britain. 
 As the project got under way, we participated in and documented 
online debates about key elements of the campaigns and reactions to 
them. We took our interim fi ndings back to the communities and 
organisations with whom we had done the initial research, and 
included their responses in the fi ndings. 
 From the outset of the project we worked with community organi-
sations as partners. This helped to guide the direction of the research, 
ensuring that it had some value and relevance beyond academia, and 
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that it also included invaluable practical research support. Through 
the project we hoped to unsettle or at least bring into question the 
division between ‘activism’ and ‘academia’. We tried to think carefully 
about the sort of contributions academic researchers can make to the 
groups and individuals we work with – because of the time, resources 
and specialist skills to which we have access – and to recognise that 
research partners and participants may have similar skills but are in 
different situations during the project, because of their personal cir-
cumstances, political commitments, institutional priorities, or pres-
sures of time, workload and resources. In being able to attach funds 
to the work done by the community partners, we could recognise and 
value their expertise and time commitment to the project. 
 Such partnership working took place in a context where there are 
immense pressures on the voluntary sector. We were very conscious 
of adding to the workload of these groups. Therefore being clear 
about roles within the project and managing expectations on both 
sides was crucial. In addition, for groups working on asylum issues 
with specifi c goals there was sometimes a mismatch between our 
interests (anti-immigration campaigns) and the very specifi c and 
urgent issues groups were dealing with (such as destitution and 
deportation). This is an ongoing question, which needs to be continu-
ously negotiated in research projects like ours. 
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